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Abstract
This thesis is a study on change and stability in 
Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. Kjell 
Goldmann's theory on change and stability in foreign
policy is applied to Turkish foreign policy towards the
Middle East. It is argued that since the mid-1960s,
Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East has been 
stabilized; there have been no changes in the policy
except for adjustment changes. In this study, the 
stability in Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle 
East is explained with the help of thirteen foreign policy 
stabilizers presented within the framework of Kjell 
Goldmann's theory.
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Özet
Bu tez, Türkiye'nin Orta Doğu'ya yönelik dış 
politikasında değişim ve durağanlık üzerine yapılmış bir 
çalışmadır. Kjell Goldmann'm dış politikada değişim ve 
durağanlık teorisi, Türkiye'nin Orta Doğu'ya yönelik dış 
politikasına uygulanmıştır. Bu tezin temel savı 
1960'ların ortalarından beri Türkiye'nin Orta Doğu'ya 
yönelik dış politikasının sabitlendiği; birkaç ayarlama 
dışında üzerinde hiçbir değişiklik yapılmadığıdır. Bu 
çalışmada Türkiye'nin Orta Doğu'ya yönelik dış 
politikasındaki durağanlık, Kjell Goldmann'm teorisinde 
sunduğu onüç dış politika sabitleyicisinin yardımı ile 
açıklanmıştır.
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Chapter I: Introduction
1.1 The Need for an Analysis of Change and Stability in 
Turkish Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East
The entire world was affected when the Cold War began. 
It was one of those profound changes which every single actor 
felt itself forced to react one way or another. The end of 
the Cold War also brought about a major change in the 
international system though not of the same caliber. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the rules of the game were 
reversed, the way the game ended, i.e., the disintegration of 
first, the Soviet Bloc, and then the Soviet Union itself, 
despite all the shock it caused, was not that unexpected. On 
the contrary, many regarded its end to be near while many 
others considered this to be wishful thinking.
Leaving aside the degree to which the end of the Cold 
War was expected, one has to concentrate on the impact it made 
on international relations. The end of the Cold War, though 
it came gradually, produced, in the end, a snowball effect on 
people's conception of international phenomena in that a world 
not divided by an iron curtain seemed to present new 
opportunities as well as challenges.
Given such profound a change in the international arena, 
states were expected to adopt to changing circumstances as 
required by the definition of change in foreign policy, which 
implies that change is a response of the government to its 
perception, of some change in its external environment. In 
this sense, the response one government gives to foreign 
stimuli, i.e., change in the external environment, is a matter 
of perception. That is why most foreign stimuli are missed, 
misinterpreted, ignored, or treated routinely by governments. 
It is assumed that it is only when foreign stimuli are 
repeatedly reinforced by other events that it becomes 
"inescapable" for governments to respond to them.
Although change in the environment, in this case, the 
end of the Cold War, is not the only stimulus that initiates 
change in foreign policy, and despite the fact that external 
stimuli may not always bring about foreign policy change, it 
is still regarded to be the major source of change in foreign 
policy analysis. This largely results from a deterministic 
understanding of international interaction which gives little 
power to actors, but tends to explain state action as 
responses to international stimuli, in contrast to the 
voluntarist understanding which concentrates on states' own 
initiatives as the major source of change. The "truth," if it 
exists, is somewhere in between. Accordingly, foreign policy 
change is the response of the actor, i.e., the government, to
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the external environment which it perceives to have changed. 
Three alternative combinations may emerge in line with this 
thinking: either the environment may change, but the actor may 
not perceive it to have changed; or the environment may stay 
the same, but the actor may perceive it to have changed; or 
the environment may change and the actor may perceive this 
change. In any case, it still depends on the actor whether to 
respond or not, regardless of whether it perceives a change in 
the environment or not.
However, it is still assumed, seemingly in contrast to 
the previous argument, that the end of the Cold War was very 
profound a development, which would, in one way or another, 
cause some change in the foreign policies of states. Indeed, 
the end of the Cold War was one of those foreign stimuli that 
caused the unfolding of events and made it nearly impossible 
for governments to ignore the change. Accordingly, by 1989, 
foreign policy change was on the agenda of many states. 
However, the extent to which change in policy was to take 
place remained vague for most states. Some confined to minor 
adjustments while others went as far as changing their 
orientation.
Turkey was among those states that were rather hesitant 
to adapt their policies in the face of profound change in the 
external environment. The Turks preferred to wait until late 
1989 when there came such a moment with the coming down of the
3
Berlin Wall it became clear that the developments were 
irreversible. Even after 1989, Turkey refrained from making 
any changes in its foreign policy although the Soviet Union, 
whose posed threat has been one of the major determinants of 
Turkish foreign policy, has completely changed its policies. 
One explanation that can be put forward is that by then, 
Turkey shared with the United States a strong interest in the 
preservation of existing structures and relationships. One 
author describes this as Turkey's "secret hope" that, despite 
everything, Turkey wished to see nato preserved.1 Thus the 
Turks refrained from taking the initiative for a foreign 
policy change, and preferred to wait. This attitude might 
also have stemmed from Turkey's being a "small power, which by 
definition implies that she is in the position of responding 
to what happens in the external environment rather than 
shaping that environment."2 The Turks, to go one step 
further, are even hesitant to respond to what happens in the 
external environment if it seems to require any change in the 
traditional policy, a salient issue in Turkish domestic 
politics. In fact, Turkish foreign policy has been 
characterized by its consistency and continuity, in comparison 
to other young states. This is partly because nearly every 
foreign policy action that the governments undertook since the 
mid-1960s have been considered within the broad framework of 
the so-called "traditional Turkish foreign policy" regardless
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of changes in the external environment/ as experienced in the 
recent crisis in the Persian Gulf (1990-91). When there has 
been any change it has been "slow, deliberate, carefully 
elaborated, and gradually developed by succeeding 
governments. "3
It is this nature of Turkish foreign policy that leads 
the analysts of Turkish foreign policy to conclude that forces 
of continuity/stability prevailed over the forces of change. 
The small number of analyses that make up the literature on 
Turkish foreign policy have usually concentrated on the 
continuity of Turkish foreign policy. This not only stemmed 
from the fact that the policy itself has been very consistent 
and proved to be a continuation of the past policies, but also 
from the negative meaning attached to the word "change," which 
has usually been identified with the foreign policy of the 
Menderes era. In this sense, the words "change" and 
"deviation" have usually been attributed similar meanings in 
that change is not perceived to be something good, while 
continuity is praised.
However, the tern "continuity" can also easily be 
equated with the term "stability," which has a rather negative 
connotation, especially in the eyes of those who vie for 
"dynamism" in foreign policy. It is argued here that both 
continuity and change are neither good nor bad in themselves. 
The meaning one attributes to these terms usually depends on
5
whether s/he is for or against change in foreign policy. To 
give an example, continuity in Turkish foreign policy towards 
the Middle East, which is the main concern of this study, has 
endowed Turkish policy with a degree of predictability and 
also consistency, both of which are praised. The very same 
continuity in policy, however, caused drawbacks for Turkey 
when changes took place in the external environment to which 
Turkey failed to react swiftly, or adopt to changing 
circumstances.
A similar argument may be put forward on those very few 
analyses on Turkish foreign policy that they presented a 
continuity in arguing for the continuity in Turkish foreign 
policy. The reason why such analyses usually concentrated on 
continuity rather than change is probably that the word 
"change" has been given a negative connotation, i.e., 
deviation from Kemalist foreign policy principles. However, 
when it became clear by 1989 that lack of change can be as bad 
as change itself, the need for a better analysis of the forces 
of continuity in Turkish foreign policy made itself felt. The 
Gulf Crisis erupted at a time when Turkey was beginning to 
reconsider its policies and has decided to reassert itself as 
an important factor for European security. Although Turkish 
foreign policy towards the Gulf Crisis was intended, by 
President Ozal, to be a "deviation from the stagnant policies 
of the past" through the "pro-active" stance he took during
6
the crisis, the result did not disturb the pattern of 
continuity in Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East.
What should be remembered is that the argument, here, is 
not that Turkey should have adopted a more active policy 
during the crisis, and that it should have enforced its 
strategic importance to the West and the Middle East alike. 
On the contrary, it is argued that there seems to be a limit 
in rapprochement with the Middle Eastern states, as Turkey's 
past experience of relations with the region also proves.4 
However, the stable nature of Turkish foreign policy towards 
the Middle East still strikes the analyst because although 
there has been a profound change in the external environment 
in which the policy is shaped, the policy remains stable, 
contrary to expectations and also statements by some. This is 
what inspired this analysis: the urge to learn about the 
factors that sustain the continuity of Turkish foreign policy 
towards the Middle East.
As argued before, change is neither good nor bad in 
itself. So is stability in foreign policy. However, a 
student of foreign policy analysis cannot remain content with 
arguing that Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East 
has always been stable. An analyst has to become able to 
account for change and the lack of change, not only for the 
sake of building theory per se, but in order to become able to 
account for the future, to the degree that is possible. It is
7
in this sense necessary to become able to account for the lack 
of change in Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. 
Towards this end, Kjell Goldmann's theory on change and 
stability in foreign policy will be utilized.3
1.2 Scope and Objective
As indicated above, the objective of this study, i.e., 
an analysis of change and stability in Turkish foreign policy 
towards the Middle East, is to become able to account for the 
lack of change in the policy with the ultimate aim of becoming 
able to account for the future. It is assumed that knowledge 
of stabilizers of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle 
East, i.e., phenomena, the presence of which tend to inhibit 
change in policy, may help the analyst to become able to 
predict, to some degree, what may happen in the future, though 
this is not the ultimate purpose.
Towards this end, Kjell Goldmann's theory of change and 
stability in foreign policy will be utilized. The 
"theoretical sketch" he provides about the stabilizers of 
foreign policy, an inventory he puts forward in this analysis, 
will be applied to the Turkish case, i.e., Turkish foreign 
policy towards the Middle East. The aim of choosing relations 
with the Middle East as a test case in an analysis of 
stability of Turkish foreign policy is twofold: The first one 
is that the recent change in the external environment, i.e.,
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the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the .Soviet
Union were profound changes, when the Soviet Union's 
importance in Turkey's security calculations is considered. 
Not only a major threat to regional security has dissolved, 
but also its advocates like Syria, which came to threaten 
Turkey's security, lost their major ally. Since this fits the 
definition of profound change, one expects to see some change 
in Turkey's foreign policy towards the region. It is, in this 
sense, interesting to analyze the stability of the Turkish 
foreign policy towards the Middle East.
The second reason stems from the peculiarity of the 
experiences of the recent crisis in the Gulf and the aura it 
caused in Turkish domestic politics. The discussion as to 
whether Turkey's policy in the Gulf Crisis constituted a 
deviation from traditional Turkish foreign policy towards the 
Middle East or not drew the analyst's attention to the matter 
that made an analysis of the stabilizers of Turkish foreign 
policy towards the Middle East more than interesting.
Thus, it is extremely interesting and also a 
challenging task to become able to account for the 
stabilizers of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle 
East. However, what is meant by the term, the "Middle 
East" also needs clarification. This need stems both from 
the problematic nature of the term and also from its usage 
within the context of Turkish foreign policy. The
9
problematic nature of the term largely depends on 
different meanings attributed to it. Since September 1902 
when the term was first used, the "Middle East" meant 
different things to different people. Still, it was 
always the outsiders, i.e., the West, who defined the 
Middle East. Roderic Davison sumps up the history of the 
term: "For, as the term 'Middle East' has developed a
history to its present condition, the unifying principle 
has always been the political and strategic interests of 
outside powers."6
In addition to the problem arising from the nature 
of the term "Middle East", its usage within the context of 
Turkish foreign policy is also not problem-free. In the 
literature on Turkish foreign policy, the policy towards 
the Middle East, the policy towards the Arab World, and 
the policy towards the Muslim world are often used
interchangeably. It is this ambiguity inherent in the
term, and also its usage within the Turkish context that 
leads one author to argue that Turkish foreign policy 
towards the Middle East has always been "undetermined".7
Within the bounds of this analysis, the term Middle 
East will be referred to as the sub-system including all 
the countries of the Mashrek (Near East), the Maghreb 
(North Africa), and the Gulf Region. This is because
references to states from all three subregions is made
10
when referring to Turkish foreign policy towards the 
Middle East. Thus, although it is only a small group of 
Middle Eastern states with which Turkey enjoys full 
bilateral relations and lays down specific policies (these 
states include Iran, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and Israel), the 
fact that the term Turkish foreign policy towards the 
Middle East includes, at least theoretically, all three 
subregions, leads the analyst to delimit the boundaries of 
the region accordingly.
However, although all three subregions, the Mashrek, 
the Maghreb, and the Gulf region, are included in the 
analysis on change and stability in Turkish foreign policy 
towards the Middle East, bilateral relations with each 
state will not be considered within the bounds of this 
study. This is not only because the Middle East will be 
treated as a sub-system with a dynamic of its own,8 but 
also because Turkey formulates its policies on a regional 
basis, i.e., Turkish foreign policy has a broad framework 
called the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East 
in accordance with which bilateral relations with each 
regional state are shaped. It is in this sense that the 
Middle East will be treated as a sub-system and the 
Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East will be 
analyzed accordingly.
1 1
To do this, Kjeii Goldmann's inventory called the 
stabilizers of foreign policy and his theoretical sketch on 
foreign policy stabilizers will be utilized. His theoretical 
sketch will be treated as a systematic checklist of various 
phenomena that tend to block, delay, or reduce the scope of 
change. The objective would be to check to what extent these 
phenomena were active in the Turkish case. Although 
contributing to further refinement of the inventory would not 
be the purpose, an empirical application will inevitably make 
a contribution, however modest.
1.3 Outline of the study
Goldmann's theoretical sketch of thirteen types of 
stabilizers will be checked against the Turkish case, in order 
to see which ones and to what extent were active in reducing 
the sensitivity of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle 
East to pressure for change that may come from the external 
environment. Although the bulk of this study covers an 
analysis of the stabilizing inpact of various stabilizers on 
Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, established in 
the mid-1960s, pre-1960 developments will also be considered 
to present an idea as to the forces of continuity and change 
that work in Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. 
The second chapter is an analysis of foreign policy theories 
and theories of foreign policy change in particular.
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Goldmann's theoretical sketch on foreign policy stabilizers 
will also be analyzed, in detail, in this chapter. The third 
chapter, as indicated above, includes a brief historical 
appraisal of the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle 
East. The so called new Turkish foreign policy towards the 
Middle East of the 1960s, which later came to be called the 
traditional policy will be analyzed in depth to prepare the 
groundwork for an analysis of change and continuity in Turkish 
foreign policy towards the Middle East.
Chapters four to seven comprise analyses of policy. 
Chapter four is on international stabilization of Turkish 
foreign policy towards the Middle East. The stabilizing 
impact of normative regulation, dependence, and third party, 
as stabilizers of foreign policy, will be analyzed in this 
chapter. Chapter five analyses the cognitive stabilization of 
the policy through studying the stabilizing impact made by 
consistency, centrality and testability of the policy in 
question. The sixth chapter is on political stabilization of 
Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. The impact of 
institutionalization, support and salience of foreign policy 
stabilization will be considered. In the seventh chapter, 
administrative stabilization of Turkish foreign policy towards 
the Middle East will be analyzed. Four stabilizers, the 
presence or absence of which will be checked against the 
Turkish case are fragmentation, critical variables, response
13
repertory, and decision structure. The conclusion chapter 
will include an analysis of the total stabilizing impact of 
Goldmann' s thirteen stabilizers on the stability of Turkish 
foreign policy towards the Middle East.
14
2.1 Theories on Foreign Policy
There is little agreement, in the field of International
Relations, over the use of terms such as International 
Politics, Foreign Policy, and International Relations.1 Lack 
of consensus on the definition of foreign policy, i.e., the 
dependent variable of International Relations, is a persisting 
problem of the field. Although most studies on international 
relations have been foreign policy studies, lack of consensus 
on key definitions impeded the emergence of an overall 
paradigm which would, if ever could, organize theoretical 
components to further our understanding of the behavior of 
nations.2 Two problems of foreign policy studies, lack of an 
overall paradigm and the lack of agreement on key definitions, 
tend to reinforce each other which leaves the sub-field of 
foreign policy analysis with a plurality of foreign policy 
theories. According to Holsti, this stems from the paradox as 
to "[h]ow one defines these terms is largely influenced by 
what one wants to investigate, and what one investigates is 
largely a function of a particular approach, model or 
theory."3 Since it is not easy to break away from this
paradox, it would be safer to resort to a rough definition of
Chapter II: Theories on Foreign Policy and Applications
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foreign policy that is easier to agree upon. In this sense, 
foreign policy can roughly be defined as the relationship of 
units to the international system, i.e., to other states.4 
Foreign policy analysis, as a sub-field of International 
Relations, is the study of this relationship.
Since many international and domestic factors play upon 
the behaviors of states, foreign policy studies require a 
combination of different perspectives of the family of social 
sciences. Political Science, Economics, Psychology and 
International Politics all provide insight into foreign policy 
studies. It is because foreign policy analysis requires 
inter- and/or multi-disciplinary approaches to state behaviors 
that a plurality of foreign policy theories exist. The lack 
of an overall paradigm to play within and the insufficiency of 
existing theories to account for the relationship of states to 
other states results in criticisms of the field, which tend to 
question the competence and/or relevance of foreign policy 
analysis as a sub-field of International Relations. However, 
foreign policy analysis, despite its deficienciès, serves an 
important purpose in furthering our understanding of 
international relations by the help of its main deficiency, 
the plurality of foreign policy theories. Although still far 
from accounting for state behaviors, foreign policy theories 
provide valuable insights into relations among nations.
16
Two main criticisms directed against foreign policy 
analysis, -that it is no different from Diplomatic History or 
that it is too much Political Science oriented- in this sense, 
may become the main strength of the field. Accordingly, 
foreign policy analysis is not simply Diplomatic History, as 
is usually argued by theorists in search for grand theories to 
explain the entirety of the international system. Neither is 
it simply Political Science, as claimed by diplomatic 
historians and International Relations traditionalists alike, 
that it concentrates on political process at the expense of 
policy outcome.5 Foreign policy analysis is rather the study 
of "transactions [between states], the domestic circumstances 
that produce them, the effect on them of the system and its 
structures and their influence on the system."6
The criticisms directed against foreign policy analysis, 
in a sense, take root from this eclectic nature of the field 
that it combines perspectives, which, otherwise, fall into 
different paradigms of international relations studies. James 
N. Rosenau, one of the forerunners of the field, defines 
foreign policy studies as a "bridging discipline." Margot 
Light, building upon this definition, underlines the 
significance of foreign policy analysis, which, in Rosenau's 
words again, is "a discipline with limitless boundaries" 
regarding the number of independent variables that have to be 
dealt with:7
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As a subject of study, FFA [foreign policy 
analysis] is invaluable both because it is a 
'bridging discipline', connecting together the 
diverse issues that students deal with under 
separate headings in other subjects, and because 
it translates abstract theory into concrete 
problems. Furthermore, by concentrating on the 
interface between the state and the state system,
FPA links the micro level of politics with the 
macro level of the international system.8
Foreign policy analysis, as "a discipline with limitless 
boundaries" is undertaken not only by foreign policy scholars, 
but also by others who study international relations. Among 
these, Steve Smith discerns five main ways of studying foreign 
policy: through a domestic politics perspective; International 
Relations theory; comparative foreign policy theory; case 
studies; and middle-range theory.9 The domestic politics 
perspective treats the state as a self-contained unit and sees 
foreign policy as its external activity. International 
Relations theory, as opposed to this, stresses the systemic 
causes of state behavior. Comparative foreign policy theory 
can be considered as an attempt to find a mid-way between the 
two- an attempt to combine external and internal causes into a 
generally applicable theory of foreign policy. Case studies 
and middle-range theory, in comparison to comparative foreign 
policy theories, are less ambitious approaches. Case studies 
still dominate the field although under attack for not being 
scientific enough. Middle-range theory, on the other hand, is 
an attempt to inject theory into historical analysis.10
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The plurality of foreign policy theories, as mentioned 
before, impede the development of a general theory of foreign 
policy. But, they still contribute immensely to our 
understanding of the international phenomena.
2.2 Theories of Change in Foreign Policy
If and when an analyst attempts to inject the concept of
change into foreign policy analysis, s/he has to face the 
greatest handicap of the lack of a general theory in foreign 
policy analysis which results, according to Rosenau, in the 
non-cumulative character of foreign policy studies.11 This 
prevents the analyst from coping with the extraordinary 
rapidity of change in world affairs. Given this state of the 
field, two traditions of foreign policy analysis coexist: that 
of viewing foreign policy in terms of traditions, as the
pursuit of formerly defined policies, and that of viewing it 
in terms of situations, as variable responses to changing 
conditions. Although this cannot be termed as peaceful
coexistence, given the inherent tension between viewing 
foreign policy in terms of traditions and in terms of
situations, the main tendency in the field of foreign policy 
analysis, surprisingly, has been to do both at the same 
time.12 This stems from the inclination in the field to
undertake vertical analysis, tracing trends down through
history. According to Rosenau, there is "a compelling
19
simplicity" about this type of analysis that foreign policy 
actions of states are seen as the continuation of some 
previous pattern.13 In this sense, foreign policy becomes
embedded in the history of the nation. Accordingly, Rosenau 
argues that:
The residue of the past can thus be seen as 
differentiating the behavior patterns and
attitudinal tendencies of any society from those 
of every other society. Moreover, since the 
norms that sustain a nation's culture are not 
entirely consistent with each other, 
contradictions among the external policy that a 
society may pursue can be easily explained as 
reflecting the diversity inherent in the
society's culture. If, for example, a society 
avoids involvement in one situation abroad* and 
becomes deeply involved in another, a perusal of 
its past would probably yield enough evidence of 
flexible orientations to permit one to posit the 
contradictory behavior as expressive of a 
pragmatic style.14
On the other hand, the analysis of foreign policy in 
terms of situations concentrate on changing demands emanating 
from the international system or from the decision maker's own 
society. However, current stimuli is injected into foreign
policy analysis only in crisis situations that "[o]ther than(
the studies bearing on crisis behavior foreign policy analysts 
have not made environmental variables the focus of theoretical 
inquiry." As a consequence, the literature lacks propositions 
or data concerning interaction and relative strength of the 
demands arising out of past experiences on the one hand and 
out of present circumstances on the other.15
t
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In line with this tendency to combine two opposing
traditions, and also due to the lack of any other
comprehensive theory, foreign policy of a state is usually 
analyzed in terms of its traditions. And when, for some reason 
or another, any change occurs in a state's foreign policy, 
this is explained by referring to the dynamics of 
international politics or the imposing/erratic nature of
leaders. The important point which is usually ignored is the 
inherent inconsistency in the assumptions of these two
traditions. According to Goldmann, "such explanations
undermine the very assumption that foreign policy is 
patterned- unless it can be explained why this particular 
policy was vulnerable to that particular disturbance." 
Goldmann, then, puts forth the question "if both [change and 
stability] were to be expected, how can either be explained, 
and how could either have been predicted? What factors 
determine whether, when, and to what extent pressure for
change in a policy will in fact produce change?"16 This
failure largely results from the tendency in tihe field of 
International Relations to explain events after they take 
place. The problem is not that events are being explained 
after they take place; it is not possible to do otherwise. It 
is that analysts tend to adapt their theories of foreign 
policy making to explain the change in policy which resulted 
in that specific event in the aftermath of the event within
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the environment that has been changed by the unfolding of that 
event without even being aware of it. This is not to claim 
that dynamics of change in foreign policy is totally ignored, 
but that our existing theories are not able to account for 
it.17
The domestic politics perspective, one of the five sub­
fields of foreign policy analysis, deals, among other things, 
with the dynamics of change in foreign policy. However, while 
studies on theories of foreign policy decision-making have yet 
failed to produce a single, definitive policy-making^ model, 
they have contributed to the field by putting forward new 
insights into the way decisions are made.18 As such, foreign 
policy analysts have been unable to understand and explain 
change which adds a new complexity to already complex models 
of foreign policy making.
According to Rosenau, one of the forerunners of 
comparative foreign policy studies, the study of foreign 
policy "cries out for developmental theory," i.e., a theory of 
foreign policy that can account for how major determinants of 
a state's foreign policy behavior interact across time.19 He 
argues that this is because
both area specialists and comparative foreign 
policy analysts tend to reject the very idea of a 
developmental sub-field that is committed to 
specific methods and that aspires to building 
visible and testable theory. Committed to 
accounting for the unique details and cultural 
nuances that differentiate their region or 
country of concern, area specialists do not see
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themselves as engaged in a specific enterprise... 
Comparativists, on the other hand, resist the 
idea of a developmental sub-field because they do 
not regard their endeavor as scientific and fear 
that a focus on development across time will 
confine them, perforce, to a single case and 
accounting for the impact of specific events, 
foci they see as the very antithesis of science 
with its stress on identifying and explaining 
central tendencies among many cases.20
Drawing attention to this gap, Rosenau, back in the 
1970s, had called for constructing developmental theories of 
foreign policy without foregoing the basic committments of 
science. In this sense, the aim of constructing a 
developmental theory of foreign policy would be to "explain" 
and to "anticipate" developments that are likely to occur at 
those moments "when emergent structures clash with persistent 
patterns, when continuities seem increasingly 
counterproductive relative to the possibilities of change, 
when domestic needs and foreign policy changes are in 
conflict."21
Although years have passed since Rosenau called for 
developmental theories of foreign policy making, students of
i
foreign policy analysis have not yet been able to construct a 
developmental theory that would "explain" the past and the 
present and "anticipate" the likely developments of the future 
of a state's foreign policy.22 Nevertheless, there have been 
attempts in recent years to integrate the concept of change in 
foreign policy analysis; an effort that seems to have prompted 
by large-scale historical change: The end of the Cold War,
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which led International Relations specialists to recognize 
their static conception of the international system that, 
until now, prevented them from accommodating processes 
causing/precipitating change.23 Since then, there have been 
attempts to explain the evolution of the international system24 
an example of which is K.J. Holsti's Change in the 
International System.25 In this collection of essays Holsti 
analyzes change in the international system and foreign policy 
making as well as change in the analysis of International 
Relations. According to him, foreign policy analysis has been 
predominantly static and thus, most studies concentrated on 
particular countries' foreign policy decisions at the expense 
of foreign policy change.26 One of these essays "Restructuring 
Foreign Policy: A Neglected Phenomenon in Foreign Policy 
Theory," is a study of change in foreign policy.27 But the 
type of change Holsti is interested in is "dramatic change," 
namely foreign policy restructuring and re-orientation, which 
he finds out to be more relevant for analyzing foreign 
policies of the Third World states, since they are the ones 
who are not content with their foreign policies. Since he 
distinguishes between "normal" foreign policy change and 
foreign policy restructuring, and takes up the latter as his 
understanding of change at the expense of the former, his 
framework appears to be suitable for analyzing foreign policy
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re-orientation, which seems to be the exception, rather than 
"normal" foreign policy change, which emerges to be the rule.
The attempt to incorporate "normal" change in foreign 
policy studies produced two inspiring works by Charles F. 
Hermann and Kjell Goldmann. Hermann, in his study titled 
"Changing course: When governments choose to re-direct foreign 
policy,"z3 suggests a framework to conduct analyses of change 
in foreign policy. Goldmann's study, Change and Stability in 
Foreign Policy29 on the other hand, provides a very complex 
theory of how foreign policy is stabilized. Both authors' 
understanding of change, as opposed to Holsti's, admit 
"normal" foreign policy change in their definition of change 
in foreign policy. Hermann's concept of "major foreign policy 
re-direction" involves any change in foreign policy other than 
adjustments changes, i.e., those changes that occur on the 
level of effort only.30 Goldmann, on the other hand, has a 
wider definition of change. According to him, change in 
policy is assumed to have taken place when "either a new act 
in a given type of situation or a given act in a type of 
situation previously associated with a different act" is 
observed.31
Kjell Goldmann, whose theory of change and stability in 
foreign policy will be utilized within the bounds of this 
study, is interested in the factors that determine whether, 
when, and to what extent pressure for change in a government's
25
In an attempt toforeign policy will in fact produce change.32 
find an answer to this question he puts forward an inventory 
called "stabilizers" of foreign policy defined as the 
phenomena that tend to inhibit change in foreign policy even 
when there is pressure for change. According to him, foreign 
policy theories have to become able to account for change and 
lack of change, called stability, not only for the sake of 
building a theory per se, but in order to become able to 
account for the future. He argues that
[t]he question of change and stability in foreign 
policy is vital for peace and security. In order 
to improve relations between long-standing 
adversaries it is necessary to destabilize their 
mutual policies of enmity. Once this has been 
achieved, the task is to stabilize their emerging 
policies of amity- that is, to make it possible 
for an initially fragile détente to survive the 
stresses and strains that are bound to occur.33
Goldmann's theory of change and stability in foreign 
policy is not a theory per se but, as he defines it, a 
"theoretical sketch", or a weak theory in the sense that "its 
concepts are imprecise, its propositions are weak, and it has 
not been exposed to a systematic empirical test."3'1 Still, his 
theoretical sketch serves the purpose not only because a 
sketch is better than nothing at all, but also because it is a 
necessary intermediary step towards producing theory proper.
The disadvantages of using a weak theory are also valid 
for this study. However, as Goldmann indicates, "those who 
need to consume theory cannot always produce themselves." It
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is even impossible for a "student" of International Relations 
to undertake such a huge task. But, "if a theoretical sketch 
exists, there is no need to choose between being arbitrary and 
beginning from scratch" which are two alternatives open to a 
student in the absence of a proper theory/3
In this study, Goldmann's theoretical sketch will be 
utilized in analyzing change and stability in Turkish foreign 
policy towards the Middle East. His theoretical sketch, in 
the absence of a proper theory will serve as "a tool for 
asking better questions -as a systematic checklist for the 
analysis of specific problems."36
2.3 The "Theoretical Sketch": Change and Stability in 
Foreign Policy
Since the task here is to identify the factors that make 
Turkish foreign policy more or less sensitive to pressure from 
any of the sources of change, stabilizers of Turkish foreign 
policy will be identified. Goldmann defines stabilizers as 
those factors that "determine whether an input into the system 
from one of the sources of change will set a process of change 
in motion." The argument here is that "in the absence of 
stabilizers, policies are highly sensitive to new conditions, 
to negative feedback and to residual factors." Stabilizers 
are assumed to reduce this sensitivity in mainly three ways: 
(l)by blocking policy change unless removed, (2)by reducing 
the scope of policy change, (3)by delaying policy change.37
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This study will be an attempt to answer the question how 
to account for change and stability in Turkish foreign policy 
towards the Middle East. Towards this end, Kjell Goldmann's 
conception of stabilizers will be utilized and his systematic 
checklist of foreign policy stabilizers will be checked 
against the Turkish case. Goldmann classifies stabilizers 
into four categories: administrative, political, cognitive, 
and international.
'Administrative' stabilizers are identified by 
examining the structure and the mode of operation 
of the bureaucracy. 'Political' stabilizers are 
identified by studying the domestic politics of 
foreign policy. 'Cognitive' stabilizers may be 
found in the beliefs on which the policy is 
based. 'International' stabilizers concern the 
state's external relations.38
Under these four categories there are a sum of thirteen 
stabilizers which will be considered below. The main pattern 
will be from most to the least common and obvious; from 
foreign policy stabilization by international agreement to 
foreign policy stabilization by administrative structures.
According to Goldmann's theory, international 
stabilizers are those factors that reduce the sensitivity of 
a foreign policy to change through means external to the 
state. There are mainly three ways for international 
stabilization: Normative regulation, dependence, and third 
party effect. Normative regulation may stabilize a policy 
through creating expectations on the part of other parties 
regarding the agreements/treaties that cannot be violated
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without incurring a cost to the actor. Dependence, mainly 
understood as economic dependence, may be created by the 
pursuit of a policy of the actor towards its subject that the 
actor becomes dependent upon this relationship. It is through 
the creation of such a relationship between the actor and its 
subject that dependence functions as a stabilizer of foreign 
policy. Third party may function as a stabilizer through the 
creation of a stable structure of relations between the actor, 
its subject and a particular third party where the actor's 
relations with the third party determines its relations with 
the subject.39
Cognitive stabilizers, on the other hand, are those 
factors that operate at the individual level. A policy is 
considered to be cognitively stable if the actor's belief in 
the policy is consistent, central and untestable. 
Consistency, centrality, and stability function as stabilizers 
by their impact on the psychological costs of policy change. 
It is assumed that consistency of a policy increases the cost 
of change by increasing the actor's belief in thé system and 
making change less likely. Centrality functions in a similar 
fashion that when a policy is central, thus positively linked 
to other policies, it will be harder to change the policy 
without incurring costs in the form of negative impact on 
other policies. Testability, on the other hand, functions as 
a stabilizer in its absence. When a policy is untestable it
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does not run the risk of being challenged by consequences 
incompatible with the intentions, thus becoming less amenable 
to change.40
The third group of stabilizers are political stabilizers 
which operate at the domestic level through causing a foreign 
policy to be "embedded" in domestic politics which reduces its 
sensitivity to change. There are three dimensions to this 
process: Institutionalization, support, and salience. The 
degree of institutionalization or the extent to which the 
government has become committed to pursue a policy may operate 
as a stabilizer through increasing the political cost of 
deviating from that policy and also through decreasing the 
alternatives to be considered or "the likelihood of 
contingency planning". Support functions as a stabilizer by 
increasing the costs of deviating from a policy. However, the 
inpact of lack of support or opposition to a policy is not 
easy to measure since it depends on the type of Political 
party system and leadership structure. Salience, on the 
other hand, functions through its impact on the degree of 
institutionalization and support of the policy. If an issue 
is regarded to be salient, "it matters more the extent to 
which a policy has become institutionalized as well as whether 
it is consensual or controversial."41
Fourthly, administrative stabilizers are assumed to 
function when administrative tasks of intelligence, planning
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and decision-making are carried out in a way that inhibits 
change.42 There are four types of administrative stabilizers 
that are assumed to function. Two of these, fragmentation and 
decision structure are structural stabilizers, while critical 
variables and response repertory are substantive in the sense 
that they concern the substance of what the apparatus is 
doing. Fragmentation in the administrative structure may 
function as a stabilizer by hindering the discovery of new 
patterns and impeding the organization's ability to adopt and 
to learn. Critical variables are those rules of what to take 
into account and what not when monitoring the environment. 
There are usually rules about tolerable ranges, that is, about 
the changes in the values of the critical variables that would 
justify a reconsideration of the current policies by the 
administration. The fewer the number of critical variables, 
the more stable the policy. And secondly, the larger the 
tolerable ranges, the more stable the policy. The third type 
of administrative stabilizer, response repertory of a country 
is composed of those contingency plans worked^ out by the 
bureaucracy. Its impact on the stability of a policy depends 
on its existence as well as its nature, i.e., whether it is 
moderate or not. Fourthly, decision structure may help 
stabilize a policy depending on its nature. Leader autonomous 
groups are assumed to be more open for changes while decision
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structures requiring bargaining among delegates may be more 
stable.43
As Goldmann also indicates, his theory or "theoretical 
sketch" of foreign policy stabilization is rather complex and 
has its limitations. He lists four main limitations: (l)a
number of conceptual deficiencies; (2)the weakness of its 
causal claims; (3)the limited extent to which these claims 
have a basis in research; (4)its static nature. Nevertheless, 
since conceptual improvement is likely to come primarily from 
attempts at empirical application, the objective of this study 
will be to utilize his "theoretical sketch" while being aware 
of its limitations. Goldmann's theoretical sketch, in this 
sense, will be treated as a systematic checklist of various 
phenomena that tend to block, delay, or reduce the scope of 
change. The purpose would be to check to what extent these 
phenomena were active in the Turkish case. Although 
contributing to further refinement of the inventory would not 
be the purpose, an empirical application will inevitably make 
a contribution, however modest. In this' sense, the 
systematic checklist of these four types of stabilizers will 
be checked against the Turkish case, i.e., Turkish foreign 
policy towards the Middle East, in order to see which ones 
were active in reducing its sensitivity to pressure for 
change. Keeping in mind the limitations of the theory and 
also problems of finding data that are relevant, the attempt, 
here, would be to make generalizations based on data. In
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cases where it is not possible to find relevant data, the 
researcher will rest content with impressions while trying to 
be as scientific as possible.
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Chapter III: Turkish Foreign Policy Towards the Middle 
East
3.1 Basic Concepts
Foreign policy can roughly be defined as the 
relationship of units to the international system -other 
states.1 It has four components ranging in scope from general 
to specific: foreign policy orientation, national role,
foreign policy objective, and action.2 In any analysis of 
foreign policy, it is usually the government actions that are 
taken as the main indicators of a state's foreign policy. 
Outside observers most of the time equate foreign-policy 
making with day-to-day problem solving. According to Paul 
Seabury:
All too often policy is the product of random, 
haphazard, or even irrational forces and events. 
Equally often it is the result of dead-locked 
judgments, an uneasy compromise formula. , Often 
what happens on the surface as a nation's settled 
course of action may be due to indecision, 
unwillingness or inability to act. It may be no 
policy at all but simply a drift with events. 
Sometimes foreign policies are the product of 
statesmen's passive compliance with strong 
domestic political pressure - and thus products 
of contending political forces within the nation 
itself. Finally, policy may be due to
statesmen's abdication of choice and rational 
judgment in the face of ruthless and strong 
external pressures.3
Although every action governments take cannot be
understood to constitute a step towards the achievement of an 
ultimate goal as assumed by the rational actor model, 
nevertheless, there is usually an ultimate goal or set of 
goals known as foreign policy objectives that governments 
attempt to achieve through ordering of various actions. This 
should not be taken to mean that the approach here is a 
teleological one and that "purposefulness" is being injected 
into foreign-policy making.4 The aim rather is to present 
foreign policy as a puzzle, pieces of which have to be studied 
separately in order to "solve" the whole.5
There are, as indicated above, four components of this 
puzzle: orientations, roles, objectives and actions. 
Orientations and roles are broader components of foreign 
policy which reflect basic national needs as well as external 
conditions.6 What one means by orientation is "a state's 
general attitudes and committments towards the external 
environment and its fundamental strategy for accomplishing its 
domestic and external objectives and for coping with 
persisting threats."7 National roles, on the other hand, are 
about how governments conceive themselves and what 
committments they undertake in line with these conceptions. 
They "provide guidelines for actions when specific situations 
arise in the environment."8 The third component of foreign 
policy, foreign policy objective, is "an image of future state
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of affairs and future set of conditions that governments, 
through individual policy-makers, aspire to bring about."9 
Foreign policy action, within this framework can be defined as 
what "governments do to others in order to effect certain 
orientations, fulfill roles, or achieve and defend 
objectives."10'11
It is against this conceptual framework that any 
analysis of Turkish foreign policy must be tested. There are 
two basic reasons for this: The first one arises from the
parallel drawn between puzzle and foreign policy. It is not 
possible to grasp the reason behind a foreign policy action 
without prior knowledge about other components of the puzzle, 
i.e. orientation, national roles, and objectives. The second 
reason stems from the nature of Turkish foreign policy towards 
the Middle East and its origin as an "extension" of Turkey' s 
pro-Western policy.12 It would be too simplistic an approach 
to try to explain Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle 
East as a policy on its own for what one ends up with after an 
analysis may seem to be a self-destructive policy which is far 
behind Turkey's policy as understood here. Thus it becomes 
essential to explore the nature of Turkish foreign policy from 
the very beginning.
3.2 Kemalist Foundations of Turkish Foreign Policy (1923-1938)
Turkish foreign policy stands on well established
principles driven from the Kemalist legacy. The most
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prominent of these "Peace at home and peace abroad" is
considered to be the "keystone" of Turkish foreign policy. 
Atatürk had said, in his State of the Nation speech of 
November 1, 1928: "It is quite natural and therefore simple to 
explain the fact that a country which is in the midst of 
fundamental reforms and development should sincerely desire 
peace and tranquillity both at home and in the world."13 
Realistic as it was, Kemalist foreign policy did not leave any 
room for idealism other than its mostly sought after ideal of 
becoming an equal member of the Western world of nations. 
Therefore, argues one author:
Atatürk qualified his desire for peace by saying:
'In the formulation of our foreign policy we pay 
particular attention to the safety and security 
of our country and to our capability to protect 
the rights of the citizenry against any 
aggression.7 This meant that while Turkey7s wish 
was to live in peace with all nations and 
maintain friendly relations with great and small 
powers alike, she was nevertheless prepared to 
prevent the infringement of her territorial 
sovereignty and political independence and she 
would not hesitate to take up arms against would- 
be aggressors.14
According to Aptülahat Akşin, the first Turkish 
Ambassador to Syria, it was one peculiarity of Atatürk7 s 
foreign policy that it stayed away from military alliances and 
pacts. This stemmed from, argues Akşin, his conviction that 
every alliance would provoke a counter-alliance due to 
suspicion and insecurity it will cause, which will be against
37
Turkey' s foreign, policy principles that necessitate friendly 
relations to be established with all nations.15
During the Atatürk era, Turkey's international 
orientation was non-alignment which seemed to be the one best 
fit to serve its objectives in the immediate post-WWl period. 
Turkey was a war-torn country in need of internal 
reconstruction which made it a must to seek peace in both 
domestic and international environments. Accordingly, Turkey 
assumed the role of "independent" during this period, which 
can roughly be defined as "the pursuance by the governments 
its own best interests."16 Turkey, as a young republic facing 
internal problems and undergoing rapid modernization, had to 
be realistic and modest in its external objectives. Most of 
the effort, during this era was spent on establishing friendly 
relations with all nations and cultivating new bases of 
friendship with old enemies. This was enabled by the unique 
nature of the Republican foreign policy which was not 
contaminated by any ideology, not even by Kemalism which was 
not an ideology per se.17 Turkish policy makers appeared to be 
operating in the "gray area" avoiding extreme alternatives.18
A second role which Turkey assumed during this era was 
"internal development" which, like, "independent," has little 
or no reference to a particular task or function within the 
international system. Governments assuming this role direct 
their efforts towards problems of internal development.
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Holsti argues that "[t]here is a suggestion of wishing to 
remain uninvolved in international political matters," 
regarding this role conception.19 Nevertheless, international 
cooperation particularly in economic and technical matters is 
not ruled out.
Political pragmatism as well as realism guided Turkish 
policy makers during this era. Two basic foreign policy 
objectives were sought throughout the period: "to create a 
strong and modern state which without external assistance 
could defend its territorial integrity and political 
independence against external aggression; and to make Turkey a 
full-fledged member of the Western European community of 
nations on an equal basis."20
Turkey' s Middle East policy the main principle of which 
was avoidance of interference with Middle-Eastern affairs was 
formulated within this general framework. Although bilateral 
relations with regional states were established, the main 
thrust of Atatürk's Middle East policy remained one of 
"ignorance" or "leaving the Arabs on their own."21 The Sadabad 
Pact (8.7.1937) concluded with Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan was 
a good example of how Kemalist foreign policy distanced itself 
from the Middle East. Rather than being an example of 
regional cooperation and collaboration, as it is claimed to 
be, the Sadabad Pact outlined the principles according to 
which member states would not interfere in each others'
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affairs. The Turkish policy makers were also aware of the
"simplicity" of this pact for they only emphasized its 
psychological impact.22
During this early era. Westernization, or to make Turkey 
a full-fledged member of the Western European community of 
nations on an equal basis, together with other core objectives 
of maintaining security, territorial integrity, and political 
independence remained Turkish policy makers' core objective, 
i.e., the objective fundamental to the existence of the 
political unit without which the state cannot pursue other 
types of objectives.23 Other possible objectives such as 
propagating the Kemalist ideology, supporting anti-imperialist 
movements elsewhere or regional leadership, which the new 
Republic was expected to pursue were either ignored or 
subordinated to these core objectives.24 Turkey's Middle 
Eastern policy, as indicated above, was shaped as an 
"extension" of its pro-Western policy with the ultimate aim of 
minimizing the dangers to its core objectives. To quote one 
observer of Turkish foreign policy, the primary objective of 
Turkey's Middle East policy during this era was "to avoid a 
waste of resources in the area rather than to derive benefits 
from it."25
However, in accounting for Kemalist foreign policy, one 
should not be misled by the common perception that it was a
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policy of total avoidance of Middle Eastern affairs. As 
Robinson puts it
the ■ policy probably operate[d] so long as it 
enforce[d] Turkish interests....During the early 
years, republican Turkey refrained from making 
overtures against anyone. In her weakness, she 
wished to give no cause for complaint. Other 
than the Hatay plum, which ripened and fell into 
the Turkish lap, the Turks pursued a non­
committal policy, even up to the closing months 
of the World War II [emphasis mine].26
In fact, it was Atatürk himself who patiently waited 
until "the Hatay plum" ripened. Between March 15, 1923, when 
in a speech he gave in Adana he mentioned Hatay as being a 
"Turkish land for 4000 years,"27 and mid-1936, when the 
Montreux convention was signed, Atatürk cautiously waited and 
helped the Turks of Hatay (Sancak- the Sandjak of 
Alexandreatta) to pave the way for the incorporation of Hatay 
to Turkey.28 Finally in October 1936 Atatürk, noticing that 
the international environment was favorable for such a move - 
because Europe was getting closer to war-, took the initiative 
and by suddenly leaving for Adana to inspect the troops, he 
made sure that the French would understand his readiness to 
use military means if the Hatay problem was not solved in 
favor of the Turks. In fact, it was Atatürk's decisiveness, 
tactfullness and his non-hesitance when it was in Turkey's 
interests, which in the end, enabled the incorporation of 
Hatay to Turkey (1939).
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Another indication of secondary status given to 
relations with the Middle East was seen in 1924-25 during the 
upheavals in Rif, Morocco headed by Abd al Kerim.29 The 
Turkish attitude towards this proto-nationalist independence 
movement showed that even Turkey' s ignorance of Third World 
independence movements, for which the Democratic Party 
government was harshly criticized during the 1950s was not 
without precedent in the history of the Republican foreign 
policy. At first, the Turkish press and public opinion took 
interest in the Rif rebellion and parallels were drawn between 
the Turkish War of Independence and the struggle of the 
Moroccans. However, from 1925 on, the government press and 
the state elite together started to voice their concern that 
it might be harmful to Turkey's interest to draw the wrath of 
the French and the Spanish at a time when Turkey needed their 
support in the League of Nations to secure a favorable 
solution of the Mosul dispute. After July 1925, the Turkish 
press changed tune and the Rif rebellion was not mentioned 
again. Accordingly, it was during the same days when a 
Turkish member of parliament suggested the government should 
issue a newspaper in French with the twofold aim of responding 
to the allegations that Turkey was causing unrest in Morocco 
and the Caucasus, and also showing everybody that Turkey's 
foreign policy had nothing to do with Islam but was open and 
sincere to Europe.30
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3.3 The Change in Turkey's Orientation and NATO Membership 
(1939-1960)
In the post-WWII era, Turkey changed its orientation and 
became allied. The tripartite treaty signed with Britain and 
France in 1939 had already allied Turkey with the West. 
However Turkey did not live up to its committments during the 
War, due to reasons of its own, and it adopted an attitude of 
buying time. Although it was allied to the West in terms of 
its national orientation, Turkey still did not regard itself 
as a faithful ally in terms of national role conception and it 
gave utmost priority to remain non-belliggerent,31
The decisive break came in February 1952 when Turkey 
became a member of nato. The change in the orientation to 
alignment with nato concurrently changed Turkey's conception of 
its national role. Turkish policy makers largely began to 
conceive Turkey's role as a "faithful ally"32 of nato, i.e. the 
West, and a "bridge"33 between the West and the Middle East. 
These two national role conceptions reinforced each other in a 
rather peculiar fashion. It was through proposing itself as a 
bridge between the West and the Middle East that Turkey 
reinforced its position vis-a-vis the West, especially the 
U.S., which by February 1952 led to nato membership.34
During the period between 1947, the declaration of the 
Truman Doctrine and February 1952, the declaration of nato's 
acceptance of Turkey and Greece to membership, the Republican 
People's Party (RPP) and Democratic Party (DP) governments
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alike worked hard to strengthen Turkey's position vis-à-vis
the West by proposing Turkey as a bridge between the West and 
the Middle East, thus agreeing to act in line with the British 
proposal for a Middle Eastern Defense Organization.35 In fact, 
Turkish policy makers even during Atatürk's presidency 
conceived Turkey as a potential bridge between the West and 
the Middle East,36 an argument that largely emanated from the 
peculiarity of the Turkish Revolution that made Turkey the 
first Muslim state to adopt a Western-style democracy. 
Turkey's Republican rulers also adopted this line of thinking 
during the late 1940s. Although initially they were reluctant 
to assume a role in the Middle East, they became more eager to 
get involved in a Middle Eastern Defense Organization in which 
Turkey was planned to serve as the link between the West, i.e. 
Britain, and the Middle East after they realized that this was 
a step they had to take in their march towards nato 
membership.37
During the Second World War, there did not seem to be 
any direct contact between Turkey and the Middle East. 
Following the signing of the tripartite treaty with the French 
and British (October 19, 1939), the treaty of friendship and 
non-aggression with Germany (June 18, 1941), Turkey turned its 
eyes toward the West. Relations with the Middle East, 
together with concerns other than remaining out of the war, 
were frozen during the course of the war. Things did not
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change much after the end of the War in that the RPP 
governments did not seem enthusiastic to change Turkish policy 
towards the Middle East although the region had changed 
drastically. Turkish foreign policy makers' attitudes towards 
the newly independent Middle Eastern states seemed to be one 
of accepting the developments as they were, or like a "fait 
accomplis" that had to be lived with, but nothing more.38 
However, what Turkey did not do as well as what it did during 
the war, in a way, shaped its post-war policies.
Accordingly, although the maintenance of Turkish non­
involvement even under immense pressure from the Allies is 
regarded to be a story of success, it was not without 
ramifications for Turkey's post-war relations. To give an 
example, active Turkish involvement in the Korean war can be 
considered as "the price Turkey had to pay to shake off the 
stigma of unreliability that still hung over her as a result 
of her wartime policy."39 Selim Deringil notes that there was 
"considerable suspicion particularly in the U.S. and British 
military circles that in the event of a Soviet ntove into Iran 
and the Arab world, Turkey would allow the Soviets safe 
passage."40 The fact that the RPP also did not object -in 
essence-41 to the decision to send 4,500 troops to Korea can be 
taken as an indication of its agreement with the Democratic 
Party regarding the necessity of reassuring the West of its 
willingness for cooperation.42
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Turkey' s efforts to prove itself to be open and sincere 
to the West did not seem to have ended with its active 
involvement in the Korean war, though it became a member of 
nato on February 17, 1952. Active Turkish involvement in 
Middle Eastern affairs and over enthusiasm of the Turks to 
cooperate with the U.S. forces during the DP administration 
can also be regarded as a part of the same effort. Thus it 
can be argued that "it was a question of seeking to maintain 
Turkey's credibility as a reliable partner of the West which 
caused it to pursue a pro-Western policy."43 Besides, as 
argued before, Turkish membership in nato came only after a 
promise made to the British, who until then held reservation 
to Turkey's membership, that Turkey would assume the 
responsibility for the establishment of a Middle East Defense 
Organization.
In the following years these measures were furthered by 
the DP governments which accused the RPP governments for their 
aloofness during World War II.44 The Middle East became the 
focus of the DP governments in the attempt to' prove their 
loyalty and cooperativeness to Turkey's Western allies. 
Although Turkish policy makers did not know the Middle East 
well, for they simply had no experience of involvement in 
regional affairs, they, on the contrary, argued that "only the 
Turks really understood the Arabs and therefore in a position 
to approach the Arab states" for the proposed defense
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organization.45 Given Turkey's lack of experience in the 
region, Turkey seems to have undertaken such a task with the 
ultimate goal of securing its Eastern and Southeastern borders 
against direct or indirect Communist threat.
Adoption of this policy by the Turkish policy makers 
gradually evolved. As the Communist threat to the region 
grew, the Turks became less hesitant to ally themselves with 
the West although they came to realize the difficulties in 
developing better cooperation and understanding with the 
Middle Eastern states. According to the U.S. Ambassador to 
Ankara, George McGhee (1951-1953),
Köprülü...felt that Turkey was in an extremely 
difficult situation. Earlier, when it was still 
seeking admission to nrio, Turkey had felt obliged 
[emphasis mine] to demonstrate its solidarity 
with the West. Subsequently, the Turks felt they 
must be loyal to their new allies. Since the 
interests of the West so frequently clashed with 
those of the Middle Eastern states, it was 
impossible for Turkey to satisfy everyone, and 
thus it had decided that the West must be given 
top priority."46
It was in this sense that Turkey's Middle East policy, 
in the post-WWII era too, became an extension of its pro- 
Western policy. During this era not only its Middle East 
policy, but literally everything other than Turkey's core 
objectives of maintaining security, political independence and 
territorial integrity were subordinated to the goal of 
Westernization and becoming a full-fledged member of the 
Western European community of nations.47
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It was during the 1950s when Turkey's economy also 
became dependent upon the West, further reinforcing Turkey's 
pro-Western policy. From the late 1930s on, the futility of 
non-alignment had become known to Turkish policy makers not 
only due to security considerations, but also because of 
increasing economic difficulties at home. By the end of the 
1920s, the policy of 'private initiation' had begun to falter. 
Coupled with the 1929 economic depression, Turkish policy 
makers decided to tilt towards etatism understood as state 
interventionism in the economy and Western financement of 
Turkish economy which required establishment of better 
relations with the West.48 Towards this end Turkey took a few 
actions, one of which was Turkish agreement at Nyon on 
September 10-11, 1937 to participate in the British hunt for 
German submarines in the Mediterranean.49
Thus, from the 1930s on, external financing of Turkish 
economy became one of the factors shaping Turkish foreign 
policy.50 Karpat underlines Turkish foreign policy objectives 
in the Middle East from 1940s on as "achieving first, national 
security, second, economic aid, and third, at expanding 
influence in the area."51 It is in this sense that Turkish 
policy towards the Middle East became an extension of Turkey's 
pro-Western foreign policy, for none of these objectives were 
adopted for the sake of strengthening relations with regional 
states, but rather as a result of Turkish attempts to prove
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itself to the West as a cooperative partner in regional 
affairs. The explanation was that the latter in return would 
give it a hand in coping with its internal problems. The DP 
government, by 1955 had already concluded that Middle East 
Defense Organization was doomed to fail without Arab 
participation which it failed to obtain. On the other hand, 
Turkey was in vital need of cooperating with the West through 
the formation of such an organization not only because of 
security considerations or as a step towards proving itself as 
a part of the West, but particularly because it needed to 
continue and strengthen its relationship with the West for 
domestic political and economic reasons. By the end of 1955, 
inflationary policies and foreign trade deficits had brought 
Turkish economy face to face with bankruptcy. The Menderes 
government, more than any other time, needed Western and 
especially U.S. aid:
Menderes and his colleagues apparently expected 
that the U.S. government would boil them out of 
their economic difficulties. The DP leadership 
believed that Turkey's political inqportance to 
the West would induce its allies to provide 
extensive economic assistance even if the Turks 
refused to follow the course recommended by their 
partners. Such a calculation was by no means 
farfetched. While the U.S. aid mission 
continually pressed the Turkish government to 
retrench and follow a more rational economic 
policy, in the end the U.S. always came forward 
to provide essential assistance to keep the 
Turkish economy afloat. Indeed, American aid 
nearly doubled over its previous rate during 
these crucial years -averaging about $96 million 
annually for the period 1953-1959.52
49
One factor on which both the previous RPP and the ruling 
DP governments agreed was that "Turkey stood to benefit more 
from a comprehensive association than from a bare formal 
security guarantee. To bring the somewhat refractory U.S. to 
this conclusion, the Turks were willing to take as a wide 
range of obligations," which included Turkey's assuming a new 
role in the Middle East.53
What differed in the DP governments' understanding of 
the use of nato membership and intimate relations with the 
United States was a political worry that troubled Menderes and 
his colleagues. nato membership, which was considered by the 
Democrats as a security tap against any plot that may be 
undertaken by the Republicans to topple them,54 by the mid- 
1960s became a security tap against a potential military coup, 
because they thought being a member of the Democrats' Club 
would ensure the continuation of democracy in Turkey. The 
Menderes government's overreaction to the Iraqi military coup 
(1958) can be analyzed in line with this reasoning that 
Menderes, by trying to convince the United States with the 
help of Jordan to intervene in Iraq,55 wanted to show a lesson 
to potential coup makers in Turkey. Menderes was reported to 
have accused the opposition in a speech he gave in Balıkesir 
in the aftermath of the Iraqi coup in September 6, 1958 of 
adopting the Iraqi example by trying to topple the government 
through use of force. This was reported as Menderes' first
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mentioning of the word of a coup56 which he feared would become 
a "contagious disease."57
Thus, from the second half of the 1950s, strengthening 
the relationship with the United States began to serve a 
domestic political purpose as well. This objective of the 
government was crystallized with the "Cooperation Agreement," 
concluded between Turkey and the United States on March 5, 
1959. In the preamble of the agreement, the determination of 
the parties "to resist aggression direct or indirect" was 
mentioned which provoked audible reactions within the 
Republican ranks who asked for a clarification of the term 
"indirect" and sought assurance that Menderes did not intend 
to ask for American assistance in stifling the opposition.58
The Menderes government, on the other hand, took the 
Cooperation Agreement as a guarantee of U.S. committment to 
Turkey, the Turkish democracy and the elected government of 
the Democratic Party. Given the fact that Soviet pressure on 
Turkey was decreasing (relations were being re-strengthened 
with the Soviet Union and Menderes was expected to visit 
Moscow in June 1960) and relations with Egypt, which were 
strained following the Turkish recognition of Syria's break 
with Egypt in 1958, normalizing (Egypt sent an Ambassador to 
Turkey in June 1959 after a few years' interval),59 the 
Menderes government's demand for U.S. guarantee to help Turkey
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in resisting indirect agression seems to be made more on 
domestic grounds rather than external.
Thus, during the years 1939-60, Turkey's core foreign 
policy objectives remained the same except for dropping of the 
phrase "without external assistance": 'To create a strong and
modern state which could defend its territorial integrity and 
plitical independence against external agression; and to make 
Turkey a full-fledged member of the Western European community 
of nations on an equal basis.' The fact that Turkey's foreign 
policy objectives in the Middle East were defined within this 
framework led the Turks to disregard the political structure 
and objectives of their Middle Eastern neighbors.60 Lack of 
experience in the region and Kemalist foreign policy's 
avoidance of the Middle Eastern affairs during the initial 
years of the Republic probably made it easier for successive 
Turkish governments to pursue this course. The fact that 
Turkey, despite its initial hesitation, went forward with the 
idea of first a Middle Eastern Defense Organization, then the 
Baghdad Pact is indicative of Turkey's willingness to be 
subservient to the will of its allies and especially its major 
ally, the United States -into whose "sphere of responsibility 
and influence" Turkey entered.61 Relations with the Middle 
East were perceived by the Turkish policy makers as a means to 
be utilized to further its core objectives. Securing and 
strengthening ties with the U.S. was seen by the Democrats
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élan vital to further these objectives. That Turkey did not 
have a structured set of relationship with the Middle East to 
stabilize its relations made it easier for the Menderes 
administration to agree with the wishes of its allies. For 
there was no precedent from which to deviate.62
During these years, Turkey took a few, then undisputed, 
actions that later came under immense criticism. Turkey's 
voting record in the United Nations was one of those 
problematic issues. In 1955, Turkey voted against the 
Algerian case in the United Nations General Assembly. In 
1957, Turkey abstained from voting on an Afro-Asian proposal 
for Algerian self-determination. In this sense Turkey seemed 
to be acting as royalist as the king if not more. These 
actions were to come under immense criticism during the 1960s.
Turkish recognition and maintenance of relations with 
Israel was another problem area. Turkey's initial approach to 
the Arab-Israeli dispute tilted toward the Arabs. This was 
not only because anti-imperialism was a foreign policy 
objective of Turkey's, which indeed was, but rather because 
Turkey perceived the creation of a Jewish state in the region 
as a threat to its security due to the latter's links with the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. It was largely as a result 
of this second factor that Turkey in November 1947 voted 
against the partition resolution that divided Palestine into 
two states, a Jewish state and an Arab state. It took the
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Israelis a lot of time and effort to convince the Turks, who 
believed Israel's neutrality to serve as "camouflage for deep- 
rooted communism, "63 that Israel would not constitute a Soviet 
bridgehead in the Middle East. It was particularly Western 
support for the new Jewish state that "shook the resoluteness 
of Turkey,"64 that in March 28, 1949, it finally recognized 
Israel, becoming the first Muslim state to do so. In December 
1949, two states forwarded for this action, the most 
fashionable of which is to argue that Turkey sought to pursue 
the "fashion prevalent in the West"65 by recognizing Israel. 
There is some truth in this argument to the degree that the 
Turks thought maintaining links with Israel will be a symbol 
of its ties with the Western world -something of which they 
were proud. Another reason may be that Turkey perceived 
benefits in acquiring Israel's friendship which they thought 
could act as an advocate of Turkey's interests in Washington.66 
Besides, the decision to recognize Israel did not seem to be 
controversial at home, which enabled the Turkish policy makers 
to freely pursue their line of foreign policy which was free 
of any religious considerations.
However, contrary to what is generally thought and 
despite the conclusion of a trade agreement between Turkey and 
Israel on July 4, 1950,67 Turkish-Israeli relations were not 
that good even during the times when the Arabs perceived them 
to be flourishing. During the early 1950s, the Menderes
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government tried to put some pressure on Israel regarding its 
domestic affairs, and demanded for a public stance of 
opposition to communist states.68 It may well be concluded, as 
Israel's Ambassador Maurice Fisher did, that the Turks failed 
to distinguish between socialism and communism let alone 
shades of socialism. In his reports to the Israeli Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Fisher wrote that by 1956, Ankara was 
still expressing concern over the political balance in Knesset 
which they believed tilted towards the communists.69
Turkey's relations with Israel were no more than cordial 
until the late 1950s. This was not because Turkey refrained 
from alienating Middle Eastern states. Turkey's relations 
with Israel from the very beginning were very volatile.70 
Although Israel desired to foster links with Turkey, for it 
believed this would allow Israel to "strengthen its ties with 
the West while not formally abandoning its non-alignment,"71 
this was not reciprocated by Turkish policy makers. It was 
only after Turkey's Middle Eastern security environment began 
to change in the late 1950s that Turkish policy makers decided 
to play the Israeli card. Following the 1958 coup in Iraq, 
the Turks, who until then had been trying to slow down 
negotiations going on with their Israeli counterparts on 
cooperation for security, became eager to talk.
'A, our envoy, was invited to Zorlu in Istanbul,' 
wrote Ben-Gurion excitedly in his diary, five 
days after the coup, and (Zorlu) told him that 
they are acting parallel to our actions, and that
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he will be pleased to see full cooperation 
between our political activities and theirs.72
On August 29-30 1958, Turkey and Israel signed an
agreement for cooperation in the diplomatic, military and 
intelligence spheres, as well as in commerce and scientific 
exchanges.73 However, this agreement, rather than functioning 
as a stabilizer of relations between the two countries, became 
an "illustration of the unpredictable nature of Turkish- 
Israeli relations."74 Though two countries shared many things 
in common, the dynamics of Middle East politics became the 
main determinant of two countries' relations. Turkey's main 
objective regarding relations with Israel remained that of 
"maintaining" them. Turkey's role conceptions also reinforced 
this objective. Being a faithful ally of the West required 
Turkey to be friends with Israel, which was itself a Middle 
Eastern state aspiring to become a member of the West. The 
bridge role, too, necessitated good relations with Israel for 
it was the major party in the region who had a "gap" to be 
bridged.
i
The formation of the Baghdad Pact, initiated by Britain, 
was another foreign policy action taken by the DP 
administration which was harshly criticized during the 1960s 
for its alienation of the Arabs and causing Turkey's isolation 
in the international arena. The conditions that initiated 
such action have been mentioned before. Iraq, Iran and 
Pakistan were three other "Northern Tier" states that shared
Turkey's concerns and joined Turkey, the "backbone," in the 
Baghdad Pact in 1955 to constitute the "flesh surrounding the 
backbone."'5
The 1956 Suez Crisis was a test case for Turkey's Middle 
East policy which took its concrete form in the formation of 
the Baghdad Pact. During the crisis, although member states 
denounced Israel and Turkey withdrew its ambassador from 
Israel on November 20, 1956, Turkey, nevertheless, informed 
the Israelis that it would remain friendly; afterwards, 
diplomatic relations were continued at a lower level with 
exchange of charge d'affaires. Since the Suez Crisis caused 
alienation of the Arab states and a rift was formed between 
the Baghdad Pact members and non-members, the Baghdad Pact, 
largely due to its divisive nature, came to be regarded as a 
"failure"; it was blamed for the rise of radicalism in the 
Middle East. However, the success or failure of a policy has 
to be considered with regard to its objectives, not side 
effects. What Turkey was trying to achieve through its Middle 
East policy during the 1950s, as argued before> was not the 
acquisition of the friendship of regional states, for whom it 
did not seem to have cared until then. It may even be argued 
that the Turks were not yet conscious of the importance of the 
role that was beginning to be played by the Third World, and 
particularly the Middle Eastern states in the world fora. 
Thus, alienation of the Middle Eastern states was a side
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effect of Turkey's Western-oriented foreign policy, which, 
during the 1960s, made rapprochement with the Middle East its 
foreign policy objective- again not for the sake of its own, 
but in order to strengthen Turkey's position vis-à-vis the 
West.
3.4 The Netr Turkish Foreign Policy (1960- )
3.4.1 Prelude to change, 1960-1964
The 1960 coup did not bring about any significant change
in Turkey's foreign policy. The National Unity Committee (NUC 
-composed of 38 officers who carried out the coup), on the 
contrary, took care to make it known that Turkey would remain 
a faithful ally of the West. The fact that Selim Sarper, who 
was a career diplomat and Turkey's former ambassador to the 
U.N., was appointed to the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs 
was an indication of the NUC's effort not to disrupt the 
continuity in Turkey's foreign policy.
During these years, Turkey's Middle East policy also 
remained unaltered; it was still an extension of Turkey's 
Western-oriented foreign policy. The lack of cautiousness and 
the urge to act with the West, which were attitudes identified 
with DP governments, were still visible in Turkish actions. 
To give an example, on September 29, 1961, when Syria decided 
to break away from the United Arab Republic (UAR -founded by 
Syria and Egypt in 1958), Turkey became the second state after
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Jordan to recognize the new regime. Such early a declaration, 
which was probably prompted by Turkey's happiness to see the 
rift between two most anti-Western states in the region, drew 
the wrath of the Egyptian leadership and they decided to cut 
all diplomatic relations with Turkey/6 Another example of 
continuity in Turkey's policy was seen in Turkey's voting 
record during 1961 when it served as a member of the United 
Nations Security Council. The records show that Turkey voted 
in favor of colonial powers in all proposals concerning 
disputes between the colonial powers and their colonies in 
search for independence. Turkey supported France and Britain 
in their problems with Tunisia and Kuwait respectively, thus 
further alienating the Middle Eastern states.77
3.4.2 Change in Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle 
East
During the early 1960s, although the Soviets gave 
indications of their eagerness to normalize relations, Turkish 
policy makers remained cautious and made it known their desire 
that Turkish-Soviet relations remain within the boundaries 
drawn by East-West relations.78 The change in East-West 
relations, which became more visible after the 1962 Cuban 
missile crisis when it became clear that both the United 
States and the Soviet Union were determined not to be drawn 
into war with each other, gradually convinced the Turkish 
policy makers for the need of a multilateral foreign policy. 
The transition from the strategy of massive retaliation to
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flexible response was also decisive in defining Turkey's role 
because the defense of Turkey, especially Eastern Turkey came 
under dispute. The removal of the Jupiter missiles in 1963, 
which were placed in Turkey as part of massive retaliation 
strategy, that was dropped by the United States by the 1960s, 
was an indication of this change in U.S. policy which came as 
a blow to Turkish policy makers.79
Nevertheless, it was only after 1964 that events such as 
the U.S. landing on Lebanon (1957), when Incirlik air base was 
used on notification rather than consultation with the Turkish 
authorities, came under consideration and contributed to a 
review of U.S.-Turkish and Turkish-Middle East relations. The 
review of Turkish-Middle East relations was largely caused by 
the Turkish displeasure with the attitude of its allies who 
failed to support Turkey on the Cyprus issue, a case in which 
Turkey considered itself to be "absolutely" right. The Middle 
Eastern countries' support of the Greek Cypriots caused the 
Turks to come to terms with their cultural and historical 
bonds. Thus, the Cyprus case became a catalyst' for a large- 
scale review in Turkish foreign policy as a result of which 
the so called new Turkish foreign policy was formulated. 
Displeasure, feeling of betrayal, anger and failure of hope in 
this case led to and also enabled a review of Turkish foreign 
policy in general and relations with the Middle East in 
particular during the 1960s.80 It was also at this critical
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juncture that Turkish foreign policy lost its bipartisan 
nature largely as a result of the effective role that came to 
be played by Turkish public opinion.
The so called new Turkish foreign policy, which emerged 
in the mid-1960s as a result of these discussions and 
considerations was planned to stand in opposition to the 
mistakes committed during the 1950s that were blamed for the 
deterioration of relations with the Middle East which, in 
return, caused Turkey's isolation in the region and alienation 
at the United Nations concerning Cyprus. In this sense, 
Turkey's pre-1960 policies toward the Middle East produced a 
negative feedback that led to cognitive inconsistency and 
increased opposition. However, although, as a result of 
these, Turkish foreign policy lost its bipartisan nature, 
adoption of a multi-faceted foreign policy and the formulation 
of a new Turkish foreign policy remained as issues on which 
all parties -except for the extreme right and left- agreed.
The most prominent feature of the new Turkish foreign 
policy was its emphasis on multi-faceted policy making. 
Turkey's foreign policy orientation, although subject to 
criticism by radical rightist and leftist circles alike, 
remained unquestioned at the policy-making level. Turkey's 
national role conceptions also did not change although the 
role of "faithful ally" came to be less emphasized. Turkish 
national role conception of a faithful ally of nato remained
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unaltered even during years of internal turbulence, but the 
idea of being a faithful ally of the United States came under 
immense criticism. Turkish policy makers, indeed, took great 
care to minimize criticisms to their Western allies since they 
knew it well that Turkey could not do without nato which served 
Turkey's core foreign policy objectives of maintaining 
security, térritorial integrity and political independence and 
making Turkey a full-fledged member of the Western community 
of nations. The "dual effort" of trying to maintain a low- 
profile in alliance relations with the West while trying to 
keep other channels of communication open, and, if possible, 
aid was undertaken with these considerations in mind.81 
Turkey, without weakening its ties with the West, changed its 
attitudes towards the Soviet Bloc and the Third World alike, 
which came to be called the multi-faceted foreign policy.
When applied to the Middle Eastern context, this policy 
required less cooperation with the United States, and a more 
balanced attitude towards the Arab-Israeli dispute. 
Nevertheless, Turkey refrained from overruling cooperation 
with the United States and preferred to make its decisions ad 
hoc.82 Decrease of tension in the region enabled by the end of 
Turkish-Western efforts to direct the regional course of 
politics and the resurgence of inter-Arab rivalries allowed 
the Turks to distance themselves from U.S. policies without 
incurring any costs. A good example of this effort was seen
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in 1964 when Turkey, together with other cento (Central Treaty 
Organization -the name Baghdad Pact took after Iraq's
withdrawal in 1958) members, Iran and Pakistan, concluded an 
agreement to create the organization of Regional Cooperation 
for Development (rod) . Although rcd seemed to be "duplicating" 
non-military functions of cento, since, it, by no means,
advocated anything new, it served an important political and 
psychological purpose in stressing the "independent" nature of 
the new organization, i.e., that it was being planned and 
worked out by Turkey, Iran and Pakistan alone, and that it 
sought no military purposes.83 Through initiating the 
formation of rcd, Turkey intended to give a signal of its
independent foreign policy. The Middle Eastern states were 
not the only audience of this gesture. Turkey, at the same 
time, wished to show the Soviets that cooperation between the 
three rcd members was not tainted by cold war concerns as it 
had been during the 1950s. Rapprochement with the Middle 
Eastern states was also initiated with the Soviets in mind, 
who continually tried to enlist the Turks on the! anti-Israeli 
front. Nevertheless, the Turks were able to maintain a 
balanced attitude and did not go so far as the Soviets 
demanded.84
In sum, Turkey's role conception during these years 
remained being a faithful ally of nato. In its relations with
the United States, Turkey emphasized its independence though
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it still remains questionable to what extent this was anything 
other than rhetoric. It is true that U.S. involvement in 
Turkey's domestic affairs was decreased to and kept at a 
minimum, and a new Defense Cooperation Agreement was signed on 
July 3, 1969 to limit and regulate U.S. presence in Turkey. 
However, regarding the use of nato bases for non-NAro purposes, 
Turkish policy makes preferred to preserve a degree of 
"ambiguity" which they believed to have "a deterrent value of 
its own."35 Although Turkey maintained that it would not allow 
the use of its bases during 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars, 
it would still be premature to argue that this was an 
indication of a complete reversal in Turkish foreign policy 
simply because Turkey refused to cooperate with the U.S. while 
adopting a policy of benevolent neutrality that tilted towards 
the Arabs. It would be more accurate to argue that Turkey 
adopted a policy of caution in its attitudes towards the 
Middle East crises in line with which it carefully weighed the 
pluses and minuses of each action to be taken and decided 
accordingly. In this sense, Turkish foreign policy carefully 
stuck with one of the main principles of Kemalist foreign 
policy: that of pragmatism. As seen in Turkish policy makers' 
declarations during the 1980s' crises in the Middle East, 
Turkey did not completely rule out cooperation with the U.S. 
for non-NATO purposes. It rather put forward principles to be 
fulfilled before becoming part of a Western intervention to
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the Middle East. In sum, Turkey acted "decisively and
cautiously at the same time; without abandoning its
multifaceted foreign policy."86
As indicated before, when defining a state's foreign 
policy, verbalized policy as well as non-verbalized policy, in 
other words declared programs, as well as behavior patterns 
will be taken into consideration. Although the two may not be 
identical, they nevertheless have a correlation that is 
unlikely to be zero. Besides, in foreign policy making,
declarations as well as actions are important; statement by a 
policy maker about his/her country's intention to change a 
policy is as important as the real change in attitudes and 
actions. In this sense, various statements made by Turkish 
policy makers during this era to the effect that Turkey will 
adopt a multi-faceted foreign policy and that Turkey will 
leave its previous pro-Western policies made an impact as 
strong as the impact of actions Turkey took to this effect. 
During the late 1960s and early 1970s moderate actions 
Turkey's policy makers undertook in an attempt to balance 
Turkey's ties with the West and the Middle East seems to have 
convinced the latter. During these years the relative calm 
that came to the region also enabled the Turks to pursue this 
policy. It was primarily so because the Turks felt themselves 
relatively secure that they could overrule U.S. use of nato 
bases in Turkey in Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973.
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However, it was also because the Arab-Israeli dispute 
was the main focus of regional states during this period that 
Turkey did not face any real dilemma in trying to balance its 
committments to the West with its policy of rapprochement with 
the Middle. East. By the end of the 1970s, however, as 
increasing Soviet activities in peripheral areas of the world 
gave way to a second cold war, Turkey' s threat perceptions 
began to intensify. The twin crises of 1979, Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan and the Iranian Revolution led the Turkish 
policy makers to reconsider Turkey's ties with the West. The 
Turks, although still refusing to make any formal strategic 
committment outside the nato framework, became more eager for 
consultations about cooperation for security in the Middle 
East. To quote one analyst of Turkish foreign policy, these 
developments brought back "the traditional images of 
international politics held by the Turkish policy makers."87 
To give an example, in November 1983, the Ulusu government 
concluded an accord with the United States whereby American 
troops in the Multinational force in Lebanon (which were 
deployed in Beirut at the request of the Lebanese government, 
following the 1982 Israeli attack on the plo forces in Beirut, 
with the task of assisting the Lebanese Army in restoring the 
authority of the central government) were awarded the right to 
use the nato base at İncirlik.88 The permission Turkey granted 
the Multinational force to use the İncirlik base during the
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Gulf crisis (1990-91) was another example of how Turkey 
cooperated with the West whenever it deemed necessary, and 
also felt conditions to be ripe for such cooperation. It is 
in this sense that one should not go too far in claiming that 
Turkey's relations with the United States were weakened in the 
post-Menderes era or that Turkey adopted it as a principle to 
overrule any U.S. request for the use of nato bases in Turkey 
for non-NATO purposes. On the contrary, it may be argued that 
Turkey's national role conceptions remained to be that of a 
faithful ally of both nato and the U.S. although the latter 
was less pronounced. It was in this sense that Turkey's new 
foreign policy can be considered to have become successful. 
Without changing the basic tenets of Turkish foreign policy, 
Turkish policy makers were able to pull the Middle Eastern 
states to their side -to the extent that was possible.
The main change was in the rhetoric employed by the 
Turkish policy makers that they emphasized Turkey's adoption 
of a multi-faceted foreign policy which made establishment of 
good relations with the Middle Eastern states one of its 
goals. To this end, diplomacy rather than coalition building 
was to be the main foreign policy tool.
Regarding Turkey's role conception as a "bridge" between 
the West and the Middle East, the new Turkish foreign policy 
can be considered to have given substance to this role. In 
fact, the drafters of new Turkish foreign policy argued that
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the role of a bridge was "designated" for Turkey by "history 
and geography" alike.89 Still, the bridge role remained 
largely a rhetoric and was not conceptualized on the policy 
making level so that it could have presented an operational 
significance.90 Nevertheless, rapprochement with the Middle 
East, undertaken as a part of the multifaceted foreign policy, 
was presented as an implementation of Turkey's bridge role. 
According to the formulators of the new Turkish foreign 
policy, Turkey, in order to fulfill the bridge role, had to 
maintain friendly relations with regional states. To do this, 
Turkey had to adopt a "sound" policy refraining from 
entertaining any goals of leadership, keeping in mind the fact 
that its position in the eyes of the Middle Eastern states 
could only be based on respect. Ambassador Hamit Batu, one of 
the drafters of new Turkish foreign policy, argued that "if 
Turkey properly grasped and adopted this historically 
designated role with all its obligations, its position in the 
Western world would be strengthened."91 What was significant 
in this argument was that strengthening of Turkey's role in 
the Western world was presented as the final aim of 
strengthening ties with the Middle East. In this sense,
Turkey's Middle East policy still remained a means to an end, 
an extension of Turkey's Western-oriented foreign policy.
If one looks at Turkey's behavior pattern during this 
era, an indication of the adoption of a multifaceted policy
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was seen in Turkey's participation in the preparatory meetings 
for and the Conference of Afro-Asian states held in Djakarta 
in 1964 and in Algeria in March 1965, respectively. To 
compensate for its absence in the non-aligned conference, 
Turkey sent two ambassadors to inform the participants of its 
position.92 This was different from Turkey's pre-1960 
policies, when Turkey refused to attend Afro-Asian conferences 
and was reported to have participated in the Bandung 
Conference in 1955 on U.S. prompting to present the case 
against non-alignment. Nevertheless, Turkey, in an attempt to 
balance its participation in the Conference, sent its Minister 
of Rural Affairs to Tel Aviv in 1964 to reassure Israel of its 
friendly intentions.93
As part of its effort to enlist Middle Eastern states, 
which they saw as "potential natural allies," Turkish foreign 
policy makers sent representatives and goodwill missions to 
present Turkey's case on the Cyprus issue. Another aspect of 
this policy of rapprochement with the Middle East, which led 
Turkey to activate its role of a bridge between' the West and 
the Middle East necessitated careful balancing of its 
attitudes towards the Arab-Israeli dispute. During the period 
under consideration, Turkey undertook this policy with 
success. To give a few examples, following the 1967 war, 
Turkey, although refraining from condemning Israel as the 
"aggressor," nevertheless advocated its withdrawal to its pre-
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1967 borders.94 But still, Turkey refrained from openly 
favoring Palestinian independence during the 1960s and the 
strongest resolution backed by Turkey, U.N. Security Council 
resolution 242, did not even mention the Palestinian people by 
name but referred to the "refugee problem".93
During the 1970s, Turkey's policy tilted more towards 
the Arabs as did the U.N. General Assembly. However, by the 
mid-1970s Turkey's policy gradually became pro-Arab to the 
extent that it even came to contradict its previous
declarations and actions.96 Nevertheless, Turkey's relations 
with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (plo) remained 
cool. When in 1979, plo was given the permission to open an 
office in Ankara (three years after it was announced that the 
permission would be given) it was declared that the rank of 
the head of plo office will be the same as the Israeli
representative.97
During the 1980s, as Turkey's ties with its allies 
restrengthened, Turkey began to retreat towards its more 
carefully balanced policy. In 1982, Turkey abstained from the 
U.N. voting on a resolution, which condemned Israel's
annexation of the Golan Heights. The resolution further 
declared that Israel was not a peace-loving state, and 
deplored the negative U.S. vote that prevented the U.N.
Security Council from adopting "appropriate measures against 
Israel and calling on U.N. agencies and international
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institutions to tailor their relations with Israel to its 
punitive terms."98 During the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88) Turkey 
adopted a policy of neutrality in line with its new foreign 
policy principles. According to one observer, this strict 
attitude of neutrality adopted by the Turks "further 
strengthened a sense of confidence in Turkey's credibility as 
a non-interfering, friendly, and reliable neighbor."99
From the mid-1980s on, parallel to its rapprochement 
with the West, the Turks began developing their ties with 
Israel. By 1986, diplomatic representation between the two 
countries, downgraded to the level of second secretary 
following Israel's declaration of Jerusalem as its capital,
was restored to pre-1980 level, i.e . that of charge
d'affaires. In December 1991, the Turkish government
undertook another balancing act and upgraded Turkey's
diplomatic relations with both Israel and the plo to the 
ambassadorial level.
Turkey's return to the balancing game renewed interest 
in the bridge role. In 1986, Prime Minister Ôzal , in an 
attempt to justify Turkey's continuing relations with Israel, 
was saying that he regarded Israel "as a window...on future 
events." For Turkey "to play a role in solving the problem of 
the Middle East...;that window must remain open," argued 
Ôzal.100
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Ayhan Kamel, back in 1977 had outlined the new Turkish 
foreign policy towards "the Middle East, i.e., towards the 
Arab countries"101 which were summarized by Seyfi Ta§han in a 
rather recent study. According to these two experts, Turkey's 
policy towards the Middle East can be summarized in six 
principles;
• non-interference in the domestic affairs of the Middle 
Eastern countries,
• non-interference in inter-country relations,
• equality,
• maintenance of both diplomatic relations with Israel 
and of political support for the Arab cause,
• maintenance of links with the West, with due regard 
for their impact on Turkey's relations with the Middle 
East and vice versa,
• development of bilateral relations.102
This outline of the Turkish foreign policy towards the 
Middle East can, more or less, be regarded as the Turkish
i
foreign policy towards the Middle East not only because other 
experts on Turkish foreign policy seem to agree upon it,103 but 
also because Turkey's verbalized as well as non-verbalized 
policy seems to converge upon these principles as seen in the 
preceding analysis. The principles outlined as the new 
Turkish foreign policy still continue to guide Turkish foreign 
policy makers during the 1990s. Hamit Batu, the drafter of
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the new Turkish foreign policy, argues that even the Turkish 
policy during the Gulf crisis (1990-91), regarded by many to 
constitute a deviation from the "traditional Turkish foreign 
policy" 104 (the term used to define what was the new Turkish 
foreign policy of the 1960s), cannot be considered to 
constitute a change in policy, for " [d]evelopments have been 
too rapid for any government to chart a new course amid 
unpredictable events."105 Batu prefers to define Turkey's 
policy towards the Gulf Crisis as constituting a deviance from 
some of the practices of its traditional policies. Andrew 
Mango agrees with him on this point that he regards "[t]he 
imperceptible rate of change of Turkish foreign policy [as] 
the base of journalists in search of copy, and even of 
academics in search of theses to prove."106 Nevertheless, he 
agrees that the Gulf Crisis (1990-91) brought about a degree 
of change to Turkish foreign policy that Turkey got involved 
in an inter-Arab dispute, which was something it tried to 
avoid since the Baghdad Pact.
However, it is disputable whether Turkey'1 s involvement 
in the anti-Iraqi camp, in the case of the latter's invasion 
of Kuwait, as a change in Turkey's foreign policy towards the 
Middle East. As mentioned before, change, within the bounds 
of this study, will be defined as "a new act in a given type 
of situation or a given act in a type of situation previously 
associated with a different act."107 Building upon this
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definition, for Turkey's involvement in an inter-Arab dispute 
and the permission it granted the multinational force to use 
the nato base at Incirlik to constitute a deviation from the 
traditional Turkish foreign policy, the traditional policy 
should have overruled such an action. However, as indicated 
before, Turkish foreign policy makers, even when following a 
multi-faceted foreign policy, which aimed at rapprochement 
with the Middle Eastern states, did not completely rule out 
cooperation with the United States, preferring to make their 
decisions ad hoc.108 On the contrary, several statements made 
by the Turkish policy makers during the 1980s, when the 
tension in the region seemed to escalate, pointed to a number 
of conditions to be fulfilled before Turkey could get involved 
in an inter-Arab dispute or allow its bases to be used for 
non-NRTo purposes. Although they were never declared as a "set 
of principles," the hints that pointed to them were present in 
Turkish policy makers' statements as to why Turkey did not get 
involved in this or that dispute. These were as follows: The 
crisis in the Middle East had to pose a direct threat to 
Turkey's interests; the United States had to have a clear-cut 
policy laying down its objectives, principles, and action 
plans; there had to be some kind of a cooperation among the 
nato allies, which necessitated overlapping of U.S. and 
European views; Turkey's Middle Eastern neighbors had to agree 
with the U.S. regarding the presence of this threat and should
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not object to Turkish involvement in an inter-Arab dispute. 
If all of these conditions were to be fulfilled, which only 
did during the Gulf Crisis (1990-91), Turkey could not think 
about getting involved in an inter-Arab dispute.
Thus, it can be argued that Turkey's foreign policy 
towards the Middle East showed a continuity since the 1960s 
when it was first formulated. Although there have been minor 
adjustments, the main tenets of the policy remained the same. 
The definition of change adopted within the bounds of this 
study does not involve adjustments as change in foreign 
policy, for a government's foreign policy constantly changes 
with minor adjustments just like in Heracletius' observation 
that one cannot step in the same stream twice.109
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Chapter IV: International stabilizers
International stabilization of a foreign policy is 
assumed to be the first step towards foreign policy 
stabilization. According to Goldmann, the typical process 
of policy stabilization begins at the international 
level. In the model presented by Goldmann, the
international stabilization of a foreign policy is a 
process by which "the actor's international relations are 
colored by his pursuit of this policy."1 There are three 
ways to international stabilization of a foreign policy: 
The policy may be stabilized by international agreements, 
by economic depdendency, and by relations with third 
parties.
4.1 Normative Regulation ,
Normative regulation is considered to be "the
traditional method for policy stabilization in international 
relations."2 According to Goldmann, " [r]egulation may take 
the form of treaties or agreements but also of custom. Norms, 
whether formal or informal, create expectations that cannot be 
violated without incurring a cost."'3 Problems related to lack
of enforcement in international law are known to all.
However, the concern here is not whether/to what degree 
governments take norms into consideration when formulating 
policies and taking actions. It is assumed a priori that 
governments, although in varying degrees, do take norms into 
consideration either before, during or after policy making 
processes.
The problem regarding the measurement of the influence 
of norms in policy making process is that it is not merely a 
problem of observance or non-observance of clearly defined 
rules and regulations -when they exist. It is that 
governments do take action which they believe to be 
consistent with international law. According to Holsti, 
" [g] overnments normally characterize conflicts in the legal 
and diplomatic terms that are most advantageous to their 
interests and objectives. This practice is not necessarily a 
capricious twisting of legal principle to fit facts; it arises 
out of different perceptions of reality."4 Nevertheless, this 
should not be taken to mean that governments foster a 
Machiavellian approach in cases of conflict between national 
interest and international law by choosing to abide by the law 
as long as it fits their interests. Although it is a 
perennial problem of international law that there is no 
institution in the international arena to assume the functions 
of a domestic government in law enforcement, the fact that 
states, nevertheless, observe international norms, enables one
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to make the assumption that governments do take norms into 
consideration either before, during or after policy making 
process.
Besides, given the problem of lack of enforcement in 
international law, the fact that the state in question has 
priorly accepted to abide by the rules and regulations of 
international law makes it costly for a government to violate 
them. The problem is not that a government can violate these 
norms but that it becomes costly to do this. According to 
Holsti, "[t]hrough treaties, declarations and traditional 
methods of dealing with other states, most governments create 
abroad certain expectations that future actions will conform 
with past patterns of behavior."5 This is how customary norms 
act as stabilizers in foreign policy-making; the pursuit of a 
policy, by definition, implies .that there occurred a minimum 
degree of regulation in the form of customary norms. Goldmann 
considers such regulation which emerges in the form of 
unilateral international regulation "difficult to distinguish 
from the stabilizer...called institutionalization"6 and 
underlines the need for regulation of the relationship by 
explicit agreements for normative regulation to act as a 
stabilizer on foreign policy.7 However, the mere presence of 
agreements between the parties is not enough; they should be 
analyzed with regard to their regulatory performance with the 
following criteria in mind: "the legal status of the rules,
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the occurrence of contradictory regulation, and the problem of 
application associated with the rules."8
Before going into an analysis of the existing agreements 
between Turkey and the Middle Eastern states, one peculiarity 
of the Turkish case should be emphasized. States' desire for 
stability and predictability is often quoted as one of the 
reasons for states' acting in conformity with international 
law. Care taken by revolutionary regimes to conform to 
international law is usually shewn as an example of this 
desire. Yet, non-revolutionary states with modest foreign 
policy objectives, which, according to this argument, find it 
easier to conform to international law, for their ultimate aim 
is to create a routine to make their policies more stable and 
predictable. According to Holsti, governments that are formed 
after great wars or periods of instability also fit this rule. 
Accordingly, such governments conform to international norms 
because of their desire for stability and predictability in 
order to "make permanent the changes that have been achieved 
through political and military actions. The 1 peace treaty 
creates a new order out of chaos, stability out of rapid 
change, and predictability out of uncertainty."9
The over-enthusiasm to conform to international law that 
was observed in Turkish foreign policy in the inter-war era 
can be explained with the help of this understanding. Turkey 
of the 1920s was a war-ridden state with a ruined economy
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which had to start from scratch in establishing a republican 
regime. In the inter-war era, Turkey underwent a period of 
revolutionary change by undertaking a rapid and comprehensive 
modernization program which made it a must for successive 
Turkish governments to opt for stability and predictability in 
its international relations. Peace and stability in the world 
was necessary to be able to sustain revolutionary change at 
home. It was this desire for stability that made Turkish 
foreign policy makers over-enthusiastic to conform to 
international law.
An analysis of Turkish foreign policy during this period 
shows that Turkey followed a policy that was strictly in 
conformity with principles of equality, respect for agreements 
and peaceful resolution of disputes. During Atatürk's 
presidency, five international disputes to which Turkey was a 
party were settled through pacific means either before the 
Permanent Court of International Justice or the Council of the 
League of Nations. In March 1936, Turkey asked for a revision 
of the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty concerning the 
demilitarized status of the Turkish Straits basing its claim 
on the principle of rebus sic stantibus (which was found 
justifiable by other parties that revisions were agreed upon 
in the Montreux Convention [1936]) .10
In case of the Mosul dispute, Turkey agreed to the 
decision of the League of Nations which awarded Mosul to Iraq
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on the conditions that the British mandate over Iraq should 
continue for twenty-five years. Turkey at first questioned 
the legality of the award but on June 5, 1926 concluded a 
treaty with Britain to settle the Mosul question according to 
which Turkey agreed to relinquish its claims to Mosul in 
return for the promise that 10% of the revenues of the Turkish 
Petroleum Company (which was the name of the British oil 
company that drilled Mosul oil) would be paid to Turkey for 
twenty-five years.11 Turkey preferred to agree with the 
decision of the League of Nations not only for the reason that 
it was incapable of doing anything else, but because Turkey 
was in need of peace and stability.12 This was an indication 
that Turkey chose to abide by the rule of the Permanent Court 
of International Justice or the Council of the League of 
Nations even when they were not fully in congruence with or 
even contrary to Turkish national interest. One should not 
exaggerate this attitude and argue that Turkish foreign policy 
during the era has been characterized by complete adherence to 
International Law whatever its costs were. The'fact was that 
Turkey chose to abide by International Law even in cases when 
it was contrary to its national interests (such as the 
decision to give up Mosul) not only because of its belief in 
the ethical value of law observance, but also because of its 
desire to create stability and predictability in its foreign
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policy which was vital for the national reconstruction and 
development of Turkey.13
Turkey's foreign policy in the post-World War II era can 
also be explained within the context of Holsti's 
characterization of states with modest foreign policy 
objectives. Turkey, a state with no external ambitions, 
preferred to adhere by international law to make its policies 
more stable. According to Holsti, "[f]or states with more 
modest external objectives, law observance for many types of 
transactions becomes so routine that policy makers would 
consider other alternatives only in great conflicts or 
emergencies."14 The same can be argued with regard to the 
normative regulation of Turkey's Middle East policy, perhaps 
with the exception of the 1950s, which led, in the 1960s to 
the formulation of the so-called new Turkish foreign policy 
that included more modest objectives compared to those of the 
1950s. In fact, most of the principles of the new Turkish 
foreign policy towards the Middle East were embodied in the 
u.n. Charter and the Helsinki Final Act. Accordingly, Turkey's 
Middle East policy stands on well established principles three 
of which are: non-interference in the domestic affairs of the
Middle Eastern countries; non-interference in inter-country 
relations; and mutual respect for sovereignty. These are 
universal principles every state is expected to abide by when 
laying down policies. Depending upon these principles, it may
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be argued that Turkey at least creates the impression of a 
conformist state, over-enthusiastic to act in accordance with 
the rule of law to justify its inaction most of the times.
Turkey's relations with the Middle East cannot be 
claimed to have become extensively regulated to the degree 
that it will be stabilized through normative regulation. For 
normative regulation to exist, there should be treaties or 
agreements between Turkey and the Middle Eastern states, 
stipulations of which would regulate relations. In the 
Turkish case, there exists no such agreement apart from 
bilateral treaties. Among these, five are still in force.15 
However, since these treaties are limited in scope they do not 
regulate Turkey's relations with the Middle Eastern states, at 
least not extensively. An analysis of these treaties show 
that they usually cover economic, technical or cultural 
matters; or as in the case of agreements with Iraq, Syria and 
Iran they cover cooperation in security matters which usually 
means border insurgencies. The experience of the ill-fated 
Baghdad Pact made Turkey rather hesitant to ini/tiate or join 
multilateral regional organizations. Instead, Turkey 
preferred to sign bilateral treaties of limited scope. It is 
as a result of this hesitance on Turkey's part that it is not 
a member of any Middle Eastern regional organization other 
than the oic (Organization of Islamic Conference) .
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The oiC/ of which each regional state (with the 
exception of Israel) is a member, is considered to be a 
"loose" organization with limited regulatory power. It is 
true that the Organization is limited to a consultation forum 
where Islamic states come together and exchange views. 
However, although the oic does not have the power to make 
binding decisions on its members the fact that those states 
regularly come together and exchange views on issues and that 
a resolution is agreed upon at the end of each meeting can be 
considered to have regulatory effect. Member states at least 
learn about the views of others and also their own position 
compared to theirs. Thus, although they have only 
psychological and moral implications, the decisions of the oic 
have an effect on member states. Besides, the suspension of 
Egypt's membership following its recognition of Israel and the 
Camp David accords, which was sanctioned in the third Summit 
Conference in Taif, Mecca in 1981, shows that the oic does not 
tolerate deviation. Even though the imposition of such a 
sanction has no legal basis in the Charter, unanimous decision 
by member states was considered to be enough to suspend 
Egypt's membership in 1981. The legal basis of the decision 
was built upon the assertion that the action constituted a 
"material breach" of a treaty (i.e. the objectives of the oic 
Charter) .16
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Turkey, a de facto member of the oic, has not yet 
ratified its Charter; nor has it participated in the formation 
and activities of the Islamic Court of Justice or the Islamic 
Jurisprudence Academy. The fact that Turkey detained from 
these actions on the grounds that they would not conform to 
its secular constitution, precludes any sanction to be imposed 
on Turkey thus hindering the effectiveness of normative 
regulation. Nevertheless, the fact that Turkey did not 
ratify the oic Charter and that it puts reservations on the 
resolutions on decisions that are not in accordance with u.n. 
resolutions, Turkey had approved or supported, its secular 
constitution, and basic foreign policy, does not prevent the 
psychological effect, mentioned before, from functioning. The 
declaration made by the Turkish government during the seventh 
Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers held in istanbul in 
May 1976 that Turkey has decided to approve the Charter of the 
oic17, which is still subject to the approval of the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly,18 can be considered as an example of 
this psychological factor. Another incident in- which Turkey 
seems to have acted in line with the expectations of oic states 
was Turkey's decision in December 1980 to reduce the level of 
Turkish representation in Israel from the level of chargé 
d'affaires to that of second secretary19 Following Israeli 
government's announcement of its decision to shift its capital 
from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in July 1980, diplomatic
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representatives of fifteen Muslim countries with the plo 
representative as their spokesman came to visit the Turkish 
Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel to reiterate their
governments' wish that Turkish government break of all its 
relations with Israel. The representatives were reported to 
have reminded Demirel that this would also be in conformity 
with Islamic Conference resolutions. Although refusing to cut 
off its relations with Israel, the Demirel government decided 
to close down its consulate in Jerusalem and summon the 
Turkish chargé d'affaires in Tel Aviv to Ankara for 
"consultations" to "reevaluate the matter."20 It was in 
December 1980, after the September 12, 1980 coup in Turkey
that the new government decided to reduce Turkey's level of 
representation in Tel Aviv. Although it is argued that Turkey
did this "because it felt, as a member of the oic, it had to
show its support for the Arabs on this sensitive issue 
involving the legal status of Jerusalem as it had always
done...since the 1960s," it was also reported that according 
to a "secret" decision reached by the Islamic - Conference of 
Foreign Ministers, in September 1980 in Morocco, the General 
Secretary of the oic was authorized to prepare a special report 
concerning Turkey's relations with Israel which was to be 
discussed during the oic summit to be held in Mecca in January 
1981.21
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Although existing agreements do not meet the 
criteria set above for normative regulation to function as 
a stabilizer of Turkish foreign policy, Turkey's relations 
with the Middle .East can still be regarded to be 
regulated, - at least to an extent. First, by participating 
in the conferences since 1969 Turkey created international 
expectations on the part of Muslim states, which makes it 
harder for Turkey to deviate. Second, the psychological 
effect does function that Turkey sometimes finds it hard 
to act alone. Thus, although existing agreements did not 
constitute a stabilizing effect on Turkey's Middle East 
policies, depending on the fact that they did not 
extensively regulate these relations, the psychological 
effects arising from Turkey's membership to the oic cannot 
be disregarded.
4.2 Dependence
The word dependence has a variety of meanings. The one 
used by Goldmann is rather a narrow one. According to him, an 
actor's dependence on its relationship with the 4nvironment is 
defined to be "a function of the cost of goal attainment if 
the relationship were broken in comparison with the cost of 
goal attainment if it had never been established."22 For "it 
is more costly to interact first and then stop than it would 
have been not to interact in the first place."23 In this 
sense dependence is understood to be a condition that follows
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the process of adaptation rather than one arising out of need. 
If we follow his line of thinking, "the pursuit of a policy 
creates a particular relationship between actor and 
environment; the actor increasingly depends on continuing this 
relationship; this dependence helps to stabilize the 
policy."24 This type of dependence, defined by Goldmann as 
structural dependence, acts as a stabilizer of policy when the 
actor adopts to continuing interaction, considers unacceptable 
not to interact, and adheres to the present policy.
The concern here is to determine whether Turkey' s 
economic relations with the Middle East helped to stabilize 
Turkish foreign policy towards the region. To do this, first, 
the evolution of Turkey's economic relations with the region 
will be analyzed to see whether and to what extent the two 
parties became structurally adopted to this interaction. For 
dependence to act as a stabilizer the economies of both 
parties must become structurally adopted to each other. 
Dependence in the sense of one economy's need for another is 
treated as a source, but not a stabilizer of foreign policy. 
Thus, it is of extreme importance regarding the purposes of 
this study to see whether increasing economic relations with 
the Middle East was a source or an outcome of Turkish foreign 
policy towards the region. If it is assumed that Turkey in 
mid-1960s changed its policy towards the Middle East to adopt 
the so-called new Turkish foreign policy, which emphasized
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multi-faceted policy making, a balanced attitude towards the 
Arab-Israeli dispute as well as non-interference in inter-Arab 
disputes, with economic goals in mind due to increasing 
economic influence of the Middle Eastern states, then Turkey's 
economic dependence to the Middle East emerges to be the 
source of the change in Turkey's policy towards the Middle 
East. If, on the other hand, it is assumed that Turkey 
adopted this new policy with political goals in mind, which in 
time led to economic interaction and later dependence, then, 
dependence may emerge to be a stabilizer of Turkey's foreign 
policy towards the Middle East. This depends on one's point 
of view as well as his/her reading of history.
Within the bounds of this analysis after determining the 
extent to which the two parties have become structurally 
adopted to this interaction, an attempt will be made to 
analyze its impact on Turkish foreign policy towards the 
Middle East. The hypothesis, here, is that economic 
interdependence helps to stabilize a country's foreign policy, 
since it becomes costly for the country in question to stop 
interacting due to political reasons after its economy becomes 
structurally adopted to this interaction. When this 
hypothesis is tested against the Turkish case, it is expected 
to inquire into the degree of adoption of Turkish economy in 
that whether continuing interaction with the Middle East 
stabilized Turkish foreign policy towards the region to the
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extent that it became more costly for Turkey to disrupt these 
relations, or not.25
Turkey's policy of rapprochement with the Middle Eastern 
countries began to take shape during the second half of the 
1960s as a part of its desire to follow a multi-faceted 
foreign policy. The so called new Turkish foreign policy
emphasized diplomacy as an instrument in trying to strengthen 
the relations with the Middle East. What initiated new 
Turkish foreign policy was the isolation in which Turkey found 
itself concerning the Cyprus dispute and its attempt to enlist 
Middle Eastern states in strengthening its position. During 
the initial phase, Turkey's economic relations with the Middle 
East were kept at a minimum, although Turkey was an oil 
importing country thus dependent on Middle Eastern oil. 
However, it was not this dependency on oil that helped Turkey 
to decide to reaffirm its economic ties with the Middle 
East.26 On the contrary, the drafters of the new Turkish 
foreign policy emphasized the political aspect of relations 
with the Middle East. It may well be the case that Turkish 
policy-makers refrained from putting economic relations to the 
forefront for fear of appearing opportunistic. Although 
Turkey expected to derive benefits from strengthening 
relations with the Middle Eastern states, it did not want this 
to appear as the reason for the adoption of the new Turkish 
foreign policy. This largely stemmed from the care Turkish
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policy makers took to maximize the positive impact adoption of 
the new Turkish foreign policy was expected to make on the 
Middle Eastern states. For, Turkey wanted to differentiate 
itself from the Western European states, which following the 
OPEC oil embargo, changed their attitudes toward the Arab- 
Israeli dispute and became more benevolent toward the Arab 
cause. Turkey also wanted to prove the Middle Eastern states 
that it sincerely wanted to strengthen its relations. To this 
end, Turkish policy makers downplayed the role of economic 
interdependence in regional relations. Another reason for the 
downplay of economic factors in regional relations may be the 
general inclination in Turkish foreign policy to downplay the 
role of the economy. According to H.E. Yılmaz îkizer (Ret. 
Ambassador), the main failure of Turkish foreign policy is 
this inclination that it does not pay much attention to the 
practice of exchange/give-and-take in international 
relations.27
During 1969-1973, the Middle Eastern share in total 
Turkish exports was "negligible," amounting to j3.3% at its 
highest. The average of the period was 1.8%.28 It was the 
same with Turkey's imports that Middle Eastern share was 6.1% 
in 1973, the highest during the period. The period average 
was 3.4%.29 Following the o p e c  oil embargo in 1973, many of 
the European countries reviewed their Middle East policies and 
tried to show more understanding toward the Arab cause
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regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict thus disassociating 
themselves from the policies of U.S. and Israel. Turkey, too, 
adopted similar approaches on the political plane, but it was 
on the economic plane that it was hesitant. Although it was 
among those countries whose economies were most severely hit 
by the embargo Turkey, did not react immediately to remedy its 
already precarious economy. This hesitance stemmed not only 
from Turkey's desire not be regarded as opportunistic by the 
Middle Eastern countries but also from Turkish economic 
structure. According to one expert, during this period, 
Turkey neither had much to offer to the regional countries as 
its industrial products were not up to the desired standard, 
nor was it able to produce enough of them to be exported.30 
It was mainly as a result of the introduction of the January 
24, 1980 stabilization program and its strict application by 
the Btilent Ulusu government (1980-83) that the structure of 
Turkish economy began to change.31 Opening the economy to the 
rest of the world was one of the aims of this program. During 
the 1980-85 period, Turkey' exports to the 'Middle East 
increased very rapidly. This was enabled both by the rise in 
oil prices in 1980 and also the export promotion policies 
undertaken in line with the January 24, 1980 stabilization 
measures.
It was the changes that took place in the Turkish 
economy after 1980 that made it more complementary with the
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economies of Middle East which enabled the export boom to the 
region. Turkey's main exports to the Middle East have 
traditionally been base metals, agricultural goods and live 
animals.32 Turkey of the 1980s had an outward-looking economy 
with competitive manufactured goods such as textiles to 
export.33 Second, Turkish entrepreneurs and state officials 
became better versed in the business culture of the Middle 
East, making it easier to commence new ventures in the 
region.34
Turkey's proximity to and affinity with the Middle 
Eastern countries can also be considered to have helped 
stimulate exports. However although the same factors were in 
force during the 1970s Turkey's economic relations with those 
very countries were not good at all. In the 1973-77 period, 
when other countries, for example Korea, was able to increase 
its exports to the Middle East Turkish exports to the region 
grew very slowly.35 Following the oil embargo in 1973, 
economic relations with the Middle East became the focus of 
government attention. The objectives of 'the Turkish
government, in approaching the Middle Eastern countries, 
according to one observer, were "to secure oil, if possible on 
easy payment terms, to attract some of the new petrodollars 
for investment in Turkey and to increase exports to oil- 
producing Arab countries."36 Although it is true that the 
number of states to which Turkey exported amounted to 8 in
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1973, began to increase steadily beginning with 1974 and
stabilized around 14 partners from 1978 onwards and that the 
number of states from which Turkey imported which were only 6 
in 1973 climbed to 14 in 1981, its economy was still far from 
being structurally adopted to this trade relationship.37 
Until the 1980s, oil remained to be the crucial factor in 
Turkish-Arab economic relations. Thus it can be argued that 
Turkey became structurally adopted to growing economic 
relations with the region only during the 1980s. The
adaptation of Turkish and Middle Eastern economies to one
another was enabled by and an outcome of political
rapprochement and internal economic restructuring and not vice 
versa. It was only by the late 1980s that improvement in 
economic relations became a factor on its own and began to 
press for even closer cooperation.38
In the first half of the 1980s, the first signs of an 
adaptation began to surface. During the period 1980-85, 
Turkey's exports to the Middle East increased very rapidly. 
The rise in oil prices and Turkey's new trade1 regime were 
together responsible for this increase. Besides, the
"regional composition effect" was at work during this period, 
which meant Turkey's trading partners were growing more 
rapidly than the world trade as a whole.39 The collapse in 
oil prices in 1986 resulted in a shakedown in Turkish-Middle 
East economic relations causing Turkish exports to fall by
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$944 million, or by over a quarter.40 But the Turkish economy 
was still able to post a surplus of $421,2 million. In 1987, 
after the partial recovery of oil prices, Turkey still managed 
to post a surplus of $45,1 million.41 During the 1980s the 
volume of trade between Turkey and the Middle East, largely 
unaffected by the rise in oil prices, continued to increase. 
The volume of trade that was 17,14% in 1978, rose to its 
highest in 1982 by 34,13%. By the end of the 1980s it was 
stabilized around 19%.42 In the second half of the 1980s, 
Turkish-Middle Eastern economic relations consolidated around 
these figures, creating a more equitable basis for future 
relations.
The question that needs to be answered here is whether 
at the end of the 1980s the two interacting parties have 
become structurally adopted to the extent that they would deem 
it unacceptable to cede this interaction. Since dependence is 
measured by the "additional cost incurred from first 
attempting interaction and then retreating to autarky,"43 what 
Turkey gained from this interaction can help one to understand 
the cost of ceding it. According to one expert, the 
advantages of Turkey's economic cooperation with the Middle 
Eastern countries can be studied in two categories: positive 
impact on balance of payments; positive impact on other parts 
of the economy. It is further argued that the global increase
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in total Turkish exports was also related to the increase in 
exports to Middle Eastern countries.44
The expansion of exports to the Middle East could 
contribute two important factors to Turkey's 
industrialization process:
a) to lower the geographic concentration of 
Turkey's exports, and hence, the structure of export 
products
b) while alleviating the balance of payments 
problems.
The first can modify the structure of 
industrialization response to changing economic relations. 
The extra foreign exchange resulting assists the second.45
Furthermore, increasing trade with the region decreased 
both the geographical and commodity concentration of Turkey's 
exports.46 Turkey began to export to the Middle East what it 
could not sell to the European Community (e c ) because of the 
community's protectionist measures. Thus a significant and 
complementary economic relationship was consolidated between 
the two parties. Turkey imports energy from and exports food 
and manufactured goods to oil-exporting Middle Eastern 
countries which are net importers of food and manufactured 
goods. However, one should not emphasize too much the virtues 
of complementary economies. Although there is "a good amount 
of complemetarity among the economies of the Islamic bloc",
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thus creating a potential for economic cooperation, it
remained as excess capacity up to this day. According to one 
expert,
to come up to the level of intra-trade of the 
developing countries, the Islamic countries have 
to close a gap of up to 20% in exports; to come 
up to the level of the industrialized countries 
intra-trade, the gap is of 60%; and to come up to 
the level of developing non-oil exporting 
countries intra-trade the gap is of 35%.47
Turkish economic interaction with the Middle East is not 
limited to trade relations although it is the one that is most 
advanced among all. Turkish contracting firms operate in the 
Middle East. Worker's remittances also constitute a 
contribution to the Turkish economy. It was after 1974, when 
the migration of Turkish workers to Europe had almost ceased 
that Turkey began to supply manpower to the Middle East. 
Besides, Middle Eastern countries have financial investments 
in Turkey. Nevertheless, trade relations constitute the most 
significant and structured aspect of economic interaction.
The history of Turkey's economic relations with Israel, 
although showing a trend completely different from that of 
with the oil-producing countries of the Middle East, also 
reveal the problematic economic relations within the region. 
The fact that the two countries' economies are not 
complementary also contributes to the low level in economic 
relations between the two countries. However, the situation 
was completely different until the 1950s. During the period
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of the British mandate over Palestine, the bilateral trade, 
which tilted towards Turkey's favor, was very large to the 
extent that during years 1946-1949 Palestine was Turkey's 
third largest export market.48 During early 1950s, a degree 
of equilibrium was achieved in the trade balance especially 
due to Turkey's increasing imports from Israel. At the same 
time, Turkey's exports to the region began to decline as the 
two countries' economies began to become less complementary. 
Having itself become an agricultural exporter, Israel began to 
cut down its imports from Turkey while Turkey continued to 
purchase Israeli industrial products. In 1954 the trade 
balance between Turkey and Israel -for the first time- began 
to tilt towards the latter's favor, as a response to which the 
Turks made it known that "the present state of affairs should 
be seen as nothing more than a brief transitional period."49 
According to an expert on Israel's foreign relations, it was 
the Turks' "overweening national pride which [did] not 
tolerate slights" that prevented the relations between two 
countries from increasing.50 While the Israelis tried to 
convince the Turks that the two countries' economies were 
complementary -Turkey an agricultural one, Israel an 
industrial one- Turkey's Democratic rulers, who were not that 
happy about Israel's achievements -which was a smaller and 
younger state than Turkey was- preferred to keep relations at 
a low level. Coupled with the intensifying Arab-Israeli
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dispute which made it harder for the Turks to foster their 
ties with Israel, during the 1960s and 1970s, economic 
relations were kept at a a minimum. During the 1980s, as 
Turkey's economic relations with oil-exporting Middle Eastern 
countries gained pace, those with Israel were stabilized 
around 0,35% of Turkey's total trade volume- which was the 
lowest among all.51 The fact that the trade relations 
continued to tilt towards Israel, made the establishment of a 
structurally balanced relationship less likely. The high 
tariff rates Israel puts on Turkish exports prevents the trade 
between two countries from increasing due to the Turks' 
sensitivity not to increase the negative balance between 
Turkey's imports from and exports to Israel. Although trade 
relations between the two countries increased after the 
Israeli-Palestinian accord was signed, they are still far from 
contributing to Turkey's economic relations with the Middle 
East act as a stabilizer on Turkey's foreign policy towards 
the Middle East.
In the literature on Turkish foreign policy, it is 
argued that economic relationship between Turkey and the 
Middle East has begun to "stabilize."52 According to Robins, 
"what the last years of the 1980s showed is that there is a 
significant and complementary economic relationship to be had 
between the parties."53 Given the low level of trade between 
Islamic countries, Turkey's achievement emerges as an
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"outstanding trade success."54 In line with this thinking, 
one can safely conclude that Turkish economy became 
structurally adopted to continuing interaction with the Middle 
East, creating a stabilizing effect on Turkish foreign policy.
On the other hand, experts on Turkish foreign policy 
usually argue that it is a "liberal prejudice" to think that 
growing economic relations between Turkey and the Middle East 
will become structured to the extent that this will lead to a 
similar development in political relations. It was Turgut 
Ôzal, Turkey's prime minister from 1983 to 1989, who argued in 
line with the mood of the 1970s détente policies, that 
"economic relations..ease political tensions and pave the way 
for political agreements."55 Ôzal's argument was probably 
based on his functionalist understanding of international 
relations and his rather naive -especially when viewed against 
the background of Turkey's failing record in the Middle East- 
assumption that economic relations can continue and increase 
without being affected by but positively affecting political 
relations. The history of Turkish foreign policy towards the 
Middle East was full of examples of the weakness of this 
approach. Then Minister of Foreign Affairs liter Turkmen 
admitted in the early 1980s that economic relations with the 
Middle East could "continue to increase if [emphasis mine] 
political circumstances permit."56 What the experiences of 
the 1960s and 1970s taught to Turkish policy-makers was that
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rapprochement with the Middle East, which was a political end, 
could be achieved only through political means. According to 
Aykan,
[a]s Türkmen then implied, political 
circumstances could relate either to political 
tensions between the regional states (such as the 
negative impact the tensions between Iraq and 
Syria was expected to have in 1982 on Turkey's 
export to Iraq) or to the attitude of an 
unpredictable economic partner like Libya, which 
could cut economic relations with Turkey or 
prevent them from developing for political 
reasons.57
To use Goldmann's terminology, until the late 1980s, 
Turkey's economy was not structurally adopted to economic 
relations with the Middle East, which, if resulted in 
dependence, would have enabled one to test the hypothesis that 
economic dependence helps to stabilize a country's foreign 
policy. This is why establishing economic relations with the 
Middle East was neither the source of newly adopted Turkish 
foreign policy which foresaw showing more understanding 
towards Middle Eastern states nor the means towards 
establishing closer political relations with them. Economic 
relations with the countries of the region emerged to be a 
"side-effect" of Turkish foreign policy towards the region 
which evolved through time. And it was only after both 
parties structurally adapted to the relationship that it began 
to act as a stabilizer on the foreign policies of actors. It 
is beyond both the aims and the scope of this study to analyze 
the stabilizing effects of Turkish-Middle Eastern economic
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relations on the foreign policies of the latter. However, 
depending on the experience driven from the Gulf crisis, it 
can safely be argued that both sides showed a degree of 
restraint in their actions towards the other. This was 
especially visible in Iraqi attitudes towards Turkey. Despite 
the opposition's prophecies that Turkish-Iraqi relations will 
never be good anymore, Iraq began to make overtures to Turkey 
immediately after the end of the war. According to the 
Turkish daily Htirriyet , Iraqi Ambassador to Turkey, Rafi' 
Dahan Mujawil al-Takriti informed the Turkish Minister of 
Finance, Adnan Kahveci, in early February 1991 that Baghdad 
had abandoned its "inflexible" policy towards Turkey. He 
said: "Our ministers who are responsible for irrigation and 
trade are ready to hold talks with you whenever you wish to do 
so. We want to resolve the problems in the two fields."58
Turkey, although it did not refrain from closing down 
the pipeline, freezing Iraqi assets, and participating in the 
economic embargo against Iraq, is now among those countries 
who are trying to ease the embargo. The recent visit by 
Turkish businessmen to Iraq can be taken as a step towards 
reestablishing the economic links between two countries. Iraq 
also gives signals of its willingness to reestablish these 
relations.
In the past, Turkey's economic relations with the Middle 
East have never been problem-free. For example, when trade
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with Iran began to decline in 1986, there seemed to be two 
distinct reasons which triggered the decline. The reason 
behind the decrease in Iranian imports was the fall in Iranian 
oil revenues. For Turkey it was the new policy adopted by the 
Iranian government to require oil importing countries to 
import an additional $500 million worth of non-oil product.59 
One other event which showed the instability of economic 
relations with Iran was the duplicity of Iran regarding a 
natural gas pipeline that was to pass through Turkey. In 
1991, Turkey and Iran signed an agreement stipulating that if 
a natural gas pipeline from Iran to Europe was to be 
constructed thorough Turkey, Turkey was to purchase 4.5 
million m 3 of gas annually.60 Following this agreement, the 
Iranian authorities informed b o t a §, a Turkish firm responsible 
for the handling of the agreement, that a pipeline from Iran 
through Turkey to Europe was out of the question thereby 
limiting the project to the management of Turkey's purchase of 
Iranian natural gas and once more frustrating Turkish dreams 
to act as a bridge between the Middle East and Etirope. Later 
Iran announced its project to build a pipeline through the 
Ukraine to transport its natural gas.61
Nevertheless, Turkey continues to consolidate its 
economic relations with the Middle East. Turkey has signed 
trade agreements with Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria and 
Jordan. It has Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreements
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with Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Kuwait, the 
United Arab Emirates and Qatar. Turkish representatives hold 
annual meetings with the representatives of these countries 
(except for Qatar with which there has been no meeting yet) to 
further economic relations.62 Turkey has signed agreements to 
arrange relations in the banking sector with Iran and Iraq .
The state of trade relations between Turkey and the 
Middle East gives the first indications of a structural 
adaptation of their respective economies. The Gulf war 
experience also helps one to consolidate this view. However, 
although there is every indication to be optimistic about the 
future of economic relations there are still steps that need 
to be taken for this structural adaptation to consolidate and 
stabilize the foreign policies of the two parties. There is 
reason to be optimistic on the export side that not only 
Turkey's exports to the region has increased, but its products 
have become diversified and trading partners have increased in 
number. However, the same cannot be said about Turkey's 
imports. Although Turkey's imports from the region have 
increased, thus increasing the general volume of trade between 
the two parties, they still remain concentrated on oil.63 
Given the fluctuation in oil prices this creates a factor of 
vulnerability for Turkey's relations with the region. To 
overcome this vulnerability, Turkey's "relations with the oil 
producing countries should be directed towards other sectors
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and activities, while at the same time opening up to the non­
oil Arab countries ."64
In sum, it can be argued that economic dependence, an 
international stabilizer, which is assumed, according top 
Go1dmann's theory of stability in foreign policy, to emerge in 
the initial periods of policy stabilization, emerged rather 
later in the Turkish-Middle Eastern case. It was only during 
the late 1980s that the two parties' economies began to became 
structurally adapted to each other. Until then, economic 
dependence cannot be claimed to have acted as a stabilizer of 
Turkey's policy towards the Middle East.
4.3 Third Party
In International Politics, third parties are assumed to 
have a stabilizing effect on foreign policies of states 
through the process of coalition formation. The demands 
generated by coalition policy may stabilize a state's foreign 
policy through the following process: When a relationship is
established between two states, their respective relations 
with third parties show a tendency to change. If the 
trilateral relationship between the three parties, the actor, 
its object, and the third party evolves in the direction of 
forming a structure called a coalition, that is thought to be 
in "structural balance," (which tends to be stable) thus 
creating a stabilizing effect on actor's foreign policy.65
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The understanding that third parties have an impact on 
relations between states stems from traditional power politics 
reasoning, which assumes relations with an "other" state to 
have an impact on the relations between two interacting 
states. The other state is not an ordinary one but a 
significant other that has "weight."66 It is not necessary 
for the "other" state, which is called the "third party" to be 
a great power with an inherent weight of its own. Considering 
the problematic nature of the concept of weight, it has to 
have the capability to influence the relations between the 
two interacting parties: the "actor" and its "object".
The nature of the relationship between the parties 
(amicable, inimical) and the specific issue at stake (core, 
peripheral) are also important in determining the extent to 
which the third party can influence their acts and actions.67 
According to Rubinstein, a "state adopts to the preferences of 
the other when the issue is of marginal importance to it. 
Minimal adaptations are part of the overall influence 
relationship; they are the 'payoffs' for services1 rendered and 
are usually made since the costs are negligible."68 This is 
how "influence" is exercised when the relationship between the 
actor and the third party is amicable. If there is enmity 
between the two, the latter usually uses coercion or force to 
impose its will. Thus, the type of tactic used by the third 
party and the degree of success it will achieve depends on the
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"past tradition of friendship or hostility between their 
objectives and interests."69 While relations of consensus 
and/or overt manipulation are typical between states with a 
past tradition of friendly relations with few disagreements, 
relations of coercion and force seem to be more typical for 
the latter.70 According to Goldmann,
the extent to which the stabilizer here called 
'third parties' exist may be taken to depend not 
only on (1) the nature of the relation between 
actor and third party and on (2) the nature of 
the relation between third party and object, but 
also on (3) the weight of the third party."71
However, as mentioned before, not all third party 
relationships have a stabilizing impact on foreign policies of 
states, unless the established relationship is in a 
"structural balance." The theory of structural balance 
classifies such relations as to their being stable or 
unstable. Goldmann identifies four such sets of structures 
that are assumed to be inherently stable according to the 
theory of structural balance:
I. My enemy's enemy is my friend.
II. My enemy's friend is my enemy.
III. My friend's enemy is my enemy.
IV. My friend's friend is my friend.72
These structures are thought to be in structural balance 
and are therefore assumed to be inherently stable. "In cases 
I and II, the actor's policy toward an object is stabilized by
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concern with an enemy third party. In cases II and IV, his 
policy toward an object is stabilized by concern with an 
allied third party. All other structures are inherently 
unstable.. . "73
Since there are usually more than one third party that 
are somehow associated with the actor and its object, the 
study will content itself with an analysis of the most obvious 
ones. An analysis of the third parties involved in Turkey's 
relations with the Middle East shows that United States and 
the Soviet Union come forth as the most obvious ones. 
However, one factor that needs to be kept under consideration 
when trying to determine whether a third party tends to 
stabilize a policy or not, is whether the relationship between 
the actor and the third party was a condition of or response 
to the relationship between the actor and its object. Since 
third party reasoning is concerned with the role of coalition 
formation,74 one needs to differentiate between the two, i.e. 
the conditions of and responses to a specific relationship. 
What is relevant for this study is the 1 relationship 
established afterwards. States need not begin interacting 
after the relationship between the actor and its object has 
been established, but the trilateral relationship must have 
evolved towards forming a new structure. Thus, before going 
into the details of the relationship between Turkey and the 
aforementioned third parties, one has to determine whether or
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not these relations constitute a coalition formed/reformed 
after the establishment of the relationship between Turkey and 
the Middle East. If this condition is not met, no matter 
whether structural balance is established between the three or 
not, the third party effect would not be functioning as a 
stabilizer on Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, 
but will be a mere condition for its formulation. The role 
played by the United States and the Soviet Union will be 
analyzed separately to see whether they functioned as third 
party stabilizers on Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle 
East or not.
When tested against this latter criterion, i.e., whether 
relations with the third party was a condition of or a 
response to actor's relations with its subject, the 
stabilizing role of the United States as a third party to 
Turkey's relationship with the Middle East becomes 
questionable. Although Turkey's relations with the Middle 
East have a history that is older than its relations with the 
United States, it was after the end of the Secdnd World War 
that relations with both gained significance in the eyes of 
Turkish policy makers. Concurrently the Soviet Union entered 
the picture. Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East 
was shaped during the Cold War. Although there is truth in 
the assessment that Turkish foreign policy in general and 
Turkish policy towards the Middle East in particular exhibit a
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continuity, and that they both have been shaped by Kemal 
Atatürk during the early years of the Republican era, the fact 
that most of the Middle Eastern states were not yet 
independent at the time makes it harder to test its validity. 
Thus, it would not be too wrong to claim that Turkey's policy 
towards the Middle East was shaped in the post-World War II 
era. It was during the heyday of the Cold War that the third 
party effect was stronger as far as both the United States 
and the Soviet Union were concerned. Until 1964, Turkish 
policy makers assumed that the geopolitical and regional 
interests of Turkey and the United States were identical. 
Although what Turkish policy makers understood from alliance 
relationship was similar to those structures of positive 
relations, "my friend's friend is my friend" and "my friend's 
enemy is my enemy," it would still be premature to claim 
Turkish-U.S.-Middle Eastern relations during the 1950s to have 
become stabilized through this relationship. As the 1960s' 
adjustments in Turkish foreign policy that led to the 
formulation of the new Turkish foreign policy’ also prove, 
Turkey did not hesitate to deviate from policy suggestions of 
its ally when an issue it deemed to be important was at stake.
During the late 1940s and 1950s because Turkey did not 
attach utmost importance to its relations with the Middle East 
it did not refrain from being identified with United States 
policies.75 According to Bôlükbaçi,
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both İnönü and Menderes, considered Turkey's 
alliance with the United States essential for 
security and hence, tried to cooperate with the 
U.S., even in areas thought unimportant to 
Turkish national security interests. Turkey was 
eager, for instance, to associate itself with 
American Middle East policies during the 1950s.76
Turkey's Middle East policy until the 1960s had one 
basic aim, containment of the Communist threat in its Eastern 
and Southeastern borders. It was regarding this aim that 
Turkey and United States' Middle East policies converged. 
However, this convergence in policies occurred not after but 
at the same time  ^when Turkey's Middle. East policy was being 
shaped; Turkish-U.S.-Middle Eastern trilateral relationship 
was neither a condition for nor a result of Turkish-Middle 
Eastern relations.
According to the theoretical sketch provided by
Goldmann, Turkey's Middle East policy, in order to check 
whether it has become stabilized through third party effect, 
has to be tested as function of (l)the state of U.S.-Middle 
East relations, (2)the state of U.S.-Turkish relations, 
(3)United States' weight. An analysis of the trilateral 
relationship shows that only the second aspect was stable 
enough to fit the argument. Turkish-U.S. bilateral relations 
remained friendly until the 1990s. U.S.-Middle Eastern 
relationship, on the other hand, was too complex and volatile 
and did not lend itself to be categorized as amicable or 
inimical. Although the Arab-Israeli dispute continued to
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strain the relations between the U.S. and the Arab Middle 
East, there was always change and uncertainty about future 
relations. Only U.S.-Israeli relations remained as an island 
of stability. However, as the 1956 war showed, even the U.S. 
policy towards Israel was not stable enough to be taken for 
granted. Hence, one condition for United States' functioning 
as a stabilizer of Turkey' s Middle East policy did not come 
true.
Regarding the third aspect, although the weight of the 
third party was not questionable, for United States was 
Turkey's major ally and a super power, the history of Turkish- 
U.S. relations does not provide enough evidence to support the 
theory. The 1950s are considered to be a decade during when 
Turkey associated itself with U.S. policies in the Middle East 
to the degree that under U.S. influence it assumed the task of 
establishing the Baghdad Pact (1954). What is often forgotten 
is that Turkey did not attach any significance to the Middle 
East during the 1950s. Relations with the Middle East were 
seen within the context of East-West tension, cfontainment of 
the Soviet Union, and the role Turkey assumed in this 
process.77'78 As argued before, relations with the Middle 
Eastern states, apart from the rhetoric did not carry much 
weight.
However, to measure an influence relationship between 
two states, there must be certain parameters to be measured.
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To quote B51ukba?i, "Turkey's support of American diplomacy in 
Latin America is certainly not indicative of the influence 
relationship between the U.S. and Turkey because the issue is 
irrelevant to Turkey's security."79 Although it is true that 
the Middle East and Latin America do not carry the same weight 
in Turkey's calculations, the analogy still holds.80 Since 
Turkey was not interested in Latin American affairs and had 
nothing at stake regarding its relations with the Latin 
American states, it could act in line with the wishes of the 
United States, for it might have calculated that it could 
derive benefits without incurring any costs at all. Although 
Middle East was not as insignificant as Latin America was to 
Turkey, nevertheless Turkish policy makers did not attach 
great significance to relations with the Middle East that they 
could subordinate them to the wishes of its great power ally. 
Besides, even when the so called new Turkish foreign policy 
was formulated during mid-1960s with the utmost aim of 
strengthening Turkey's relations with the Middle East, it was 
done not for its own sake, but for the purpose1 of attaining 
Arab support for the Cyprus dispute. Thus, strengthening 
relations with the Middle East did not become a goal of its 
own until the late 1970s. Since then the relations between 
the three can be described as being structurally imbalanced, 
for from the 1960s on and particularly after the U.S. arms 
embargo on Turkey in 1974, Turkish-U.S. relations lost a lot
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of its predictability, especially within the Middle Eastern 
context. The multilateral approach introduced by the new 
Turkish foreign policy together with the détente in East-West 
tension caused Turkish-United States relations to become less 
structured. and more volatile. This change was also a result 
of Turkish resentment towards U.S. policy which was far from 
being structured in itself. According to Rubin,
In their dealings with the United States, the 
Turks learned that Washington can be reliable 
when it wants to be, but often lacks staying 
power and consistency in following thorough on a 
policy. As time goes on, the change in 
administration or even of personnel or moods 
within and administration has led to a tremendous 
instability in American policy-making. The Turks 
are wary of taking risks on behalf of the U.S. 
position only to find that it has been changed, 
or even reversed leaving them with a stance that 
is risky, or even opposed to a new American one.81
Recent findings regarding the Baghdad Pact also prove 
that even during the 1950s, when U.S.-Turkish bilateral 
relations were relatively stable, Turkey suffered from lack of 
predictability in U.S. actions. In the case of the Baghdad 
Pact, although it was the United States that initiated the 
formation of the Pact, it later preferred to stay away and 
refrained from becoming a member, for it became aware of its 
divisive effects in the region, which the U.S. policy makers 
feared, would play into the Soviets' hands.92
Thus, although the U.S. had weight in the eyes of both 
the Turks and the Middle Eastern states, thus fulfilling the 
first condition for the establishment of a structural balance
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in trilateral relations between U.S., Turkey and the Middle 
Eastern states, neither U.S.-Middle Eastern nor U.S.-Turkish 
relations were stable and predictable enough for structural 
balance to be established. It is in this sense that the 
United States, although remaining as a significant other to 
both actors, did not emerge to be a third party to stabilize 
Turkey's foreign policy towards the Middle Eastern states.
Similar but even stronger arguments can be put forward 
regarding the influence of the Soviet Union as a third party 
to Turkish-Middle Eastern relations. Although there was a 
general understanding that the Soviet Union was the greatest 
threat to Turkey's security and that the support it provided 
to Turkey's neighbors put Turkey's security at stake, a 
negative structural balance ('my enemy's enemy is my friend,' 
and 'my enemy's friend is my enemy') was never established. 
Although the relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union 
were inimical and that the Soviet Union was a super power 
holding great weight (thud fulfilling the third condition for 
structural balance to be established), the complexity of 
trilateral relationships prevented such a structural 
relationship from being established. Although the nature of 
the relationship between the actor and the third party was 
quite clear, the complexity of the relations between the third 
party and the subject, and the fact that the weight of the 
third party was quite irrelevant in terms of these relations
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prevented the Turkish- Soviet-Middle Eastern trilateral 
relationship from becoming stabilized through third party 
effect.83
From mid-1960s on, changes in the international 
environment and demands from the domestic environment both 
enabled and also led Turkey to adopt a multilateral approach 
in its foreign relations. As Turkey began to attach more and 
more importance to relations with the Middle East, the third 
party effect both in terms of the United States and the Soviet 
Union decreased. Turkey, beginning from mid-1960s began to 
refrain from being identified with United States policies in 
the region. The 1973 war is especially indicative of the 
Turkish effort that while Turkey refused to grant the U.S. 
refueling and reconnaissance facilities for airlift to 
Israel,84 it permitted the Soviet Union to use its air space 
to help the Syrian the latter's struggle against Israel. This 
caused resentment on the side of the Americans and 
deteriorated U.S.-Turkish relations. Following the 1974 
Cyprus affair, Turkish landing on the island and the ensuing 
arms embargo, together with the détente in East-West 
relations, enabled and led Turkey to further this multilateral 
policy which moved it further away from the stabilizing effect 
of third party relations. For example, during the Hostage 
crisis, U.S. request in April 1980 for sanctions to be imposed 
on Iran was met with Turkey's urge for "further patience."35
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Besides, right after the revolution, when the U.S. requested 
the placement of six helicopters in the n a t o  base at Incirlik 
as part of a plan for the deportation of American personnel 
and their families from Iran, Prime Minister Btilent Ecevit 
"accepted" the request on the conditions that Iranian 
officials would agree to them to enter into Iran, nobody other 
than the flight personnel would be present in the helicopters, 
and no military equipment would be transported from or to 
Iran.86 In the face of Turkish reply, U.S. Marines which were 
reported to have arrived at incirlik, were sent back to the 
Azors. It was later declared that the U.S. administration has 
accepted this "permission" with "gratitude".87
By the late 1970s and 1980s although Soviet power and 
influence began to grow in the Middle East, bringing back 
"traditional images of international politics" held by the 
Turkish policy makers, Turkey "continued to link its security 
to the West while eschewing the unidimensional policies of the 
1950s. The changing conditions have instead induced Ankara to 
act decisively and cautiously at the same time; without 
abandoning its multifaceted foreign policy."88 In 1981, 
Turkey refused the idea advanced by the U.S. Secretary of 
State Alexander Haig of forming an anti-Soviet coalition in 
the Middle East, which was to be based on the concept of 
"strategic consensus." Turkish government's declared position 
was that no strategic consensus could be reached in the Middle
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East unless the Arab Israeli conflict was settled.89 
Regarding the Arab-Israeli dispute, Turkey seemed to have 
covered a long way since 1950s that the Turks took care not to 
be identified with U.S. policies in the Middle East; instead 
they adopted a balanced attitude.
Following the end of the Cold War, strengthening 
Turkish-U.S. relations, ambiguously called "strategic 
cooperation" by President Turgut Özal,90 again became an issue 
in Turkish politics. Close cooperation between Turkey and the 
United States during the Gulf Crisis (1990-91) substantiated 
the argument that Turkish-U.S. relations may gain "additional 
significance" with the end of the Cold War.91 However, the 
Süleyman Demirel government that took office in late 1991 and 
the successive Tansu Çiller governments took care to distance 
themselves from the style of Motherland Party governments, 
which they considered to be acting too cooperative. An action 
they took in line with this attitude was the Turkish 
abstention- despite a personal appeal from President Bush to 
Prime Minister Demirel to vote in favor-, in the' U.N. General 
Assembly vote of 16 December 1991 on U.N. General Assembly 
resolution of 10 November 1975 which described Zionism as "a 
form of racism and racial discrimination."92
Thus, it can well be argued that Turkey's relations with 
the United States, even when they were closest, were far from 
being stable and predictable enough to enable the formation of 
a trilateral relationship between U.S., Turkey, and the Middle
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East to stabilize Turkey's foreign policy towards the Middle 
East. In the case of the Soviet Union, the trilateral 
relationship was even less predictable (especially beginning 
from mid-1960s), although there were times when the impression 
was created that Soviet-Turkish Middle Eastern relations fit 
the pattern 'my enemy's friend is my enemy' -especially 
concerning Turkey's relations with Syria.
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Chapter V: Cognitive stabilizers
According to Goldmann's theoretical sketch, a policy is 
more likely to be stable if beliefs of the policy makers about 
the policy are consistent rather than inconsistent, if the 
policy is cognitively central rather than peripheral, and if 
their beliefs about the policy are untestable rather than 
testable. Consistency, centrality and testability are 
cognitive stabilizers that operate at the individual level. 
If the individual policy makers' beliefs regarding the policy 
in question are consistent, central and untestable, i.e., 
cannot be convincingly proven wrong, the policy can be claimed 
to be psychologically stable.
Although individual policy makers' beliefs may be 
different than officially adopted beliefs, the two, 
nevertheless are not inherently opposed. Goldmann argues to 
the interdependence of the two, but admits that the degree of 
correspondence between them may never be known.1 If the 
analyst is able to draw inferences from individual policy 
makers' official statements regarding his unofficial beliefs 
about the policy, s/he may draw conclusions as to the 
consistency, centrality and testability of his/her belief 
about the policies with the ultimate purpose of understanding
whether it will help stabilize his/her country's foreign 
policy through its impact on the costs of policy change. In 
other words, if his/her beliefs about the policy are 
consistent, central and untestable, then, his/her perception 
of the costs of changing that policy will be higher compared 
to inconsistent and peripheral beliefs which can rather easily 
and convincingly be proven wrong.2
5.1. Consistency
Psychological reasoning suggests that if the policy 
maker's belief in a policy is consistent, s/he will perceive 
the costs of changing that policy to be greater and will not 
easily opt for change. According to Goldmann, "[a] fully 
consistent, policy-related set of beliefs has two features:
according to this set of beliefs, the policy is certain to 
produce the intended result, and it is not thought to have 
any counter-productive side-effects [emphasis mine]."3 Then, 
in analyzing the consistency of Turkish policy makers' beliefs 
on Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, two factors 
have to be considered at the same time: Whether or not the 
pursuit of the policy is believed to have a uniformly
favorable impact in terms of the objective the policy is
intended to serve, and whether there exists any side effects 
that are counter-productive. It is assumed that if both
conditions are met, the Turkish policy makers' beliefs about
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the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East can be 
considered to be cognitively consistent thus having a 
stabilizing effect on the policy.
As argued before, Turkey's pre-1960 policy towards the 
Middle East, which ended up with Turkey's alienation in the 
international fora, provided a negative feedback which helped 
destabilize Turkish foreign policy during the early 1960s and 
contributed to change. Cognitive inconsistency in the beliefs 
of the Turkish policy makers was one of the factors that 
helped produce negative feedback as a source of change in 
foreign policy. In this sense, Turkish policy makers' beliefs 
about Turkey's pre-1960 policy towards the Middle East were 
cognitively inconsistent since they thought it not only failed 
to produce the intended result but also produced many counter­
productive side-effects.
However, one point that should be kept in mind is that 
perception of the results of a policy by the policy makers as 
unintended or producing counter-productive side-effects also 
depends on how one defines policy objectives. ! If Turkey's 
foreign policy objective regarding the Middle East is defined 
as the attainment of Western and especially U.S. support in 
defense and economic matters alike in return for Turkish 
cooperativeness in Middle Eastern security, Turkish policy 
makers' beliefs may be claimed to have been consistent, since 
w h a t  w a s  intended was achieved through n a t o  membership and
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increasing U.S. defensive and economic assistance. Turkish 
policy makers' statements also point to this cognitive 
consistency in their beliefs about Turkey's Middle East 
policy. The Democrat Party's Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Fuad Köprülü's words is an example to this. Köprülü, in 
response to the U.S. Ambassador George McGhee's criticisms 
regarding Turkey's pro-Western policies that alienated the 
Arabs, was reported to have said that earlier, when Turkey was 
seeking admission to n a t o , the Turks felt they must be loyal to 
their new allies. Since the interests of the West frequently 
clashed with those of the Middle Eastern states, the Turks, 
feeling the near-impossibility of satisfying everyone, had 
decided that they should give top priority to their 
commitments to n m o  and the West.4 In this sense, the Turkish 
policy makers may be claimed to have been certain that the 
policy they pursued was going to produce the intended result.
Still, Köprülü's statement also hints that the counter­
productive side-effects of the very same policy were known to 
Turkish policy makers. Alienation of the Mi'ddle Eastern 
states can be considered to have been one of these counter­
productive side-effects which the Turkish policy makers 
ignored until mid-1960s when, coupled with other side-effects, 
it contributed to destabilize Turkish foreign policy towards 
the Middle East. In fact, Turkey's near-ignorance of Middle 
Eastern countries' responses to its own policies continued
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until the West failed it in the Cyprus matter. The withdrawal 
of the Jupiter Missiles from Turkey, and the U.S. failure to 
support the Turks against the Greeks, coupled with the 
infamous Johnson letter (1964) -which contributed to public 
opinion's becoming a factor of its own regarding foreign 
policy matters-, all helped convince the Turks that their 
foreign policy towards the Middle East, which they pursued in 
spite of its counter-productive side-effects, was not that 
certain to produce the intended result. Until then, the
Turks believed that their allies and especially the United 
States would support them in the face of such a problem. 
Turkish displeasement with the attitudes of its allies who 
failed to support Turkey on Cyprus, a dispute in which the 
Turks considered themselves to be absolutely right, led to 
inconsistency in their beliefs about the Turkish foreign 
policy towards the Middle East. From mid-1960s on, the 
policy's counter-productive side-effects such as the 
alienation of the Middle Eastern states, which were ignored 
until then, became more visible since the Turks came to need 
their support in the U.N. voting on Cyprus. The 
destabilization of Turkish foreign policy during early 1960s, 
in return, produced a new formulation called the new Turkish 
foreign policy.
An analysis on the consistency of the beliefs of Turkish 
policy makers about Turkey's new policy towards the Middle
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East shows that they were consistent -something, which, in the 
end, helped to stabilize Turkish foreign policy towards the 
region. As argued before, the new Turkish foreign policy, 
which emerged in the mid-1960s, was planned to stand in 
opposition to the mistakes committed during the 1950s that 
were blamed for the deterioration of relations with the Middle 
East which, in return, caused Turkey's alienation in the 
international fora concerning the Cyprus problem. Thus, the 
new Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, aimed at 
giving an end to Turkey's isolation in the U.N. through 
strengthening the relations with the Middle East. Secondly, 
Turkey, through the adoption of this new Turkish foreign 
policy, intended to follow a multi-faceted foreign policy, 
which Harris describes as the "dual effort" of trying to 
maintain a low-profile in alliance relations with the West 
while trying to keep other channels of communication open.5 
The pursuance of this multi-faceted foreign policy, when 
applied to the Middle Eastern context, required less 
cooperation with the United States regarding regional crises 
and a balanced attitude towards the Arab-Israeli dispute with 
the ultimate purpose of rapprochement between Turkey and the 
regional states.
The new Turkish foreign policy, which was designed not 
to repeat the mistakes of the 1950s, can be regarded to have 
become cognitively consistent in the belief system of Turkish
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policy makers -to the extent that their statements hinted at 
their beliefs. One of the drafters of the new Turkish foreign 
policy, Hamit Batu (Ret. Ambassador), writing in 1991, after 
the Gulf War (1990-91) argued that Turkey has been able to 
convince the Middle Eastern states of its good will and 
friendly intentions, which was the main objective of this 
policy when formulated during mid-1960s. He further argued 
that the friendly and understanding attitude of the Turks, who 
refrained from cooperating with the West or taking sides in 
regional disputes, introduced an important element of 
stability in the region, which, according to Batu, was 
"appreciated" by the Middle Eastern states.6 Thus, as can be 
deduced from Batu's words, Turkish policy makers believed that 
the new Turkish foreign policy, which came to be called the 
traditional policy during the 1980s, produced the intended 
result, which was rapprochement with the Middle Eastern 
states, i.e., being able to convince the Middle Eastern states 
of Turkey's goodwill and friendly intentions -to the extent 
that was possible. ‘
Regarding the counter-productive side-effects of the 
policy that was being pursued, Turkish policy makers did not 
seem to have faced grave problems. In fact, Turkish policy 
makers' main efforts were directed towards minimizing the 
counter-productive side-effects of the policy they have been 
pursuing. For example Turkish policy makers seem to have
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feared that rapprochement with the Middle Eastern states might 
restrain Turkey's relations with the West and United States in 
particular since this policy necessitated low-key attitudes in 
relations with the United States and minimum cooperation with 
the West in Middle Eastern crises. In attempt to overcome 
this effect, Turkey tried to maintain a balance in its 
relations with the West and the Middle East, and Israel and 
the Muslim states of the Middle East, which in turn, caused 
the Turkish policy makers to live through hard times. 
However, in the last instance, they, through minor 
adjustments, were able to maintain this balance; or so they 
believed which is still enough for the purposes of this 
analysis since what is important is what the policy makers 
believed in. Government programs of Turkish governments since 
the 1960s are also indicative of the Turkish policy makers' 
belief to this effect.7
Turkish policy makers also seem to have belief in 
Turkey's success in maintaining a link with Israel as part of 
the policy of maintaining a balance in its relations with 
Israel and the Arab Middle East. Thus, another possible 
counter-productive side-effect, that of restrainment in 
relations with Israel, seems to have been minimized in their 
minds.
The only counter-productive side-effect of the policy of 
rapprochement with the Middle East seems to be an indirect
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domestic effect, i.e., the increasing role of Islam in Turkish 
domestic life and the question it brings forth: Whether this 
policy will run counter to Turkey's secularism. Although 
successive Turkish governments took a more "flexible" stand 
regarding the application of the principle of secularism when 
they agreed to join the oic , even on a de facto basis,8 they 
nevertheless refrained from taking too flexible a stand that 
they, to this day, put reservations to the final declarations 
of the oxc meetings and also did not become a de jure member 
of the organization. In this sense they have been trying hard 
to minimize the role religion played in the making of Turkish 
foreign policy. However, they have not been that successful 
in minimizing the threats posed by Islamic ideological 
subversion attempts of Turkey's Middle Eastern neighbors. For 
example, the restraint Turkish policy makers try to show 
towards radical Middle Eastern regimes such as Iran with the 
ultimate purpose of reassuring them of Turkey's goodwill and 
friendship, from time to time, seems to backfire. Since the 
1979 revolution in Iran, Turkey has been trying1’ to show much 
restraint in its relations with Iran despite the inherent 
inconsistency between the ideologies of the two regimes, and 
Iranian attacks against Atattirk and his ideology which do not 
seem to come to an end. But, what Turkey seem to end up with 
as a result of this policy of restrainment is increasing 
number of threats emanating from Iran9 such as efforts
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undertaken towards exporting the Islamic revolutionary 
ideology and Iranian leaders' attacks against Atatiirk and 
Turkey's secularism through which they intend to threaten the 
ideological basis of Turkish democracy and suggest an Islamic 
one instead. Through pursuing such a policy the Iranians not 
only threaten Turkey's internal security but also serve an 
important domestic purpose by weakening the only strong 
alternative to their own Islamic ideology in the Middle East 
region, that of secular Turkish democracy.
To give another example, Turkey shows a similar 
restraint in its relations with Saudi Arabia, while the latter 
explicitly supports Islamist activities and activists in 
Turkey. It is in this sense that Turkey, from time to time, 
finds it hard to maintain friendly relations with the Muslim 
states of the Middle East while the latter continues to engage 
in subversive activities directed against the secular regime 
in Turkey. Still Turkish policy makers seem to be able to 
overcome these cognitive inconsistencies through methods of 
their own. For example Kenan Evren (former Chief of Staff, 
Head of State and President), in an interview he gave to 
Turkish daily Milliyet, stated that he had "good intentions" 
in establishing ties with the Arab states, for these countries 
provided much financial assistance to Turkey. He added that 
he did not, at the time, foresee any danger in establishing 
such a relationship. When Saudi Arabia's continuous
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denunciations of the secular Turkish republic and its 
characterization of Atatiirk as an enemy of Islam are 
considered, a former commander's seeing no harm in 
strengthening relations with Saudi Arabia seems "remarkable."10
However, the threat rapprochement with the Muslim states 
may pose to Turkey' s secular regime seems to be the only 
counter-productive side-effect troubling the minds of Turkish 
policy makers when laying down their policies. They take 
utmost care to minimize this effect at the cognitive level 
through maintaining and even strengthening relations with 
Israel thus proving to themselves and to the world alike that 
they do emphasize secularism in foreign policy making.
The Turkish policy makers try to minimize the threat of 
ideological subversion by radical Muslim states of the Middle 
East usually through diplomatic means, i.e., warning, from 
time to time, the heads of their diplomatic missions in Ankara 
and making declarations to the effect that 'Turkey will not 
let anyone threaten neither the ideological basis of the 
regime nor its territorial integrity or political 
independence.' Even then they take utmost care to minimize 
the possible harm it may cause on Turkey's relations with the 
Middle East. An example of this artitude on the part of 
Turkish policy makers was seen in February 1993 when a police 
operation in Istanbul revealed that a group of Islamic 
militants had been trained and sheltered in Iran before
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carrying out bloody activities in Turkey one of which was the 
assasination of journalist Uğur Mumcu. In this case, the 
Turkish policy makers preferred to play "deaf and dumb"11 and 
fell short of directly accusing the Iranian administration but 
maintained that "an Iranian connection does exist," and that 
necessary action will be taken if it is proved. It seemed 
that against all the evidence pointing to Iran, Turkish policy 
makers preferred to leave the door open so that the Iranian 
administration could make its escape. However, public 
reaction to Mumcu's assasination was so great that the Turkish 
government, which failed the nation by not even summoning the 
Iranian Ambassador to the Foreign Ministry, felt compelled to 
do something. Documents revealed by the Minister of Internal 
Affairs, İsmet Sezgin were given to Hikmet Çetin, then 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, who, in turn, handed them over to 
his Iranan counterpart; an action out of which came nothing 
since Iran denied all suggestions that it was behind such an 
act of terror in Turkey.12
The only exception to Turkey's low-key 1 attitudes in 
reacting against Iranian submissive activities was seen in 
1989 when Turkey recalled its Ambassador to Ankara for 
consultations, implying Iran to do the same; an action 
prompted by Iranian Ambassador Mottaki's participatipon to 
various WP(Welfare Party) rallies in Konya organized in 
support of student protests about the the ban on scarf in the
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universities.13 Relations between the two countries were 
restored only in 1992 and Prime Minister Demirel made his 
postponed trip to Iran.14
To what degree this counter-productive side-effect of 
continuing the policy of rapprochement with the Middle Eastern 
states affects the belief system of the Turkish policy makers 
and whether or to what extent it may lead, in the long-run, to 
cognitive inconsistency may not be known. What can be said 
after an analysis of the consistency of the beliefs of Turkish 
policy makers about Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle 
East is that they, to this day, remained consistent. In other 
words, Turkish policy makers continue to believe that the 
policy they have been pursuing is certain to produce the 
intended result of rapprochement with the Middle Eastern 
states, and that they also believe nearly all side-effects to 
be favorable. In sum, Turkish policy makers' beliefs about 
Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East can be claimed 
to have been consistent thus acting as a stabilizer on Turkish 
policies. To what extent they will continue to ‘be consistent 
will depend on the magnitude of this effect on the thinking of 
Turkish policy makers and whether or to what extent they will 
be able to minimize it.
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5.2 Central1ty
A  policy is regarded to be cognitively central, 
according to Goldmann's theoretical sketch, to the extent that 
it is believed to be linked positively to other policies.15 In 
Goldmann's words:
If the pursuit of policy PI is thought to 
facilitate the successful pursuit of another 
policy P2, then this link between PI and P2 helps 
to stabilize PI. The more such links and the 
stronger they are, the more central and hence the 
more stable PI.16
Then, an analysis on cognitive centrality of Turkish 
foreign policy towards the Middle East within the beliefs 
systems of Turkish policy makers necessitates the analyst to 
determine whether or not it is linked with other policies and 
if it is, whether these links are strong.
As argued before, during the early years of the 
Republic, Turkish policy makers did not adhere much weight to 
Turkey's relations with the Middle East. In the immediate 
post-War period, this attitude began to change that by the 
1950s, the Middle East became "the center of gravity" of 
Turkish foreign policy.17 However, relations with the Middle 
East did not become the central focus in the minds of Turkish 
policy makers for the sake of strengthening relations with 
regional states or for regional leadership purposes. What 
Turkish policy makers aimed at through taking an active stance 
in Middle Eastern affairs was to strengthen Turkey's position 
vis-à-vis the West and present Turkey as a valuable and
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faithful ally thus seeking to facilitate Turkey's becoming a 
part of the West. Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle 
East, during the 1960s, was central to the thinking of Turkish 
policy makers in the sense that it was thought to serve 
Turkey's both core objectives of 'making Turkey a full-fledged 
member of the Western European community of nations on an 
equal basis' and 'maintaining the security, territorial 
integrity and political independence of the state'. It was in 
this sense that Turkey's Middle Eastern policy became and 
remained until mid-1960s an extension of Turkey's Western 
oriented foreign policy.
The new Turkish foreign policy of the 1960s, which was 
planned to stand in opposition to the mistakes committed 
during the 1950s, emphasized multi-faceted foreign policy 
making. When applied to the Middle Eastern context, this 
policy required less cooperation with the United States and a 
more balanced attitude towards the Arab-Israeli dispute. In 
fact, Turkey's Middle East policy played the central role in 
precipitating change in Turkish foreign policy that it 
remained the only aspect of Turkish foreign policy, other than 
the policy towards the Soviet Union, undergoing restructuring 
while other policies either remained the same or underwent 
minor changes. Turkey's distancing itself from the West 
concerning Middle Eastern affairs facilitated its maintaining 
a low profile in its relations with the West in general and
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the United States in particular. In fact, it was only by 
keeping itself aloof from Middle Eastern affairs and trying to 
remain neutral in regional crises that Turkey could do without 
close cooperation with its Western allies. Although the 
relative calm that came to the region from the 1960s on was 
also a factor that enabled the. Turks to underplay their 
alliance ties, it was also because they stopped interfering 
with the affairs of the regional states that they could 
distance Turkey from the West while without putting its 
security or territorial integrity at stake. Thus, the new 
policy of remaining neutral in Middle Eastern crises served to 
facilitate the application of Turkey's multi-faceted foreign 
policy.
Secondly, the new policy of rapprochement with the 
Middle East necessitated a balanced attitude towards the Arab- 
Israeli dispute, i.e., a balance to be established in its 
relations with Israel and the Arab Middle East. This policy 
of balancing Turkey's relations with Israel and the Arab 
Middle East not only reinforced Turkey's neutrality vis-à-vis 
regional disputes but also the secular character of Turkish 
foreign policy. Turkey remained, until the Camp David Accord 
of 1979, when Egypt recognized Israel, the only Muslim state 
to have diplomatic ties with Israel. Besides, maintaining 
ties with Israel, which was, and still is, necessitated by 
this policy of balance, served an important purpose through
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showing Turkey's Western identity and even strengthened its 
position vis-à-vis the Western European countries. Moreover, 
Turkey hoped of and succeeded in gaining the support of the 
Jewish lobby in the United States through maintaining links 
and even cooperating with Israel. At the same time, the 
policy of balancing the relations with Israel and the Muslim 
Middle East provided a link with Turkey's other objectives 
such as maintaining the secular character of Turkish foreign 
policy, showing Turkey as a part of the West and strengthening 
its position in the United States Congress thus providing 
support for other foreign policy objectives and actions alike.
Thirdly, the maintenance of this balance also 
facilitated Turkey's policy vis-à-vis the Third World states 
in general since this balanced policy showed that Turkey was 
interested in their concerns such as territorial self- 
determination and independence. Besides, this helped Turkey 
to establish more stable bilateral relations with Middle 
Eastern countries that helped increase economic 
interdependence. Though not a source of Turkey's new policy 
towards the Middle East, economic concerns, by mid-1970s, 
became an important aspect of Turkey's relations with the 
region. Rapprochement with the Middle East also helped Turkey 
out of some of its economic problems, especially through 
securing oil shipments, providing work for Turkish migrant 
workers and credits and business opportunities for Turkish
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firms. Prime Minister Turgut Ozal, in his opening speech to 
the Third International Girne Conference in 1985 on Turkey-EC- 
Middle East Relations, said that
[e]conomic relations between Turkey and the Middle 
Eastern countries are growing rapidly to the 
benefit of both sides. This development 
simultaneously has a special importance for our 
relations with Europe because of the mutual 
benefit it offers.18
It is in this sense that fourthly, and maybe most 
important of all, the policy of rapprochement with the Middle 
East helped Turkey reactivate its role of a bridge between the 
West and the Middle East. The bridge role is, by definition, 
a vague one, for it necessitates more than the will of the 
actor to be implemented. In other words, if state A is going 
to act as a bridge between states C and D, not only state A 
has to have the will and necessary capability to enforce its 
will, but also states C and D should need state A to act as a 
bridge in between themselves and ask state A to act 
accordingly. During the 1950s, Turkish policy makers' main 
problem when implementing this role was Middle Eastern states'
i
lack of trust in Turkey. It was only after Turkey adopted the 
policy of rapprochement during mid-1960s that it slowly began 
to gain the trust of Middle Eastern states. Though this never 
became a friendship that Turkey could take for granted, the 
mistrust of the 1950s was largely overcome during this era. 
Thus, the rapprochement policy adopted during mid-1960s 
provided an impetus for the implementation of the bridge role,
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which enforced, in Turkish policy makers' eyes, Turkey's 
European identity. Turkish policy makers, through presenting 
Turkey as a natural bridge between the West and the Middle 
East wanted to reinforce Turkey's value to the Europeans thus 
strengthening its place in Europe. Hamit Batu, one of the 
drafters of the new Turkish foreign policy, writing in 1965, 
argued that it was only if Turkey properly "grasped" and 
"adopted" the "historically designated role" of bridge with 
all its "obligations," that its position in the Western world 
could be strengthened.19 This argument alone is enough to 
display the central position held by Turkey's Middle East 
policy and the national role of a bridge between the West and 
the Middle East.
Prime Minister Tansu Çiller's (1993- ) statement below 
also shows that the belief system of the Turkish policy makers 
still remain the same.
Applied by some to Turkey in the past, the terms 
such as 'buffer' or 'periphery' were at best 
questionable metaphors. But in virtually every 
sense, including the geopolitical, they were 
flawed then and are deeply misleading now. 
Although Turkey is situated in an area of 
physical transition on the Eurasian land mass, 
the geographic and political fact is that Turkey 
is a European country [emphasis mine]. And, the 
specter of chaos -and too often its terrible 
reality- in areas of Europe and of Asia adjacent 
to it must now command the attention that once 
was focused on what was, but is no longer, the 
Alliance's central front.
Turkey's demonstrated record of moderation, 
responsibility and commitment to international 
order in the midst of the turbulence reveals the
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best of the characteristics one wants to 
associate with a European 'mindset' and European 
outlook. Consider the dilemma for Alliance 
security were Turkey absent from the centre of 
this sea of turmoil and a nation of different 
character were in its place.20
Two conclusions can be derived from Çiller's words. One 
is that Turkish policy makers of the 1990s are more certain as 
to the European identity of their country compared to those of 
the 1960s who believed that Turkey, "due to its social 
structure., cannot be regarded as a Western country in the 
real sense of the term."21 Batu, in 1965, argued that Turkey 
was "admitted" into the e c because of its geopolitical and 
strategic situation. According to him, being the only Muslim 
"member" of the community, Turkey position was not "strong." 
This was why history and geography "designated" for Turkey the 
role of a bridge between the East and the West, which, if 
fully implemented, would "strengthen" Turkey's position in the 
Western world.22 This central position given to Turkey's 
rapprochement with the Middle Eastern states and the 
implementation of its role of a bridge between the West and 
the Middle East, which the rapprochement policy was hoped to 
facilitate, was believed to help reinforce Turkey's position 
in the Western world.
As to the second conclusion derived from Çiller's words, 
the strengthening of belief in Turkey's European identity 
seems to be the only change that seems to have emerged in the
belief system of the Turkish policy makers of the 1990s. This
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even reinforces the central position held by Turkish foreign 
policy towards the Middle East by enabling Turkey to become 
more active in implementing the bridge role. In other words, 
Turks' feeling more secure about their European identity may 
be expected to give a freer hand to Turkish policy makers in 
rapprochement with the Middle East which would, if it could, 
have further facilitated the implementation of the bridge role 
only if the question as to the operational significance of 
this role did not still remain open. Nevertheless, at the 
cognitive level, Turkish policy makers seem to have solved the 
problem as to Turkey's identity. In this sense, Turkish 
foreign policy towards the Middle East, which is thought to 
facilitate Turkey's integration into the European mechanisms 
through proposing itself as a bridge between the West and the 
Middle East or as "the open window" to Israel of the Muslim 
Middle East. Paradoxical it may seem, this policy remains 
cognitively consistent in and central to Turkish policy 
makers' beliefs thus serving as a stabilizer of Turkish 
foreign policy towards the Middle East. 1
5,3 Testability
Testability as a stabilizer of foreign policy is assumed 
to function is its absence. In other words, policy makers' 
beliefs which are untestable are assumed to be more stable,
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for they do not run the risk of being easily and convincingly 
proven wrong by discrepant information. The assumption behind 
this reasoning, one Goldmann borrows from Robert Jervis, is 
that beliefs tend to be stable, or to quote Jervis, there is a 
"universal source of inertia" in human affairs.23 Robert 
Jervis, in his well-known study Perception and Misperception 
in International Politics,24 analyzed the mechanisms that 
brought about the stability of beliefs, i.e., the various ways 
in which cognitive processes tend to confirm and enforce 
existing beliefs.25'26 However, as Goldmann also indicates, 
"jbjeliefs may change under the impact of discrepant 
information...and there is a need for a theory about the kinds 
of beliefs that are particularly likely, and particularly 
unlikely, to be stable."27
Robert Jervis lists a number of ways in which a belief 
may be untestable. According to him,
[t]he most vulnerable beliefs are those predicting 
definite, observable, short-term consequences.
If, on the other hand, anything can be taken to 
be compatible with a belief, this belief is
invulnerable___In an intermediate category can
be found beliefs that, even though testable in 
principle, can be checked only against evidence 
that is rarely accessible or against events that 
rarely occur.28
Basing his argument on Jervis' findings, Goldmann 
proposes the testability of a belief to be a function of 
" (1)the extent to which it can be falsified in principle, and
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(2)the extent to which relevant evidence is available in
practice."29
However, in analyzing the testability of a policy- 
maker' s belief about foreign policy, there is one main 
problem that has to be coped with, which is, the near- 
impossibility of being objective. Testability is "a genuinely 
subjective [emphasis mine] matter of how large an impact 
empirical evidence would have on the believer."30 But, 
although it is a difficult concept, for it cannot be observed 
objectively, it nevertheless serves an important purpose in 
understanding policy change and stability. That is why 
Goldmann's theoretical sketch suggests that "it be put on the 
agenda of the analyst concerned with a problem of foreign 
policy stability, even though judgments about the testability 
of the beliefs on which a policy is based cannot be but 
relatively speculative."31
In analyzing the testability of foreign policy beliefs, 
Goldmann, in parallel lines with Jervis, differentiates 
between beliefs about long-term goal attainment which are 
inherently untestable and beliefs about short-term goal 
attainment which can be quite testable.32 Then, in analyzing 
the testability of policy makers' beliefs about Turkish 
foreign policy towards the Middle East, one has to 
differentiate between beliefs about long-term goal attainment, 
and those about short-term goal attainment.
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When laid down during mid-1960s, the so-called new 
Turkish foreign policy was planned to serve one important 
purpose: the establishment of a multi-faceted foreign policy 
which could serve Turkey's twin core objectives of 
'maintaining Turkey's security, territorial integrity, and 
political independence,' and 'making Turkey a full-fledged 
member of the European Community of Nations' while 
underplaying ties with the West, especially the United States. 
The Turkish foreign policy makers believed that if they 
adopted this multi-faceted foreign policy they could foster 
ties with the Second and Third world states without incurring 
any costs security-wise. They also believed that this would 
help solve some of Turkey's economic problems through reducing 
its dependency. Apart from this general belief about the 
goals of the new Turkish foreign policy, the newly formulated 
Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East had some, more 
specific, goals which, the Turkish policy makers believed, 
would further Turkey's core objectives. Three specific 
beliefs on the part of Turkish policy makers can be singled 
out. These are (ranging from short- to long-term):
1. The belief that the policy of neutrality adopted
*
towards the Middle East crises will give an end to 
Turkey's alienation in the international fora and will 
enlist Middle Eastern countries' support in the U.N. 
voting on Cyprus.
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2. The belief that the policy of neutrality adopted 
towards the Middle East crises will bring about 
rapprochement with regional states.
3. The belief that -unless the conditions put forward 
earlier regarding Turkish involvement in a Middle 
Eastern crisis were fulfilled- Turkey may remain 
neutral in a Middle Eastern crisis situation without 
incurring any costs, while at the same time 
emphasizing the independent and neutral aspect of 
policy making in Turkey.
The first one, Turkish policy makers' belief that the 
policy of neutrality adopted towards the Middle East crises 
will give an end to Turkey's alienation in the international 
fora and will enlist Middle Eastern countries' support in the 
U.N. voting on Cyprus can be considered to be testable since 
it was about a short-run expectation.
Shortly after the Cyprus crisis started in late 1963, 
both Turkey and Greece brought the case to the international
J
fora. The alienation of the Turks caused by the removal of 
the Jupiters from Turkey as part of a deal between the United 
States and Soviet Union during the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
coupled with the infamous Johnson letter (June 1964) in which 
the U.S. president warned the Turks that if any Turkish action 
in Cyprus provoked Soviet intervention, Washington might not 
come to Turkey's help, convinced the Turks that they should
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become more independent in foreign policy making, which they 
hoped, would enable them to enlist international support for 
the Turkish-Cypriot cause. Accordingly, Turkish policy makers 
decided to set Turkish foreign policy on a multi-faceted 
course, an important aspect of which was rapprochement with 
the Third World and especially Middle Eastern countries, which 
Turkish policy makers regarded as potential natural allies. 
Turkey's participation to preparatory meetings for and the 
Conference of Afro-Asian states held in Djakarta in 1964 and 
in Algeria in March 1965 respectively was a part of this 
effort. As mentioned before, to compensate for its absence in 
the non-aligned conference, Turkey sent two Ambassadors to 
inform the participants of the Turkish Cypriot cause.33 Turkey 
also sent representatives and good-will missions to Third 
World states with the same purpose. In return, Turkey 
expected to enlist Middle Eastern support, which it did. 
Turkish policy makers' belief about goal attainment, in this 
case, was quite testable, not only because there was a short­
term expectation to be fulfilled, on the part of the Turkish 
policy makers, i.e., Middle Eastern support in the U.N. 
voting, but also because what was expected was something 
concrete that the Middle Eastern states would either vote in 
favor or not. In this sense, Turkish policy makers' beliefs 
were quite testable. However, given the testability of this 
belief about the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle
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East, there still does not seem to be agreement as to whether
the policy succeeded or failed to achieve what it intended to.
Resolution 2077, adopted at the end of the United 
Nations debate on Cyprus on December 1965, tested 
the success of this new Turkish foreign policy. 
Although the resolution threw the Turkish right 
of intervention granted by the Zurich-London 
agreements in 1960 into limbo, the fact that 
three Arab states supported it was interpreted by 
the Turkish leaders as a sign that mutual support 
between Turkey and the Arab world was "becoming a 
reality." However justified this optimism, it 
showed that Turkish leaders were encouraged by 
the vote.34
In fact, there are two different arguments regarding the 
success of this policy. According to Turkish policy makers, 
this vote in which six states voted with Turkey, proved the 
success of Turkish foreign policy that Turkey was no longer 
alone in the international arena. Those who argued to the 
contrary claimed that only six countries supported Turkey and 
this was not much of an achievement. Although there does not 
seem to be an agreement regarding what the "real" achievement 
of the policy was, the fact that the Turkish policy makers 
regarded it to be a success and that they carried through this 
policy can be taken as an indication of the untestability of 
their belief. In other words, although this belief about 
short-term goal attainment and what was expected seemed to be 
rather concrete, the extent to which it could be falsified in 
principle turned out to be rather low. It is in this sense 
that Turkish policy makers' this first belief about Turkish
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foreign policy towards the Middle East emerged to be 
untestable thus contributing to its stability.
The second belief of Turkish policy makers, that the 
policy of neutrality adopted towards the Middle East crises 
will lead to rapprochement with regional states, was about 
"long-term" goal attainment as indicated by its drafter Hamit 
Batu.33 According to Batu, this new policy was not to be 
pursued only on a temporary basis to gain support for certain 
political causes but on a permanent basis to gain the 
"friendship" and "intimate concern" of those countries.36 He 
added that the issue was not simply "whether or not certain 
Arab countries would feel sympathy to Turkey or love Turkey."37 
The issue for Turkey in the Middle East, argued Batu, should 
be "to represent [its].. .spiritual and physical presence" in 
the region and "obtain the respect" of regional states.39
Keeping in mind the factors that Goldmann proposes to be 
sought in analyzing any policy's testability (i.e., the extent 
to which is can be falsified in principle, and the extent to 
which relevant evidence is available in practice)', an analysis 
of the testability of this second belief shows that it proved 
to be untestable thus invulnerable. In trying to determine the 
extent to which this belief could be falsified in principle, 
it turned out that the belief that Turkish neutrality in 
Middle East crises will bring about rapprochement with 
regional states was too vague to be falsified since many
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things ranging from cordial diplomatic relations to strong 
friendship ties can be understood as rapprochement. Besides, 
in terms of expectations, Turkish policy makers did not 
include anything definite or observable. What was expected in 
Batu's words, was to "represent" Turkey's "spiritual and 
physical presence" in the region and "obtain the respect" of 
the countries of the region.39 It is in this sense that 
Turkish policy makers' this second belief about Turkish 
foreign policy towards the Middle East was untestable.
The third belief of Turkish policy makers that -unless 
the conditions put forward earlier regarding Turkish 
involvement in a Middle Eastern crisis were fulfilled- Turkey 
may remain neutral in a Middle Eastern crisis without 
incurring any costs, while at the same time emphasizing the 
independent and neutral aspect of policy making in Turkey, is 
rather untestable both because it is about long-term goal 
attainment, thus harder to test, but also because the kind of 
event against which it can be checked would rarely occur.
As argued before, the new Turkish foreign policy towards 
the Middle East implicitly included conditions to be fulfilled 
before Turkey could get involved in a Middle Eastern crisis. 
Turkish policy makers believed that unless these conditions 
were fulfilled, the fulfillment of which either meant that 
there was a grave danger against Turkey's security in the face 
of which Turkey cannot do anything but to react, or that
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Turkish involvement would not do any harm to Turkey' s policy 
goals regarding the Middle East. However, the fact that those 
conditions were rather too complex to be fulfilled in any 
crisis situation since they necessitated cooperation among the 
West and also Middle Eastern states' approval of Turkish 
action, it can safely be argued that this belief was 
untestable. Although the belief about policy was testable in 
principle, since Turkish policy makers believed that Turkey's 
neutrality in a Middle Eastern crisis would serve its 
interests only when these conditions were fulfilled which 
meant it could be tested in any situation which met the 
criteria, the fact that the situation that was being defined 
by the Turkish policy makers was rare to occur, the policy 
turned out to be untestable, thus invulnerable.
In sum, Turkish policy makers' all three beliefs about 
Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East turned out to 
be untestable. In this sense they may be regarded to have 
contributed in policy stabilization. In general, their 
beliefs were usually invulnerable not only because anything 
seemed to be compatible with their expectations but also 
because the conditions that they laid down were too complex 
that could have rarely occurred. Surprisingly all conditions 
were fulfilled in the Gulf Crisis (1990-91) and Turkish 
foreign policy towards the Middle East once again proved its 
stability by remaining more or less within the boundaries of 
the new, i.e., traditional, Turkish foreign policy.
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Chapter VI: Political Stabilizers
The political stabilizers, the third group of 
stabilizers in Goldmann's theoretical sketch, operate at the 
domestic political level. The existence of political 
stabilizers point to the possibility that foreign policy may 
be protected against pressures for change by becoming embedded 
in domestic politics thus increasing the costs of change.1 
According to Goldmann, two extreme cases may emerge due to the 
presence or absence of political stabilizers. At one extreme, 
a foreign policy may develop into a national dogma in case of 
which heresy would be a heavy burden in the competition for 
leadership and power and would therefore be unlikely to occur. 
In the face of a policy against which dissent is not approved, 
the voices that vie for change would not be heard. At the 
other extreme, a policy may have just been adopted over major 
opposition thus vulnerable to pressures for change. In this 
case, every sign of negative feedback may be exploited by the 
opposition as a weapon in the power struggle.2 What happens 
usually is something in between the two extremes that any 
policy by definition is stabilized to some extent. What 
differs is the degree of this stability which changes 
depending on the degree of the effectiveness of political
stabilizers in addition to others like international, 
cognitive, and administrative stabilizers.
According to Goldmann's theoretical sketch, the 
functioning of political stabilizers may inhibit change and 
stabilize a foreign policy through causing it to become 
embedded in the country's domestic politics. In other words, 
it may become too costly for the political actor to opt for 
foreign policy change if the policy is embedded in domestic 
politics. There are three dimensions to this embedment:
1. The degree of institutionalization, or roughly 
the extent to which the government has become 
committed to pursue the policy.
2. The degree of support, or roughly the extent to 
which the various actors in domestic politics 
support, are indifferent to, or oppose the 
policy.
3. The degree of salience or roughly the 
significance of the issue in the domestic 
political struggle.3
According to Goldmann, "[i]f a foreign policy has become
an institution, if there is national consensus over it, and if 
the issue is highly significant in domestic politics, than the 
pressure for change needs to be substantial in order to bring 
about a deviation from previous policy."4 However, the 
relationship between these three political stabilizers is 
usually not this simple but rather too complex. The three 
rarely exist at the same time. Besides, they do not always 
reinforce each other although they seem to be doing so. To 
give an example, it is possible for an institutionalized
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policy to be controversial or for consensus to exist over a 
policy that has not yet become institutionalized. It is in 
this sense that each one of the three political stabilizers 
have to be studied separately in order to assess the overall 
impact they may make on foreign policy stabilization.
6.1. Institutionalization
The mere existence of a policy on an issue may act as a 
stabilizer on a foreign policy through generating expectations 
on the part of the public opinion and external environment 
alike that the government will not act ad hoc but pursue this 
line of action unless there are good reasons to do otherwise.
The more institutionalized the policy is, the 
better the reasons for deviation have to be. In 
other words, the more widespread and the stronger 
the expectation that a policy will continue to be 
pursued, the more institutionalized this policy.5
According to Goldmann's theoretical sketch, at one
extreme there is the minimum degree of institutionalization 
which is necessary for a line of action to be defined as
policy. At the other extreme, there is the unshakable
institution to which the government would be! expected to 
adhere, come what may. The task of the analyst is to
determine where, exactly does its foreign policy stand in 
between these two extremes.6
Institutionalization is expected to affect policy
stability in two ways; one direct and the other indirect:
The direct effect is to increase the political 
cost of deviating from previous policy.
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Obviously, the larger the cost, the more pressure 
needed to bring about a deviation, other things 
being equal. The indirect effect is to reduce 
the likelihood that alternative policies are 
considered in advance, that is, the likelihood of 
contingency planning. The higher the political 
cost, the more likely the presumption that 
contingency planning is a waste of time.7
It is argued the indirect effect was more dominant in 
stabilizing the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East 
that the degree of institutionalization of the policy simply 
overrode the need and search for other alternatives. The 
direct effect has also functioned in stabilizing the Turkish 
foreign policy towards the Middle East that the "new Turkish 
foreign policy" of the 1960s became the "traditional Turkish 
foreign policy" of the 1970s and 1980s. In other words, the 
Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East was made a 
tradition thus an institution when it was, practically 
speaking, still too early for it to become one. By the end of 
the 1960s, there were references to this traditional Turkish 
foreign policy in government programs and newspaper columns 
alike. Even parallels were drawn with Atatürk's foreign 
policy to strengthen the argument for the traditional nature 
of the policy. As argued before, Atatürk's foreign policy 
towards the Middle East was one of non-involvement as dictated 
by the political circumstances. Drawing parallels with his 
policy helped the Turkish policy makers institutionalize the 
new policy. It was through this way that a 5-6 year old 
policy became the traditional Turkish foreign policy.
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In this sense, it is necessary to remember how policies 
may become institutionalized in order to see how the Turkish 
foreign policy towards the Middle East became an institution 
and was thus stabilized. According to Goldmann's theoretical 
sketch, a policy may be institutionalized in mainly three 
ways: By policy declarations, by custom, and by investment.8 
An analysis of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East 
shows that the policy has become institutionalized first by 
policy declarations and in time by custom.
Policy institutionalization through declaration usually 
emerges in the initial stages of the life of a policy when it 
is too early to establish a custom or to make investments. 
Policy declarations are simply commitments by the policy 
makers as to what actions they would take in the future. 
Policy institutionalization reduces imperatives for change 
when commitment to a policy reduces the alternatives for 
future governments through generating expectations at home and 
abroad alike that may not be failed without incurring domestic 
political costs. The degree of institutionalization of a 
policy may change depending on three variables: The authority 
of the official making the declaration, the frequency of such 
declarations, and the context in which the declaration is 
made.
An analysis of policy declarations about the Turkish 
foreign policy towards the Middle East shows that the policy,
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even by mid-1960s when it was newly introduced, met the 
criteria mentioned before for the institutionalization of a 
policy through policy declarations. To give an example, 
government programs of the Suat Hayri Ürgüplü government 
(February 1965-October 1965) and the following Süleyman
Demirel government (November 1965-November 1969) pointed to 
the change in the Turkish foreign policy. Both governments in 
their respective programs underlined their determination to 
stand against the "zümreci" (factional) understanding of
international relations when describing their policy towards 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.9 In other words, they 
reiterated their determination not to be drawn into regional 
conflicts based on the East-West struggle, which meant, within 
the Middle Eastern context, that Turkey would remain neutral 
towards Middle Eastern affairs. The government program of the 
Demirel government was more explicit on this matter when it 
stated the government's belief that being a member to a 
regional organization, i.e. n a t o , was not an obstacle to 
flourishing relations with non-aligned countries, i.e. the 
Middle Eastern states.10
The inclusion of these phrases in the government 
programs of the two governments that were in office when the 
new Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East was being 
introduced during mid-1960s is important regarding the 
purposes of this study, for they signify the degree of
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commitment of the two governments to the new Turkish foreign 
policy towards the Middle East. The authority factor which 
affects the degree of commitment of the government to a policy 
was found effective that the authority making the declaration 
was the highest one : The prime minister. Besides, the third 
factor, the context in which the declaration was made was 
also significant that it was included in the government 
program. Regarding the second factor, the frequency of such 
declarations, the analysis shows that declarations as to this 
effect were made frequently. From mid-1960s on whenever there 
was a crisis situation in the Middle East the Turkish 
government in office maintained its determination to remain 
neutral and not to cooperate with the West against the 
interests of the regional states. In this sense, the policy 
declarations of the Turkish governments maintained enough 
commitment to the new Turkish foreign policy towards the 
Middle East -to the degree that the policy could be regarded 
to have become institutionalized through this factor.
From mid-1960s on, policy stabilization1 through the 
establishment of a custom or practice in policy making became 
a factor of its own that institutionalized the policy further. 
What is meant by the establishment of a custom in policy 
making here is the creation of behavior patterns that tend to 
create expectations of consistency and continuity on the part 
of the domestic and foreign public opinion alike. Policy
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makers usually tend not to contradict a well-established 
custom for the simple reason that it would be too costly. 
Institutionalization by custom, in this sense, makes policies 
self-reinforcing, for "the mere fact that a policy is being 
pursued increases the likelihood that it will continue to be 
pursued."11
The Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, from 
mid-1960s on became institutionalized through the 
establishment of a custom not only due to the continuous 
pursuance of the policy, but also due to continuous references 
by successive Turkish governments as to their determination to 
continue to pursue this policy. As indicated before, various 
government leaders indicated the government's commitment to 
the new Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East in 
crisis and non-crisis situations alike.
However, as indicated before, the continuity in Turkish 
foreign policy towards the Middle East was an important factor 
in itself that helped institutionalize the policy. In this 
sense there was not only verbal commitment by the Turkish 
policy makers as seen in their policy declarations but there 
was also an established custom as their behavior pattern also 
proved. According to Goldmann, a shift in the government 
usually puts the stabilizers of a foreign policy to the test. 
The continuous pursuance of the new policy towards the Middle 
East by successive Turkish governments that were formed by
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different parties of the ideological spectrum, can thus be 
regarded as an indication of the degree of 
institutionalization of the policy. Then, policy stabilization 
through institutionalization of the foreign policy was a 
factor in the Turkish case, as seen in the former analysis, 
that helped stabilize the Turkish foreign policy towards the 
Middle East.
In sum, Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East 
was stabilized through institutionalization first by policy 
declarations, then through the establishment of a custom that 
made a "traditional policy" out of the "new policy" in a 
rather limited time.
6.2 Support
The degree of support for a foreign policy or the extent 
to which the various actors in domestic politics support, are 
indifferent to, or oppose the policy has direct effect on its 
stability. In other words, if the policy is supported by 
various domestic political actors the pressure for change on 
the policy has to be substantial in order to bring about a 
deviation. According to Goldmann's theoretical sketch,
the amount of support for a foreign policy is a 
function of the amount of positive support and 
opposition from each of the political forces in 
society, the contribution of each being weighted 
in terms of both political importance and 
substantive distance.12
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Since no quantitative index can be developed based on 
this definition, the analyst has to rely on his/her 
impressions of the policies advocated by the chief political 
actors and also the public opinion.
According to Goldmann, the extent of positive support 
and opposition may affect the stability of a foreign policy in 
more than one way. The one most relevant for the Turkish 
foreign policy is this: "The more positive support for a
policy, the greater the political cost of not pursuing it and, 
consequently, the more stable the policy." On the other hand, 
"[i]f opposition to a policy exists, there likely exists at 
least one preplanned alternative, and this, other things being 
equal, helps to reduce policy stability." Thirdly, the
existence of opposition to a policy implies that there are 
some who have an interest in taking note of, and spreading 
information about changes in the conditions for the policy as 
well as negative feedback. In other words, "[t]he stability 
inherent in very selective perception of the environment is 
less likely to obtain if there is no opposition than if 
everybody supports the policy or is indifferent."13
In order to assess the degree to which support may act 
as a stabilizer on Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle 
East, one has to determine the extent of positive support or 
opposition to the policy. After doing this, the next step 
should be to understand how it affects the stability of
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foreign policy. However, it is not an easy task to determine 
the amount of opposition to a policy and the extent to which 
it may affect policy stability. Both positive support and 
opposition to government's policies may come from various 
segments of the society. Although different in terms of 
political importance and substantive distance, each political 
force in the society has something to say for or against the 
policies of the government. Since it is not possible within 
the limits of this analysis to study the views of all 
political forces in the society, the best research strategy 
seems to be to study the views of the political parties. It 
is assumed that in a parliamentary democracy like Turkey, the 
differences and similarities between the policies of political 
parties will reflect prevailing trends in the country at 
large. This approach seems to be more relevant also if one 
sticks to the view that the role of Turkish public opinion on 
foreign policy making is visible only when drawing the 
boundaries within which the policy must be shaped. It is 
further suggested that public opinion does hot have any 
positive or negative effect on policy making in Turkey; nor 
has it the capacity to pave the way for radical changes.14 
Then, a study on the prevailing trends in foreign policy views 
of Turkish political parties will give an idea as to the 
degree of support for Turkish foreign policy towards the 
Middle East and to what extent this mat stabilize the policy.
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Turkey' s policy towards the Middle East was established 
in mid-9160s at a time when Turkish foreign policy in general 
was under attack by various segments of the society. It was 
by early 1960s that Turkish foreign policy lost its bipartisan 
nature. Thanks to the liberal constitution of 1961, dissent 
became tolerable. However, this should not be taken to mean 
that criticisms on foreign policy matters were not tolerated 
until the 1960s. It was rather that there was a general 
consensus among the government and opposition alike that 
foreign policy was a matter above party politics if not a 
"taboo."10 This not only stemmed from the nature of the single 
party rule lasted until 1946, which did not tolerate 
deviations that would alter party discipline but also from the 
general belief among Turkish policy makers and members of 
opposition alike that the policy that was being pursued was 
the "right" one. According to Deringil, This was also due to 
the historical conditioning of Turkish policy makers.
In the early Republican era, the Ottoman 
political conditioning of the governing elite led 
them to suppose that the natural form of rule was 
by diktat. Their socialization as military men 
or bureaucrats had not provided them with any 
instinct for democracy.16
Following the Second World War, with the introduction of 
multi-party regime, this political atmosphere which equated 
criticism with dissent and even treason came to an end. 
However, foreign policy continued to remain a matter above 
party politics after 1946 and "resisted the general process
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which was leading towards democratization of political 
decision-making, and the change in the character of the state 
elite that went with it."17 Although the development of the 
multi-party system in the post-1946 era led to "the first 
crack in the unity of the Turkish elite,"18 the crack was not 
wide or deep enough to cause foreign policy to lose its 
bipartisan nature. Besides, both the RPP and DP agreed that 
foreign policy remain above party politics. Even after the 
May 27, 1960 coup, which left nothing untouched in the 
domestic political arena, foreign policy remained an 
exception. It was not only the politicians but also the elite 
that argued against a change in foreign policy or simply did 
not discuss about Turkish foreign policy. Thus, although both 
the domestic political environment and the external 
environment were favorable for a discussion to be started 
about Turkish foreign policy, neither the politicians, nor the 
elite seem to have taken this chance.19 It was only by mid- 
1960s that Turkish foreign policy lost its bipartisan nature 
and became a matter of party-politics.
Within this environment, the Turkish foreign policy 
towards the Middle East became the focus of criticisms. 
Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, which was 
blamed for Turkey's alienation in the United Nations voting on 
Cyprus came under immense criticisms from the rightist and 
leftist circles alike. Surprisingly, however, what came out
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of these discussions, the new Turkish foreign policy towards 
the Middle East, again became a matter above party-politics 
once it was adopted. According to Kurkgtioglu,
[During the 1960s] a pro-Arab policy in the Middle 
East was probably the only foreign political 
issue on which all political forces in Turkey, 
from the extreme right to the extreme left, all 
agreed albeit due to different, and sometimes 
even conflicting reasons.20
Thus, even during times when it came under immense 
criticism there was some kind of agreement on Turkish foreign 
policy towards the Middle East that even when it changed, a 
consensus emerged afterwards that still remains unaltered. 
Since the 1960s, the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle 
East can be claimed to have been stabilized. Goldmann argues 
that "[t]he more positive support for a policy, the greater the 
political cost of not pursuing it."21 On the other hand, if 
there is opposition to a policy this means there likely exists 
at least one preplanned alternative or, if not, there are 
people who have an interest in taking note of and spreading 
information about the changes in the environment, and negative 
feedback thus causing the policy to become less and less 
stable.22
As argued before, the first reasoning fits the Turkish 
case that Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East may 
be argued to have become stabilized since the amount of 
support for the policy increased, in time, the political cost
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of not pursuing it. This is especially true for the mid-1960s 
when the policy was first introduced, and early 1970s when 
political support was even greater. However, by mid-1970s 
criticisms to Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East 
as well as Turkish foreign policy in general increased from 
far right and left alike. Goldmann argues that "if opposition 
exists from both the left and the right to a center policy, 
the two may cancel each other out."23 It is in this sense that 
the criticism of the extreme left and right which took harsh 
stance against the Turkish foreign policy during the 1960s may 
be understood to have canceled each other out. What is 
interesting to note is that both the left and the right voiced 
nearly the same criticisms against the Turkish foreign policy 
towards the Middle East. Both seemed to want Turkey to be 
more pro-Arab in the Arab-Israeli dispute, and to refrain from 
cooperating with the West in Middle Eastern crises. Maybe it 
is because both the extreme right and the left agreed upon 
these criticisms that they were not strong enough to 
destabilize Turkish foreign policy towards the'Middle East. 
Besides, the opposition never proposed alternative policies to 
be pursued other than Turkey's leaving n a t o , disassociating 
itself from the West and Israel and becoming the "natural" 
leader of the Middle East. Furthermore, since "a modest 
amount of opposition" is considered to be "more stabilizing 
than perfect consensus," Turkish foreign policy towards the
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Middle East can be considered to have become stabilized 
through this process.
With regard to the parties closer to the center of the 
political spectrum, their opposition to the Turkish foreign 
policy towards the Middle East never became so great to pose 
an alternative to the existing policy. On the contrary 
opposition parties usually argued for more strict adherence to 
already agreed upon principles of Turkish foreign policy that 
led one foreign observer to argues that:
[0]n most foreign policy issues there is normally 
a broad consensus of opinion across most of the 
Turkish political spectrum. Naturally, there are
differences of emphasis---In general, however,
policy has been oriented towards the protection 
of accepted national interests and has thus 
helped to maintain the consensus. In other 
words, when talking of Turkish foreign policy one 
can, in most cases, talk of "Turkey" or "the 
Turks" without having to say which section of 
public opinion one is referring to.24
Although some argue to the contrary, this nature of 
Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East did not change 
with the end of the Cold War or after the end of the Gulf 
Crisis (1990-91) . It is true that stronger Opposition to 
government's foreign policy was voiced both during and after 
the crisis. It is also true that this was the first time 
foreign policy became an issue for public discussion. 
Although this may be regarded as "a contribution the Gulf 
Crisis made to the Turkish democracy, "25 the extent of this 
contribution should not be exaggerated since what was being
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discussed was not about the policy itself, as would be 
expected, but rather about the way through which this policy 
was pursued. It became such that after all the aura that was 
caused after the Gulf War, the substance of Turkish foreign 
policy towards the Middle East was left untouched. Two 
reasons may be discerned for this lack of real discussion 
about the substance of Turkish foreign policy towards the 
Middle East. The first one results from the nature of public 
opinion in Turkey. Although people have their own views about 
government's policies, the fact that they lack even basic 
knowledge about foreign affairs prevents public opinion from 
becoming a force of its own.26 Secondly, the politicians also 
lack the necessary background to keep up with the unfolding 
events in the international arena and to put forward 
alternative policies the presence of which could have 
destabilized the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle 
East. This is true for both the past, and unfortunately, the 
present. During the Gulf Crisis, the criticisms of the 
opposition largely concentrated on the personality of the 
President and the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of 
the way he conducted foreign policy. Lack of enough knowledge 
about the ongoing of events should not be an obstacle for the 
members of the opposition when trying to decide about their 
own positions, argues Soysal in his book titled Parliament and 
Foreign Policy.27 According to him, opposition parties usually
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use this as an escape for their inability to produce 
alternatives for government policies. What Soysal pinpoints 
to in criticizing the RPP opposition to DP governments's 
policies is a deficiency of Turkish political parties that 
they have not been able to overcome even today.28
Apart from the extreme right Welfare Party (WP), no 
other party seems to have alternatives to the existing Turkish 
foreign policy towards the Middle East. The fact that the 
WP's plan foresees Turkey to become a leading power in 
establishing "the Union of World Muslims" towards creating a 
"just order" in the world, is indicative of the inability of 
the Turkish opposition to produce alternative policies.29
Thus, although there does not seem to be an enthusiastic 
support voiced for Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle 
East, the fact that there does not exist a strong opposition 
with preplanned alternatives or with the capacity to monitor 
the environment leads one to the conclusion that Turkish 
foreign policy towards the Middle East has been and still 
likely to be stabilized with the help of the functioning of 
support as a stabilizer of foreign policy.
6.3 Salience
The salience of an issue can be shortly defined as its 
significance in the domestic power struggle. The salience of
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a policy signifies "the extent to which the patterns of 
domestic coalitions and cleavages would be affected by an 
actor's changing his position on it."30 Accordingly, if a 
policy is considered to be salient in the domestic political 
arena, this means that more will be at stake if the actor 
tries to make any changes on it.
According to Goldmann's theoretical sketch, political 
salience as a stabilizer of foreign policy has an indirect 
effect on the stability of the policy. It is assumed to act 
as a stabilizer of foreign policy through reinforcing the 
stabilizing impact of institutionalization and support.
On this assumption, even a highly 
institutionalized and consensual policy 
vulnerable to disturbances if the actors in 
domestic politics deem the issue to be 
politically trivial. If they consider the issue 
to be politically salient, it matters more the 
extent to which a policy has become 
institutionalized as well as whether it is 
consensual or controversial.31
It is in this sense crucial to assess the salience of a 
policy in the domestic political arena to see whether it is 
salient enough for significantly reinforcing the impact of 
institutionalization and support. Since salience is not a 
concept easy to operationalize, Goldmann proposes two methods 
for its measurement. One method is to measure the attention 
the policy receives in the political arena. The other method 
is to examine the changes in conditions and cleavages that 
have occurred or of debates about their eventuality.32 Still,
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if a policy is found to be politically salient, it does not 
necessarily mean that the policy will likely be stabilized. 
It only means that, if the actors consider the issue to be 
politically salient, it matters more the extent to which a 
policy has become institutionalized as well as whether it is 
consensual or controversial. Accordingly, even a highly 
institutionalized and consensual policy may be vulnerable to 
disturbances if the actors in domestic politics deem the issue 
to be politically trivial.33
An analysis of the salience of the Turkish foreign 
policy towards the Middle East shows that the issue, i.e., 
Turkey's relations with the Middle East is considered by the 
actors in Turkish political arena to be politically salient. 
Although there is usually little political controversy about 
Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, the fact that 
there is usually little political controversy about Turkish 
foreign policy in general is indicative of Turkish political 
actors' tendency to view foreign policy matters to be above 
party-politics as well as their lack of enough background 
about foreign policy matters, which reinforces the first 
tendency. It is this nature of Turkish political parties, 
mentioned before, which leads one analyst to argue that
the question of which one of the.. .[political 
parties] will rule singly or in coalition through 
the next decade is likely to be an insignificant 
[emphasis mine] factor with respect to the basic
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values, objectives, calculations and instruments 
of Turkish foreign policy.34
This is not because foreign policy is not an issue of 
little political salience in Turkish domestic politics, but 
because there is usually little controversy about foreign 
policy matters in general. The same can be argued for Turkish 
foreign policy towards the Middle East that there is little or 
nor controversy, as argued before, about it.
Although salience in the sense of amount of controversy 
is not what one looks for when analyzing the degree of 
salience of a foreign policy, the fact that the other two 
methods proposed by Goldmann do not seem to produce any 
results, leads one to the conclusion that one can also resort 
to measure the amount of controversy during the course of 
his/her analysis, as can be seen here.
The two methods proposed by Goldmann, as mentioned 
before, were the measurement of the attention the policy 
receives, and an examination of the changes in coalitions and 
cleavages that have occurred or of debates about their 
eventuality.35 Given the fact that foreign policy matters have 
not, as a tradition, been made a matter of debate in the 
Turkish political arena and that even when they are debated it 
is usually about the style through which the policy is 
conducted rather than its substance, it would be futile an 
effort to search for clues as to the salience of foreign 
policy issues, and about relations with the Middle East in
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particular, when forming coalitions and cleavages or holding 
debates.
Regarding the amount of attention Turkish foreign policy 
towards the Middle East receives, an examination of government 
programs shows that the issue is not paid much attention in 
comparison to other more controversial issue like relations 
with the United States. References to the policy towards the 
Middle East, which cover three paragraphs at the most, usually 
evolve around the same phrases -no matter what political party 
comes to power- like 'Turkey's commitment to a just and stable 
peace in the Middle East,' or like 'Turkey' s wish that the 
Arab-Israeli dispute would be given an end.'36
However, although both methods Goldmann proposes to be 
used when analyzing the degree of salience of a foreign policy 
point to "insignificance" of Turkish foreign policy towards 
the Middle East in domestic power struggle, this should not be 
taken to mean that it is not salient. One is tempted here to 
repeat one peculiarity of Turkish foreign policy which is that 
it is considered to be a matter above party politics. This is 
not only because, as argued before, that foreign policy is 
considered to be a taboo -usually due to security reasons 
which stems from the tendency of the Turkish policy makers to 
equate foreign policy with the national security policy-, but 
also because the political actors do not have the necessary 
background to follow the ongoing international events, let
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alone proposing alternatives to the existing policy. This 
peculiarity, or rather deficiency of Turkish political actors 
give rise to a situation that seems to be unforeseen by 
Goldmann, in case of which the policy is politically salient 
but this is not reflected in policy statements or government 
programs.
The salience of Turkish foreign policy towards the 
Middle East was seen during the Gulf Crisis (1990-91) when the 
Motherland Party government and President Ôzal's policies were 
criticized with the claim that they constituted a deviation 
from traditional policies.37 This controversy was caused not 
only because of the significance of the issue, for Turkey's 
security for even participation in the war was considered to 
be one of the alternatives, but also because of the belief 
among the opposition parties in the "correctness" of the 
traditional policy that they did not tolerate a deviation even 
in style. Besides, since the traditional Turkish foreign 
policy towards the Middle East was equated with Atatürk's 
foreign policy, any deviation was presented as a deviation 
from the Kemalist legacy, which is, in itself enough to make 
an issue politically salient in the Turkish context.
Thus, although unable to be detected through Goldmann's 
methods, Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East 
emerges to be politically salient in the Turkish political 
arena, though not in the power struggle, except for crisis 
situations which do not seem to alter the rule. It can be
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argued, building upon these findings, that the salience of 
Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East increases the 
stabilizing effects of institutionalization and support with 
the help of the peculiar nature of Turkish foreign policy and 
Turkish political actors.
173
Chapter VII: Administrative Stabilizers
Goldmann's suggestion that administrative phenomena may 
function as stabilizers of foreign policy rests on the 
assumption that the administrative tasks of intelligence, 
planning, decision-making and implementation may be carried 
out in such a way that inhibits change.1 In the absence of 
administrative stabilizers, i.e. bureaucratic inertia, the 
following may take place:
1. Changes in policy conditions and negative feedback are 
discovered immediately.
2. Alternatives have already been prepared, or are 
promptly invented.
3. A decision to change policy can easily be made.
4. This decision is fully implemented without delay.2
Leaving implementation aside, which is 1 not included 
within the bounds of Goldmann's theoretical framework (for the 
simple reason that it is assumed to be less problematic in the 
foreign policy process in the implementation of decisions, for 
once the decision to change has been made, it is unlikely to 
be seriously distorted by foreign ministry officials), only 
intelligence, planning and decision-making processes will be
taken into consideration when looking for stabilizers of 
foreign policy.
Goldmann, in his theoretical framework discerns four 
administrative stabilizers of foreign policy. Two of them, 
fragmentation and decision structure, are structural in the 
sense that they concern the structure of the administrative 
apparatus. The other two, critical variables and response 
repertory are substantive in the case that they concern the 
substance of what the apparatus is doing.
The administrative stabilization of a foreign policy is 
assumed to take considerable time and to be contingent on its 
previous international, cognitive and political stabilization. 
Until now, it has been argued that most of the stabilizers 
included in Goldmann's theoretical sketch seemed to be 
functioning on the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle 
East. The fact that the policy has not been changed, i.e., 
stabilized, since the mid-1960s hint that the administrative 
stabilizers have also been effective throughout this process. 
The administrative stabilizers are assumed ' to be less 
effective during the initial stages of a policy since policy 
makers usually have incentives to maintain their sensitivity 
to the environment as well as the availability of other 
alternatives.3 In the later stages of a policy, where the 
Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East is now, 
administrative stabilizers emerge and usually take hold of the
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ongoing of events. To what degree they may inhibit change in 
foreign policy depends on their strength to detect which they 
have to be studied separately.
It is in this sense that the distinction made between 
the structural and substantive administrative stabilization of 
a foreign policy becomes meaningful. According to Goldmann, 
whose study includes an analysis the stability of détente, 
since parties (the Soviet Union, United States, and West 
Germany) had interest in avoiding the administrative 
stabilization of détente, the number of variables in the 
critical range was high and the tolerable ranges tended to be 
small. In other words, the respective governments of the 
Soviet Union, United States, and West Germany were very 
receptive to developments in their external environment that a 
large number of variables remained critical. "[0]ur antennas 
are big and constantly operating, " said one German observer 
when described Germany's détente policy. The same was true 
for the U.S. and Soviet policy makers. It is in this sense 
that substantive stabilization of détente seemed a low 
probability.
This condition, which Goldmann terms as "the existence 
of a stabilization bias to the detriment of détente", can be 
claimed to have been absent in the Turkish case. The Turkish 
bureaucratic elite, on the contrary, were in favor of the 
stabilization of new Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle
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East, just like the Turkish politicians were. However, since
the task here is not to identify the intentions of Turkish 
foreign policy bureaucrats, leaving the ontological 
impossibility of such a task aside, one should retain with 
pointing out that substantive stabilizers of Turkish foreign 
policy towards the Middle East were active from the very 
beginning. For the definition of the policy and its laying 
down of strict principles, however undeclared, indicated 
Turkish policy makers' willingness to utilize substantive 
stabilizers in stabilizing the policy. The rest was left to 
the making of bureaucratic inertia and time.
7.1 Fragmentation:
Fragmentation falls into the category of administrative 
stabilizers which means that administrative growth may 
stabilize a policy through hindering the discovery of new 
patterns. Although growth may increase the capability for 
data collection thus contribute to policy process, "the 
correlation between the amount of available 'data and the 
visibility of important features may be negative."4 Besides, 
organizational compartmentalization, which follows, may 
inhibit communication and coordination, and may render 
planning cumbersome. Furthermore, standard operating
procedures, which may be created to cope with administrative 
growth can inhibit the discovery of the unexpected as well as
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innovation and improvisation.5 The only remedy for policy 
stabilization through fragmentation seems to be the 
establishment of an effective coordination mechanism to 
connect separate parts of the organization. According to 
Goldmann, this is very important to overcome the loss of 
perspective inherent in compartmentalization and also to be 
able to benefit from the investment made in increased 
capacity.6
The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs is neither very 
large nor fragmented. It has 740 officials working in 13 
different departments specializing on different regions and 
issue areas.7 The department responsible for bilateral 
relations with the Middle East and Africa is one of these 13 
departments. Until the 1980s there was no separate department 
working on relations with the Middle Eastern states that all 
fell under the responsibility of the department of bilateral 
relations. Thus the Ministry of Foreign Affairs cannot be 
considered to be too large or fragmented. However, although 
this is the case, that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not 
large or fragmented enough to impede any change, fragmentation 
still functions as a stabilizer of Turkish foreign policy 
towards the Middle East albeit in a different way.
The problem of fragmentation in Turkish foreign policy 
towards the Middle East emerges as a result of the 
multiplicity of governmental institutions involved in the
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foreign policy process, and the problem of lack of
coordination that ensues. In Turkey, foreign policy 
bureaucracy comprises the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
Ministries of Defense and Finance (regarding issues that deal 
with their respective subjects), the Councillory of the 
National Intelligence Organization (MÎT), the National 
Security Council (MGK), the Councillory of Treasury and 
Foreign Trade, and also the Military. These governmental 
institutions are all involved in different stages of foreign 
policy planning and decision making concerning matter which 
fall under their jurisdiction. Although it seems quite 
natural that these institutions participate in the foreign 
policy process, the fact that their participation is usually 
uncoordinated complicates Turkish foreign policy structure and 
results in a problem of lack of coordination.
The origins of this problem of lack of coordination in 
the making of Turkish foreign policy go back to the 1960s. 
The experience of the 1950s, especially the unchecked nature 
of Turkish-U.S. relations had led the coup makers of May 27, 
1960 to blame the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for this state 
of relations and to curtail the powers of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, which until then was able to remain quite 
independent of other governmental institutions. The Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, which until 1960 had the authority to 
coordinate policies in political, economic and military issues
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alike, was left nearly powerless by the 1960 coup. The 
Ministries of Defense and Finance and the Military took over 
the powers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding their 
areas of interest, and began to participate in the foreign 
policy process in a rather active manner.8 After the 
establishment of the National Security Council with the 1961 
constitution, foreign policy making in Turkey became utterly 
complicated which resulted in the problem of lack of 
coordination.9 Although the National Security Council is 
supposed not to participate in foreign policy making but to 
make recommendations to the executive on national security 
matters, the fact that foreign policy is usually equated with 
national security policy, especially by the military circles, 
resulted in the military's gaining an upper hand in the 
Turkish foreign policy process.10 The primary reason for this 
has been the nature of the Middle East as an unstable region 
and the fact that Turkey's three Middle Eastern neighbors 
constitute, in one way or another, threats to Turkey's 
security. Moreover, the lack of initiatives in Turkish 
foreign policy towards the region also reinforced the 
convergence of security policy and foreign policy,
A legacy of the 1960 coup, the problem of lack of 
coordination in foreign policy making was further reinforced 
by the 1971 and 1980 coups which tended to reinforce the role 
of the military. The powers of the National Security Council
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were increased by a decree dated 1983. The Motherland Party 
governments, which tended to curtail the economic powers of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through the creation of the 
Councillory of Treasury and Foreign Trade, also contributed to 
the weakening of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
It is as a result of this fragmentation in foreign 
policy process that Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle 
East can also be claimed to have been administratively 
stabilized. In fact the Turkish foreign policy towards the 
Middle East is a perfect example of how fragmentation impeded 
change in Turkish foreign policy. This is especially because 
regarding the Middle East, foreign policy and security policy 
easily converges in the minds of the military and civilian 
bureaucracy alike for the simple reason that three of the 
Middle Eastern countries as Turkey's neighbors constitute a 
threat to Turkish security. Thus, the military more easily 
and directly got involved in foreign policy making when the 
issue is Middle Eastern affairs. When ministries of Defense 
and Finance are added to this, fragmentation emerges to be a 
policy stabilizer on Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle 
East.
As mentioned before, stabilization through 
administrative fragmentation can be remedied. In fact, to 
find the optimum balance between fragmentation and 
coordination has been a continuing concern for most states
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facing this problem. However, in the Turkish case, no 
government institution seems to be capable of pulling the 
strings together, something which impedes change in foreign 
policy. To sum up, three factors can be claimed to have been 
contributed to administrative fragmentation function as a 
stabilizer on Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. 
The first one is the continuing fragmentation of Turkish 
bureaucracy regarding the policy towards the Middle East. The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Intelligence 
Organization, the National Security Council, ministries of 
Defense and Finance and the Military are all included to some 
extent in the foreign policy process. The second factor is the 
inability of the Turkish bureaucracy to remedy the problem of 
coordination. In fact, there is no clue as to this problem's 
being recognized as a problem by the Turkish policy makers. 
Although outside observers of Turkish foreign policy point to 
this problem of lack of coordination in foreign policy 
making,11 no remedy seems to have been found. Nor is there any 
sign that it is being searched for by the Turkish policy 
makers. The third factor is the dominant role played by the 
Military in foreign policy process. The role of the military 
is especially strong in the decision-making stage which causes 
Turkish foreign policy to be dominated by national security 
concerns. The view of the military that security policy is 
too important to be left in the hands of politicians or their
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"irresponsible wrangling with each other"12 is also indicative 
of their inclination to dominate the foreign policy process.
The domination of the military also results in the 
weakening of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs vis-à-vis the 
other government institutions, which contributes to the 
conservatism in the Ministry. Unable to conduct policies on 
its own, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs tends to stick with 
the existing ones. Another result of this domination is the 
politicization of many foreign policy issues, especially 
economic ones, which would otherwise be considered technical.13 
As a result of the functioning of these three factors, 
administrative fragmentation emerges and remains to be an 
irredeemable problem of Turkish foreign policy and Turkish 
foreign policy towards the Middle East alike. It is 
throughout this process that fragmentation acts as a 
stabilizer of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East 
to further stabilize an already stable policy.
8.2. Critical Variables:
In Goldmann's theoretical framework, critical variables 
are assumed to be important in assessing the stability of a 
foreign policy for they determine the degree of receptivity of 
the administration to developments in the external 
environment. The size of tolerable ranges, in a similar 
fashion, have an impact on the responsiveness of the
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administration to external developments. In other words, the 
critical variables and tolerable ranges determine what and 
what not to take into account when monitoring the environment.
The rules as to the number of critical variables and the 
size of the tolerable ranges are called standard operating 
procedures. In Goldmann's theoretical sketch, it is taken for 
granted that administrations generate standard operating 
procedures through time. It is not only administrative growth 
that necessitates the establishment of standard operating 
procedures but also the pursuance of a policy in itself may 
automatically generate them regardless of whether the 
administration has grown or not. Thus, it is assumed that 
written or unwritten rules may emerge in the course of a 
foreign policy as to what are the critical variables, i.e., 
rules as to what to take into account when monitoring the 
environment. Accordingly, it is further assumed that rules 
will also be likely to emerge about tolerable ranges, i.e., 
rules as to the degree up to which changes in the values of 
the critical variables would justify reconsidering current 
policies.14
Goldmann puts forward three suggestions regarding 
foreign policy stabilization through the functioning of 
critical variables:
First, the fewer the number of critical
variables, the more stable the policy, other
things being equal....
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Second, the larger the tolerable ranges, the more 
stable the policy...,.
The main utility of knowledge about critical 
variables and tolerable ranges, however, lies in 
their telling us about the kind of stress to 
which the policy is vulnerable. The more we know 
about critical variables, the more we know about 
the factors that may trigger a change in the 
policy as well as about the factors unlikely to 
do it. The more we know about tolerable ranges, 
the more precise these conclusions.15
Since it is not easy a task to learn about the critical 
variables of a foreign policy, for the foreign policy 
bureaucrats themselves usually do not know about or cannot 
explain them, one has to retain with impressions in his/her 
analysis of foreign policy declarations and actions.
As argued before, Turkish foreign policy towards the 
Middle East, from the very beginning, was intended to be a 
stable policy. This not only stemmed from the Turkish Foreign 
Ministry officials' well-known "conservatism" and 
"cautiousness",16 which are personality traits that lead them 
to minimize the number of critical variables. The general 
understanding among the Turkish foreign policy bureaucrats 
alike that foreign policy and security policy ■ converged on 
matters regarding the Middle East also reinforced the 
stability that they tended to minimize the number of variables 
by restricting them to only those variables about Turkey's 
security. Although foreign policy is a concept that embraces 
security policy, in the rather peculiar Turkish case, the two 
are understood to be convergent largely due to the domination
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of the military, the conservatism of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs officials, and also the civilian governments' curbing 
down of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' . To put in other 
words, it is as a result of the domination of security 
concerns when laying down foreign policy that the number of 
the critical variables are low.
The domination of security concerns in Turkish foreign 
policy towards the Middle East can easily be deduced from an 
analysis of the earlier mentioned principles of Turkish 
foreign policy towards the Middle East. As argued before, 
Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East operates 
largely on an action-response framework17 in which initiatives 
towards changing the environment are kept at a minimum or they 
simply do not exist at all. Although "Turkey needs to develop 
a favorable milieu in which threats are minimized and economic 
interdependence maximized",18 the series of principles, which 
Turkey adopted during the 1960s and strictly followed well 
until today, dwell on the security aspect of Turkey's 
relations with the region. The creation ‘ of economic 
interdependence emerged as a foreign policy principle of 
Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East only during the 
mid-1980s as a result of Prime Minister Ôzal's initiatives.
A response-oriented policy should not be expected to 
have many critical variables to monitor the environment for. 
An analysis of the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle
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East shows that the numbers of critical variables are very 
few. Turkish policy makers usually concentrate on the security 
aspect of the developments when monitoring the environment. 
This is what Kâmuran İnan terms as the "defensive diplomacy" 
in his analysis titled Foreign Policy. According to İnan, 
Turkish foreign policy lacks initiatives but concentrates on 
defense- in both strategic and diplomatic meanings of the 
term.19
Those developments in the region that do not constitute 
a direct threat to Turkey's security are readily ignored by 
the bureaucracy, who, as argued before, tend to continue the 
existing policy. Thus, Turkish bureaucrats may be claimed to 
have a tendency to restrict the number of critical variables 
that may lead Turkey to get involved in a Middle Eastern 
crisis. It is in this sense that they, when monitoring the 
environment, concentrate on security threats rather than 
opportunities for the enhancement of bilateral relations or 
for strengthening Turkey's bid for the bridge function between 
the West and the Middle East. Thus, any development in the 
Middle Eastern environment is expected to constitute a threat 
for Turkish security for it to be considered by the Turkish 
bureaucracy. This is all the more true for the military which 
dominate the foreign policy process for the time being that it 
is them who tend to emphasize the security aspects of 
developments.
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However, critical variables, although few in number, 
cannoc be claimed to have a strong stabilizing effect on 
Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, for the 
tolerable ranges do not seem to be as small as they have to 
be. Although Turkish bureaucrats' definition of a 'threat to 
Turkey's security' is not large or complicated enough to 
include threats other than military threat, the same cannot be 
argued for the size of tolerable ranges. According to 
Golamann, the larger the tolerable ranges, the more stable the 
policy. In other words, the tolerable range, for the small 
number of critical variables that are considered when 
monitoring the environment, are not very large. The tolerable 
ranges tend to be even smaller when it is a matter of increase 
rather than a decrease in threat to Turkey' s security. This, 
in a way, stems from the low number of critical variables that 
those very few which are included in the bureaucrats' list are 
only about Turkey's direct security interests. That's why 
Turkish bureaucrats do not tolerate any increase in the threat 
posed to Turkey's security. If it was not - a matter of 
security but a less salient issue like the Peace Process in 
the Middle East, Turkish bureaucrats may be expected to be, 
and are, more tolerant to the ups and downs of the 
negotiations. It was the same when the Camp David Peace 
Accord between Egypt and Israel was being worked out during 
the late 1970s that Turkey did not show more than minimum
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interest in the negotiations. In sum, although the tolerable 
ranges tend to be small, for Turkey does not tolerate even the
smallest threat to its security, which is the single most
important issue around which the critical variables
concentrate, the fact that there are very few number of
critical variables to concentrate on when monitoring the
environment contributes to the stabilization of the foreign 
policy towards the Middle East.
8.3 Response Repertory
Planned alternatives to the existing policy may be 
available in the form of opposition policy as well as 
bureaucratic programs. The former has already been considered 
when discussing the stabilizer called support, and it has been 
concluded that in the Turkish political context the opposition 
parties do not present planned alternatives to the policy in 
force, i.e., the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle 
East. What Goldmann proposes to be considered as another 
stabilizer of foreign policy, called the resporise repertory, 
is of the second type of planned alternatives. In this sense, 
response repertory is those contingency plans prepared by the 
foreign policy bureaucracy. Goldmann argues that
"[hjypothetically, a shift to a new policy is facilitated 
[emphasis mine] by the preexistence of this option in the 
repertory of responses." Thus, the presence of contingency
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plans may have a destabilizing effect on foreign policy 
especially in crisis situations. However, the opposite 
situation, the complete absence of contingency plans is also 
not that stabilizing, for "[i]f no contingency plans exist, a 
policy may break down completely under stress rather than be 
modified." 20 It is in this sense, argues Goldmann, that the 
stability of a foreign policy may benefit from the existence 
of planned moderate alternatives.
However, it is more than hard a task to know about the 
presence and the contents of contingency plans. Although 
knowledge of the response repertory could have been useful, if 
at all possible, in forecasting the likelihood of change that 
may occur in the foreign policy of the state concerned, since 
it is unlikely to be accessible, the analyst has to retain 
with his/her knowledge about the impact of other stabilizers.
Although it is true that some hints as to the content of 
some contingency plans may be achieved, but they may also be
gravely misleading, for "[o]ccasional insights will not
!'
suffice, since the absence of plans is as significant as their 
presence [emphasis mine]." It is in this sense that Goldmann 
proposes response repertory not to be included in an analysis 
of foreign policy stability. According to him, it is, in 
itself, very useful to know "what one would need to know but 
cannot know."21 This is why response repertory as a stabilizer
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of foreign policy retains its place in the theoretical 
framework.
In line with Goldmann's argument, response repertory as 
a stabilizer of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East 
will not be analyzed within the bounds of this analysis. 
However, although one may never be sure of their presence or 
absence, it will be kept in mind that "the existence of 
planned moderate alternatives" may have stabilizing effect on 
the policy.
8.4 Decision structure
In the literature on foreign policy decision making, the 
rational actor model is usually contrasted with the 
bureaucratic politics model. According to the rational actor 
model, the leader selects the best alternative proposed by the 
"leader-autonomous groups" who engage in an uninhibited search 
for alternatives. This proposition implies that this kind of 
decision making facilitates change, for the best alternative 
may not always be the continuation of the existing policy. 
If, on the other hand, decision making involves bargaining 
among various parts of the foreign policy bureaucracy, as 
implied by the bureaucratic politics model, it will be more 
difficult to vie for change; the policy will more likely be 
stable.22
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Therefore, knowledge of the way in which foreign policy 
decisions are made, about whether to deviate from the policy, 
will help the analyst to understand better what would happen 
to the policy if there is a pressure for change.
If such a decision is likely to be made in a 
leader-autonomous group formation, this helps to 
make the policy unstable; if it will probably be 
made by means of bargaining among delegates, this 
helps to make it stable. Thus, to associate a 
decision structure with a policy means to predict 
the process by which decisions about the policy 
will be made.23
It is common, in the literature on Turkish foreign 
policy, to associate the bureaucratic politics model with the 
Turkish foreign policy. Furthermore, the lack of change in 
Turkish foreign policy is usually explained with reference to 
the decision structure -and the impact of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs bureaucracy in particular. According to 
Gonltibol, Ministry of Foreign Affairs bureaucracy has a 
stabilizing impact on the Turkish foreign policy through the 
traits of over-cautiousness and dignity it imposes on the 
decision making process.24
1
However, as argued before, it is not only the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs bureaucracy that is involved in the foreign
policy process. As indicated before, the Ministries of
Defense and Finance, the National Security Council, the
Councillories of National Intelligence Organization, and
Treasury and Foreign trade, and also the Military are all 
involved in this process. Since foreign policy decisions are
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made as a result of the bargaining among various parts of this 
huge bureaucracy, each having veto power concerning veto 
powers over matter related to themselves, the foreign policy 
decision structure of Turkish foreign policy can be regarded 
to have stabilizing impact on Turkish foreign policy in 
general, and Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East in 
particular.
As argues in previous sections before, it is not only 
the fragmentation of the foreign policy bureaucracy that has 
stabilizing impact on Turkish foreign policy towards the 
Middle East; it is that no remedy such as coordination among 
several parts of the bureaucracy has been found. The lack of 
any hint as to any search that has been going on to find a 
remedy for this problem, it is argued, stems from the peculiar 
decision structure of Turkish foreign policy. It is because 
each part in the Turkish foreign policy bureaucracy wants to 
dominate the foreign policy process that no mechanism for 
decision making has been found. Thus, what is going on within 
the Turkish bureaucracy is something more than "bargaining 
among various parts of a bureaucracy". The "rivalry"25 among 
various parts of the Turkish foreign policy bureaucracy 
usually makes itself felt as a continuous struggle for 
domination in the foreign policy process. This makes two, 
both stabilizing, impact on Turkish foreign policy in general, 
and the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East in
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particular. The first impact is on the fruition of Turkish
foreign policy bureaucracy. As a result of the relentless 
struggle going on for domination in daily political matters, 
Turkish foreign policy comes to lack long-term plans towards 
the achievement of its foreign policy goals.
The lack of planning is Turkish foreign policy is known 
to all.26 According to an observer of Turkish foreign policy 
towards the Middle East, the policy did never include long­
term action plans, but usually emerged to be a policy of 
adopting low-key attitudes toward developments in the region.27 
Since the rivalry in the Turkish foreign policy bureaucracy is 
not for better long-term planning but for daily gains, it 
lacks information and task forces relevant for long-term 
planning. It is as a result of these deficiencies that 
various parts of the foreign policy bureaucracy do not come up 
with anything but continue to dwell on the very same matters 
in an attempt to keep up with the daily challenges. One 
should not expect such a decision structure not to have 
stabilizing impact on Turkish foreign policy in general and 
the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East in 
particular.
As mentioned before, the continuous struggle among 
various parts of the Turkish foreign policy bureaucracy has a 
second impact on the stability of Turkish foreign policy 
towards the Middle East, which is further reinforced by its
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first impact. It is argued here that Turkish foreign policy 
towards the Middle East has been stabilized not only by the 
decision structure but also because the rivalry among various 
parts of the bureaucracy is not for change but for continuity. 
An analysis of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East 
and the Turkish foreign policy towards the recent Gulf Crisis 
(1990-91) shows that the tendency in the bureaucracy was for 
restraining the President; what was being argued was whether 
to restrain him less or more. During the Gulf Crisis, it was 
President Ozal, as the head of the executive, who vied for 
some change in the policy while the bureaucracy tried to pull 
him back. The resignations of Head of General Staff Necip 
Torumtay, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Bozer and the 
Minister of Defense Sefa Giray can be regarded as attempts to 
restrain President Ozal's enthusiasm to get involved, in one 
way or another, in the Gulf War, by people who were under 
stress because of their inability to find a mid-way -other 
than resignation- between the conservatism of their respective 
bureaucracies and the pro-active attitudes of the' President.
It is in this sense that the decision structure of the 
Turkish foreign policy bureaucracy is regarded to have a two­
fold stabilizing impact on Turkish foreign policy towards the 
Middle East. The policy is stabilized not only as a result of 
the struggle among various actors of the bureaucracy that try 
to outbid each others' policies, but also due to the nature of
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this struggle that it is usually for continuing the existing 
policy when in the face of demands for change.
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Chapter VIII: Conclusion
Goldmann's theoretical framework suggests the 
following when describing what a highly institutionalized 
Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East would be 
like:
• There would be binding treaties prescribing the 
relations between Turkey and the Middle Eastern 
states in a precise and noncontradictory fashion.
• Turkey would have become highly dependent on 
continuing interaction.
• The relations between Turkey and the Middle
Eastern states would be supported by strong common 
enmities and friendships.
• The Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle
East would be based on consistent ideas.
• The Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle
East would occupy a central position in the belief 
systems of Turkish policy makers.
• Foreign policy-related beliefs of the Turkish
policy makers would be untestable.
• Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East
would be highly institutionalized. •
• There would be strong support for Turkish foreign
policy towards the Middle East, and little or no
opposition against it.
• The issue of Turkish foreign policy towards the
Middle East would be highly salient in domestic 
politics.
• The administration would be fragmented without 
remedies.
• The critical variables would be few, and the
tolerable ranges would be large.
. There would be no alternative in the response 
repertory, or the existing alternatives would be 
moderate ones.
• Decisions about whether and how to modify the 
Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East would 
have to be made by a -decisionmaking process of the 
delegate type, i.e., by foreign policy bureaucrats 
who do not have the authority to make any changes at 
all.
What needs to be considered is whether and to what 
extent these propositions were fulfilled, i.e., whether 
the thirteen stabilizers outlined above were functioning 
to stabilize Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle 
East.
It was expected in the beginning that several of 
these stabilizers would be found to have contributed to 
the stabilization of Turkish foreign policy towards the 
Middle East. This reasoning stemmed largely from the 
analyst's observation that Turkish foreign policy towards 
the Middle East has been a stable policy which proved to 
be able to resist pressures for change. Thus, it was 
assumed that the stabilizers proposed by Goldmann in his 
theoretical framework would be found to 1 have been 
effective in stabilizing Turkish foreign policy towards 
the Middle East.
Separate analyses of the impact of these stabilizers 
on the stability of Turkish foreign policy towards the 
Middle East have been made the preceding parts of the 
study. And it has been found that nearly all of these
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stabilizers have contributed to the stabilization of
Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, which to 
some extent explains the continuity in the policy.
However, what is crucial regarding the purposes of 
this study is to see the overall impact made by these 
stabilizers. The need to consider all stabilizers of a 
foreign policy stems from the reasoning that all have to 
be kept under consideration when analyzing its stability 
and the likelihood for change. If only one stabilizer is 
taken into consideration, one may be able to account for 
one action. For example it can easily be claimed that 
Turkey did not join the embargo imposed by the United 
States on Iran for the simple reason being that it has 
good economic relations with Iran, something which it does 
not want to lose. But this reasoning does not enable one 
to account for Turkey's cutting down the Kerkuk-Yumurtalik 
pipeline to join the anti-Iraqi camp during the recent 
crisis in the Persian Gulf (1990-91) . But if one can 
explain the overall impact they make on policy stability 
one can also become able to account for the future. It is 
in this sense that an overall analysis of the overall 
impact made by Goldmann's thirteen stabilizers have to be 
made.
It was stated earlier that the typical process of 
foreign policy stabilization starts at the international
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level, whereas administrative stabilization takes place 
toward the end of the process. "From international 
agreements and third party relations via dependence, 
cognition, and domestic politics to "bureaucratic inertia" 
-this is the essence of foreign policy stabilization 
according to the model."1 However, as an analysis on the 
stabilizers of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle 
East showed, the policy was first stabilized not through 
international stabilizers but through cognitive and 
political stabilizers of foreign policy. This largely 
resulted from the nature of Turkish foreign policy towards 
the Middle East that it was the endresult of Turkish 
policy makers' attempt to outdo the policies of the past 
and also because it was a consensual policy that the 
cognitive and political stabilizers of the Turkish foreign 
policy towards the Middle East were there and functioning 
when the policy was first established. However 
paradoxical it may seem, when contrasted with Goldmann's 
theoretical sketch, the international stabilization of 
Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East emerged in 
the later stages of the policy.
In fact, the overall stabilizing impact of 
international stabilizers was found to be low in the case 
of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. 
Normative regulation cannot be claimed to have stabilizing
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effect on Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East 
for the simple reason being that there is no extensive 
regulation of the relations between Turkey and the Middle 
Eastern states. The fact that both Turkey and the Middle 
Eastern countries are members of the oic does not create a 
strong normative regulation of Turkey's policies, for oic 
is not strong an organization to make its decisions 
binding; besides Turkey is not a de jure member of the 
oic. However, the fact that Turkey's participation as a 
de facto member to the meetings of the oic has created 
expectations on the part of the Muslims states and that 
Turkey finds it increasingly hard to fail these 
expectations and to act alone, creates a psychological 
impact that has stabilizing impact on the Turkish foreign 
policy towards the Middle East. Thus normative regulation 
did not and still does not have any stabilizing effect on 
the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East with 
the exception of the psychological impact its membership 
to the oic creates.
Regarding the impact of dependence as a stabilizer 
of foreign policy, it can be argued that economic 
dependence, which is assumed to emerge in the initial 
periods of policy stabilization, emerged rather late in 
the Turkish-Middle Eastern case. It was only during late 
1980s that the two parties' economies became structurally
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adopted to each other, though not a great extent. Until 
then economic dependence cannot be claimed to have acted 
as a stabilizer of Turkish foreign policy towards the 
Middle East.
The stabilizing impact made by third party as a 
stabilizer of foreign policy is even less, if not non­
existent. Turkey's relations with the United States, even 
when they were closest, were far from being stable and 
predictable enough to enable the formation of a trilateral 
relationship between the U.S., Turkey and the Middle 
Eastern states to stabilize Turkish foreign policy towards 
the Middle East. In the case of the Soviet Union, the 
trilateral relationship was even less predictable although 
there were times when the impression was created that 
Soviet-Turkish-Middle Eastern relations fit the pattern 
'my enemy's friend is my enemy' -especially concerning 
Turkey's relations with Syria.
The overall impact made by international stabilizers 
on Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East seems to 
be rather low contrary, to the premises of Goldmann's 
theoretical framework as argued before. When dependence 
and normative regulation, albeit of a limited degree, 
began to function as stabilizers of the policy, the 
Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East has already 
become stabilized to some extent through the impact of
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cognitive and political and later administrative 
stabilizers. This seems to support the argument made 
before that the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle 
East, from the beginning was intended to be a stable and 
consistent .policy, as indicated by the name 'traditional 
Turkish foreign policy' it was given when it was only a 
few years old.
Such an argument necessitates a more detailed 
explanation of the cognitive stabilization of Turkish 
foreign policy towards the Middle East. In the analysis, 
the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East was 
found to be consistent in the sense that the Turkish 
policy makers believe that the policy they pursue is 
certain to produce the intended result. They also believe 
nearly all side-effects to be favorable, except for a 
counter-productive side-effect of the growing impact of 
Islam in Turkey and the Middle Eastern states' support for 
this phenomenon. Although the beliefs of Turkish policy 
makers on the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle 
East were found to be consistent, thus stabilizing the 
policy, it should be indicated here that the stabilizing 
impact of consistency, in the future, will depend on the 
degree to which Turkish policy makers will be able to 
overcome this counter-productive side effect.
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Centrality as a stabilizer of Turkish foreign policy 
towards the Middle East can also be claimed to be 
effective since the policy is central to the thinking of 
Turkish politicians not only because it serves Turkey's 
core objectives, or reinforces its secular character and 
its role as a bridge between the West and the Middle East, 
but also because it reinforces Turkey's European identity 
through enabling Turkey to present itself as a valuable 
ally of the West. The strengthening of Turkey's European 
identity also contributes to Turkey's relations with the 
Middle East; the two processes tend to reinforce each 
other. Though this is not a problem-free process, the 
fact that, it is central to the thinking of Turkish policy 
makers, however paradoxical it may seem, reinforces the 
stabilizing impact of centrality on Turkish foreign policy 
towards the Middle East.
Of all the three cognitive stabilizers of Turkish 
foreign policy towards the Middle East, testability 
emerges to be the strongest one since it fits fully the 
criterion Goldmann puts forward, i.e., that Turkish policy 
makers' beliefs on Turkish foreign policy towards the 
Middle East are untestable. The untestability of Turkish 
foreign policy towards the Middle East, together with 
other two cognitive stabilizers contribute to the further 
stabilization of the policy.
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Interestingly, the cognitive stabilization of 
Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East was the 
first to evolve through the overall process of policy 
stabilization. This largely stemmed from the fact that it 
was a well-elaborated policy, a product of the Turkish 
policy makers' decisiveness to formulate a policy that 
would not repeat the mistakes of the previous years. This 
is why it was consistent in and central to the minds of 
the Turkish policy makers.
Political stabilization of Turkish foreign policy 
towards the Middle East also came early, contrary to 
Goldmann's propositions. This also stemmed from the 
peculiar character of the Turkish foreign policy towards 
the Middle East that, from the beginning, it was intended 
to be a consensual policy. As argued before, when it was 
first introduced it was the single issue on which 
political parties from the extreme left to right alike 
agreed on. In the following years Turkish foreign policy 
towards the Middle East was to become further stabilized 
through the functioning of political stabilizers albeit 
for different reasons. Firstly, the Turkish foreign 
policy towards the Middle East met all the criteria for 
Institutionalization, to function as a foreign policy 
stabilizer that it was institutionalized first by 
declarations and then by custom. As a result,
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institutionalization made a direct and an indirect effect 
towards the stabilization of the policy. The direct 
effect, as argued before, was that institutionalization of 
the policy increased the political costs of deviation from 
the existing policy. The indirect effect was to eliminate 
the need for contingency plans that the absence of 
alternatives helped stabilize the policy. In sum, Turkish 
foreign policy towards the Middle East was stabilized 
through institutionalization first by policy declarations, 
then through the establishment of a custom that made a 
'traditional policy' out of the 'new policy' in a rather 
limited time.
Regarding the impact of support as a foreign policy 
stabilizer, it can be claimed that although there does not 
seem to be an enthusiastic support voiced for the Turkish 
foreign policy towards the Middle East, the fact that 
there does not exist a strong opposition with preplanned 
alternatives or with the capacity to monitor the external 
environment in search for signs of negative feedback, 
leads one to the conclusion that Turkish foreign policy 
towards the Middle East has been and is still likely to be 
stabilized with the help of the functioning of support as 
a stablizer of foreign policy.
The third form of political stabilizer salience does 
not have a direct impact on the stability of foreign
206
policy but tends to strengthen or weaken the stabilizing 
impact of institutionalization and support. In the case 
of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, it is 
found that the policy is salient to the degree that it 
reinforces the stabilizing impact of institutionalization 
and support, in line with Goldmann's proposition.
As argued before, institutionalization, support and 
salience as stabilizers Turkish foreign policy towards the 
Middle East, did not emerge in the later stages of the 
stabilization of the policy that these three were 
effective from the very beginning. One can even argue as 
to the "mutual reinforcement between cognitive consistency 
on the one hand, and institutionalization and support on 
the other."2 Goldmann argues that development in thinking 
and of domestic politics may go hand in hand, something 
which seems to be the case in the stabilization of Turkish 
foreign policy towards the Middle East that cognitive and 
political stabilization of the policy seems to have went 
hand in hand.
Regarding the administrative stabilization of
Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, which is 
assumed to come later in the process of policy 
stabilization, the willingness of Turkish bureaucrats for 
stabilization of the policy, once it has been agreed upon, 
may be claimed to have sped this process, which otherwise
207
might have taken some longer time. In this sense, 
cognitive and political stabilization, as Goldmann has 
foreseen, enforced the administrative stabilization 
Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. 
Fragmentation as a stabilizer of foreign policy was 
effective from the very beginning and since no remedy has 
been found to the problem of lack of coordination it 
caused, it continues to function as a stabilizer of 
Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East.
The number of critical variables, the second type of 
administrative stabilizer, was found to be low. The fact 
that tolerable ranges for these critical variables are not 
large, as necessitated by Goldmann's theoretical 
framework, did not prevent critical variables from acting 
as a stabilizer of Turkish foreign policy towards the 
Middle East that those variables were all about security 
matters for which small tolerable ranges can be tolerated.
Response repertory is not included in the analysis 
as proposed by Goldmann who argues that it is useful to 
know what one would need to know but cannot know. What 
should be kept in mind regarding the response repertory is 
that its presence as well as absence has destabilizing 
impact on foreign policy, and that the presence of a 
moderate alternative may be the most stabilizing one.
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Regarding decision structure as a stabilizer of 
foreign policy, one can argue that the bureaucratic nature 
of the decision-structure contributed to the stability of 
Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. The 
bargaining, or the rivalry between various parts of the 
Turkish foreign policy bureaucracy, over the years 
contributed to the stability of policy through impeding 
the production of long term plans and averting the 
politicians' demand for change.
In sum, Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle 
East, as seen in the summary analysis above was stabilized 
through the overall impact of the thirteen stabilizers of 
foreign policy. The fact that the steps through which 
they were expected to function were disordered is 
indicative of the peculiar characteristic of Turkish 
foreign policy towards the Middle East that it was 
intended by its drafters, from the very beginning, to be a 
stable and consistent policy. Since a shift in the 
government is usually assumed to put the stabilizers of 
foreign policy to the test, the continuous pursuance of 
the new Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East by 
successive Turkish government formed by different parties 
of the ideological spectrum can be regarded as an 
indication of the degree of the institutionalization of
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the policy, i.e., that the stabilizers of Turkish foreign 
policy towards the Middle East were very effective.
In this sense, Goldmann's hypothesis that "the 
variety of phenomena included in the sketch help to 
stabilize foreign policies",3 was also confirmed, i n ‘that 
they were found to be effective in stabilizing Turkish 
foreign policy towards the Middle East. The fact that 
their order was found to be reversed in the Turkish case 
may point to the significance of cognitive stabilizers on 
the stability of foreign policies as seen in the Turkish 
example. In this sense it can be proposed that cognitive 
stabilizers may reinforce the stabilizing effects of other 
stabilizers if they emerge in the early stages of the 
process of policy stabilization.
Regarding the stability of Turkish foreign policy 
towards the Middle East and its future implications, the 
analysis of the stabilizers of the policy showed that the 
policy is stabilized by more than ten stabilizers, which 
not only explains why it remained unchanged to this day, 
but also implies that they will continue to stabilize the 
policy in the near future. As argued before, the only 
problem regarding the functioning of the stabilizers of 
Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East remains to 
be the counter-productive side-effect of the growing 
impact of political Islam in Turkey. The argument here is
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that, the future stability of Turkish foreign policy 
towards the Middle East will depend on to what degree 
policy makers will be able to cope with this side-effect 
(both the domestic and also the external aspects of the 
matter) and the potential destabilizing impact it presents 
to the stability of Turkish foreign policy towards the 
Middle East. Turkish public opinion and policy makers 
alike are very sensitive about the secular characteristic 
of Turkish foreign policy that a deviation on this matter 
will not be tolerated. That is why Turkish policy makers 
have to become able to cope with this inconsistency and 
the impact of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle 
East on this matter.
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